REALITY AND TRUTH

IN THOMAS OF YORK

Study and Text

by

John Patrick Edgar Scully

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JOHN PATRICK EDGAR SCULLY

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REALITY AND TRUTH IN THOMAS OF YORK: STUDY AND TEXT

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BIOGRAPHICAL

1925	--Born, Admaston, Ontario
1946	--B.Sc., St. Patrick's College
1946-48	--School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto
1948	--M.A., University of Toronto
1948-49	--Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Niagara University
1949-50	--School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto
1950-52	--Instructor, Department of Philosophy, De Paul University
1952-58	--Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
1952-53	--School of Graduate Studies, Marquette University
1958-	--Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Liberal Arts, University of Ottawa
1959-60	--School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto

THESIS

Reality and Truth in Thomas of York: Study and Text

(Abstract)

Thomas of York was a member of the English province of the Franciscan Order who wrote around the middle of the thirteenth century. He became a master at Oxford in 1253, and lectured there possibly until 1256, when he was appointed the sixth regent of the Franciscan Studium at Cambridge. The approximate date of his death is generally set at 1260.

His principal work is the Sapientiale, most of whose seven books, with the exception of Book VI, have been edited in doctoral theses submitted at the University of Toronto since 1951. The present thesis consists of an edition and study of Book VI, which has hitherto remained only in Gothic script dating from the first half of the fourteenth century. The earliest of the three extant manuscripts used for the edition, Florence, Conv. Sopp. A. 6. 437, was chosen as basic.

If we view the history of Western philosophy as a perennial dialogue between platonism and aristoteliamism, Thomas of York can be said to have written the Sapientiale at a unique moment in that history. For Christian thinkers, it marks the first time that a wholesale confrontation with aristotelianism was even possible. Previous to the spread of the Latin translations from the Arabic during the first half of the thirteenth century, the philosophical works of Aristotle were, for the most part, unavailable to the Latin West. One of the most distinctive features of Thomas of York is the extent to which he, a Franciscan schooled in the Christian platonism of Augustine and Anselm, endeavours to assimilate the thought of 'the Philosopher'. Thomas of York was aided in this task by the neoplatonic character of the Jewish and Arabian writings that entered the West in translation along with Aristotle, notably those of Ibn Gabirol, Avicenna and Averroes.

The natural learning of Aristotle was probably the factor that gave Thomas of York the philosophical inspiration for the Sapientiale,--an inspiration distinguishing it from the customary theological commentaries and summas of the age. In this monumental work, Book VI occurs at the end of a general metaphysics that is preceded by a natural theology and followed by a special metaphysics, or philosophy of nature and man. It is devoted to an appreciation of created being as found in reality and in the truth of the human mind.

The investigation is conducted through a study of opposites into which being is divided. These opposites are principally the one and the many, potency and act, truth and falsity. By this method, which recalls the method of dichotomous division in Plato's Dialogues, Book VI treats of four major topics that have recurred in philosophy from ancient to modern times: actual being in terms of one or many; potential being and secondary causality; the nature of truth; and finally, the nature of knowledge.

Throughout his consideration of these topics, Thomas of York is mainly concerned with upholding the perfection of creatures, instead of emphasizing their manifest imperfection when contrasted with the absolute perfection of

God. Subordinate to this concern, yet closely allied to it, is the theme of unity, which is woven into the whole fabric of his thought.

In his treatment of actual being, he adopts the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, common to Augustine and Gabirol, according to which all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal, are composed of matter and form. The forms received by successively less perfect matters proceed from God as light proceeds from the sun, with the result that a hierarchy arises of specifically different kinds of form. First, there is the spiritual form of angels and human souls; then, the incorruptible forms of heavenly bodies; and finally, the corruptible forms of bodies confined to the earth.

Against this background, Thomas of York develops his philosophy of being, with the aid of the De Unitate, a treatise of Gundissalinus. A creature exists only when its intrinsic principles of matter and form are joined together to constitute a unity. The principle of this unity within the individual is form, but the unity that it possesses and gives to matter and the composite comes from another. Ultimately, this 'other' is God. For corporeal beings, however, there is a source of unity second to the Divine, but first among creatures. This is the spiritual form of angels and human souls, from whose unity is derived the unities by which all creatures exist. Accordingly, although reality is materially many, insofar as different kinds of matter receive unity in a variety of ways, it is formally one by virtue of the unity of spiritual form.

In keeping with Gabirol, Thomas of York seeks to attribute sufficient being and perfection to the passive potency of matter in corruptible bodies for a created agent to bring this potency readily into act. Moreover, as in the thought of his renowned contemporary, Bonaventure, the movement from potential to actual being is further facilitated by the presence in matter of active potencies or incomplete forms. These forms are not wholly actual. If they were, as in the doctrine of the latitatio formarum of Empedocles, there would be no need for generation or generating agents. On the other hand, they are not just passively present in the potency of a matter that simply receives forms from an avicennian dator formarum, for this would destroy the aristotelian notion of nature as an intrinsic active principle of change. Instead, they are present in a manner that avoids the error of these extremes; they are present as incompletely actual forms that can be brought to completion by secondary causes. These forms, described by Averroes as 'active natural potencies', are none other than the 'seminal principles' of Augustine. According to Thomas of York, the unity of these potencies or principles, taken collectively, constitutes what Aristotle means by 'Nature'. Thomas of York maintains that 'seminal principles' is an apt expression, because it brings to mind the role of an efficient cause, just as the term 'seed' brings to mind a planter or cultivator. Although this causality belongs to the accidental order, it nevertheless remains a true causality. God, therefore, is not the sole cause of change; the being possessed by the passive potency of matter and the further perfections of active natural potencies make it possible for created agents to exercise a causality of their own.

In addition to the actual and potential being of reality, there is the being of truth, which man possesses in his knowledge. Like actual being, the being of truth is essentially a unity. The two kinds of truth that exist in our minds--the complex truth of propositions and the simple truth of definition--

are both reducible to the same unity as being as reality itself. The simple truth of a definition expresses the essence of a thing, and the essence of a thing consists in the indivision of form from matter, or simply the indivision of being. Complex truth consists in the indivision of the predicate from the subject, and the predicate can be regarded as a kind of form, and the subject as a kind of matter. Since, therefore, reality and truth are both reducible to the indivision or unity of being, they are not radically diverse, but essentially the same. Although the truth of a thing is conceptually different from the thing itself, it remains the 'essentiality' or determination by which a thing is what it is.

The essential sameness of reality and truth is mirrored in the sameness of the sources from which they arise. Ultimately, of course, their sameness is grounded in God as the origin of all unity, being and truth. But in the created order, just as there is a first unity that is the source of the unity by which things are real, so too there is a first truth that is the cause of the many truths in our knowledge and the many truths of things. The first truth is the same as the first unity, namely the spiritual form of angels and human souls. Holding the highest place in the hierarchy of creation, man's soul, together with the angels, contains the forms of corporeal things in a virtually more perfect manner than they are contained in things themselves.

Although all forms flow from God as light from the sun, the forms in man's soul are present to it through a special divine illumination. The light received in this illumination is unique, because it contains the forms of all things. Like William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon, Thomas of York parts company with Bonaventure in maintaining an extreme brand of augustinianism, according to which divine illumination provides man not only with the light whereby he forms true judgments, but with the conceptual content of his knowledge as well.

Like potential forms in matter, however, forms in the soul are not wholly actual prior to our knowledge of them; they are not 'innate species'. But neither are they wholly passive in a mind that resembles a tabula nuda and receives forms from things by way of aristotelian 'abstraction'. Although they were wholly actual in man before original sin, they are now incompletely actual or habitual. In man's present state sensible things must stimulate his intellect to bring these forms to complete actuality. In this way, Thomas of York, under the influence of Aristotle, assigns a causal role in knowledge to things and to man's own faculties of sense and intellect, but he does so only because of the theological doctrine of original sin. By nature man possesses truth through divine illumination, but after the Fall he accidentally requires the assistance of things and his own powers in order to know the truth.

Original sin, however, has not destroyed the basic nature of man's soul. The soul's spiritual form continues to be the first created unity by which things are real, and the first created truth by which the truths of our knowledge and the truths of things are true. Like things themselves, truths are materially many, but formally one; they are one, first, by virtue of their immortality in the human soul. With the angels, therefore, man's soul represents a kind of exemplar cause, after which the whole of creation is modelled and to which all creatures tend, in their striving for unity, being and truth.

Historically, Thomas of York, along with Grosseteste, Roger Bacon and the Pseudo-Grosseteste, to whom his thought and actual words sometimes bear a striking resemblance, helped to prepare the way for the famous synthesis of augustinianism and aristotelianism in Duns Scotus. In his own right, Thomas of York has succeeded in gleaning from a variety of sources a wisdom that envisages the world shot through with intelligibility and light, a vision that sees man standing at the summit of creation, and a conviction that man can come to a knowledge of God while still in this life by knowing His creatures.

GRADUATE STUDIES

Major Subjects:

Mediaeval Philosophy	--Professor A. C. Pegis --Professor Etienne Gilson

Minor Subjects:

Systematic Philosophy	--The Staff in Philosophy
Latin Paleography	--Professor J. R. O' Donnell

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Introduction

Thomas of York was a member of the English province of the Franciscan Order, who lived around the middle of the thirteenth century. He was a personal acquaintance of Robert Grosseteste, although Thomas came to Oxford probably after Grosseteste stopped lecturing in 1235. From the correspondence of Adam Marsh, the first regent of the Franciscan Studium at Oxford, we learn that Thomas was studying the Metaphysics of Aristotle as early as 1245. He incepted in Theology at Oxford in 1253, and lectured there, possibly until 1256, when he became the sixth regent of the Franciscan Studium at Cambridge. The approximate date of his death is generally considered to be 1260. Thomas' extant writings include: the treatise, Manus Quae Contra Omnipotentem, which appears to have played a prominent role in the struggle of the mendicants with the seculars, and is defended by Bonaventure in his Apologia Pauperum, written in 1269; a Sermon on the Passion; two Letters, preserved in the correspondence of Adam Marsh; his monumental work in metaphysics, the Sapientiale; and the opusculum, Comparatio Sensibilium, which treats in a brief manner much of the material contained in the Sapientiale.[1]

Book VI of the Sapientiale, the subject of the present study, which precedes the edition of the text itself,[2] treats of four major topics that keep recurring throughout the history of philosophy: the problem of the one and the many; the existence of secondary causality; the nature of truth; and a theory of knowledge. Interest in the problem of the one and the many extends from Parmenides and Plato down through the ages to the contemporary scene with William James. In the ancient Greek world, the monism of Parmenides aroused such widespread dispute that it became one of the dominant themes of Plato's Dialogues. Accordingly, we find Socrates telling Protarchus in the Philebus that "The one and many become identified by thought ... They run about together in and out of every word which is uttered ... This union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is ... an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old."[3] The fact that twenty-three centuries later, in our own day, we find William James seeing in a man's solution to the same problem a basic criterion of his whole philosophy,[4] testifies to the truth of Socrates' assertion. James, in his famous division of philosophers into the "tough-minded" and "tender-minded", aligns monism with

rationalism and idealism under the "tender-minded", and pluralism with materialism and empiricism under the "tough-minded".

Viewed in the light of history, the primacy of unity might be emphasized to the extent that it subordinates and absorbs multiplicity, as does the 'Being' of Parmenides, 'the One' of Plotinus, 'the Infinite Substance' of Spinoza, or 'the Absolute' of Hegel. In contrast, leaving aside the extreme pluralism of the ancient atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, and the radical materialism of a Hobbes, we might maintain with Aristotle that unity belongs essentially to individual substance, with the result that each substance is one among many. Accordingly, we would not be able to affirm the unity of any one substance without also affirming a plurality of substances.

The problem of secondary causality is closely allied with that of the one and the many, since change, which gives rise to multiplicity, is impossible in a parmenideaan universe, and without change there is no call for secondary causality. Even when the reality of change is conceded, the difficulty of knowing its cause remains. The cause could conceivably be identified exclusively with God. We might then agree with Berkeley that there are

no natural causes and "Nature ... is a vain chimera introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God."[5] On the other hand, we might try to solve the parmenidean difficulty of understanding how being can come from, or pass into, non-being, by recourse to Aristotle's doctrine of potency and act, according to which potency is neither being nor non-being absolutely speaking, but a mode of being. Similarly, in opposition to Berkeley, we might try to support the efficacy of secondary causes, without detracting from the omnipotence and omnipresence of God, on the basis of Aristotle's 'eduction' of forms from matter.

Likewise, the meaning of truth, and whether the truth of things is one or many, are questions that have never ceased to engage the attention of philosophers since the days of Socrates and Plato. Apart from an idealist like Hegel, philosophers generally conceive truth to be an agreement or correspondence between the mind and reality. Some, however, wishing to avoid the implicit dualism of subject and object in this definition, maintained that truth is an identity, an indivision, or unity of the mind with reality, instead of a mere correspondence. Plotinus,

for example, says that "The object known must be identical with the knowing act ... If this identity does not exist, neither does truth ... Truth cannot apply to something conflicting with itself; what it affirms must also be."[6] The problem whether the truth of things is one or many closely parallels the same problem with respect to things themselves. Accordingly, philosophers like Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Spinoza tend to emphasize the oneness of truth, whereas Aristotle upholds the truth of the individual substance, with the result that he considers the truth of each thing to be one among many.

Finally, concerning human knowledge, philosophers and scientists from Plato to Freud form a common front against the sophists, sceptics, and "intellectual nihilists",[7] who deny any distinction between truth and falsity, or consider truth to be unattainable by man. But there is widespread disagreement about the source and criterion of truth in our knowledge. Ultimately, there are only two possible sources of the truth we possess about things in the natural order, namely things themselves, or God. In the history of thought, we find philosophers maintaining each of these positions. Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, for example, tend to regard the intellect as innately endowed by God

with truth, or at least, with the germinal principles of truth. Aristotle, on the other hand, holds that truth is acquired from things by way of an act of abstraction on the part of the intellect from sensible experience. In the former, the very presence of truth in the intellect assures the basic certitude of our knowledge, since God is the source of that truth, and accordingly, the infallible guarantee of certitude. In the latter, no such guarantee can be found; instead, the existence of truth and certitude depends solely upon the trustworthiness of sense and intellect.

In the light of this analysis, we are faced with two different approaches to philosophical issues, namely, that of platonism and neoplatonism on the one hand, and that of aristotelianism on the other. From the viewpoint of this dichotomy, Thomas of York is writing at a unique moment in the development of Western thought. For Christian thinkers, it marks the first time that a wholesale confrontation with aristotelianism was even possible. Prior to the thirteenth century, the philosophical works of Aristotle were unavailable to the Latin West,[8] and in their absence, the mind of the West was informed by the platonism and neoplatonism of of authors like Augustine, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius.[9]

But by the time that Thomas of York was composing his Sapientiale in the 1250's,[10] Christian authors had gained access to the whole of Aristotle mainly through Latin translations from the Arabic. They had acquired as well, in translation from the Arabic, many of the writings of the Arabian commentators Averroes, Avicenna, Algazel and Alfarabi. These were accompanied by numerous treatises in Arabian science, the Fons Vitae of the Jewish philosopher Ibn Gabirol, and The Guide for the Perplexed of Moses Maimonides, which was translated from the Hebrew in 1240.[11]

The acquisition of these renowned thinkers was made possible, first of all, by the labors of the translators themselves, among whom are found Gundissalinus and John of Spain in Toledo around the middle of the twelfth century, Gerard of Cremona in the latter half of the twelfth, and Michael Scot and Herman the German in the thirteenth.[12] Secondly, it was made possible by the spread of the translations, which began in England as early as the end of the twelfth century through the efforts of such scholars as Adelard of Bath, Daniel of Morley, and Alfred of Sareshel.[13]

The work of assimilating this new learning commenced with the independent treatises of Gundissalinus himself,[14] to whom Thomas of York frequently shows his indebtedness.[15] It was taken up by William of Auvergne on the continent, who concentrated on Avicenna and an understanding of Aristotle by way of Avicenna.[16] It was carried on in England by the most distinguished teacher of the day at Oxford and the first Chancellor of that University, Robert Grosseteste, whom the Franciscans secured as their first lecturer from 1229 to 1235.[17] Grosseteste's teaching of Aristotle, whose works he was engaged in commenting upon and translating from the Greek original, proceeded unimpeded by any ecclesiastical prohibitions such as those at the University of Paris in 1210, 1215, 1231 and 1245.[18] He was well acquainted with the writings of the Arabs, but confined his attention more especially to their scientific treatises, notably Alhazen's Perspectiva, a work on optics translated about the end of the twelfth century.[19]

It was left to Thomas of York to be the first to use on a grand scale the philosophical wisdom of Aristotle and the Arabs, as well as the Jewish writers. His object is to integrate as much of the new learning as possible within the context of augustinianism, to which school

he belongs. Of all the authors acquired during the period, he seeks first and foremost the favour of Aristotle. He is aided in this endeavour by the neoplatonism that already characterized the interpretations of Aristotle provided by the Arab and Jewish thinkers. This neoplatonism stemmed partially from the blending of Plato and Aristotle in the Greek commentator on Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, whom the Arabic world had inherited. It also stemmed from the famed Liber de Causis and the so-called Theology of Aristotle, which were ascribed to Aristotle, but were in fact of neoplatonic origin. The former was excerpted from the Elementatio Theologica of Proclus, and the latter was borrowed from Plotinus, Enneads, Books IV-VI.[20] Besides the neoplatonism which emerged from these sources in the writings of the Arabs and Jews, Thomas of York fell heir directly to the neoplatonism of the Liber de Causis,[21] the author of which Thomas takes to be Christian.[22] It is not surprising that Christian thinkers found in the whole of this recently acquired neoplatonism something akin to the traditional neoplatonism of the West.[23] The new learning, therefore, provided Thomas of York not only with Aristotle, but to a great extent with the means of reconciling the

philosophy of the Stagirite with his own augustinian formation.

The natural learning of Aristotle and the Arabs was undoubtedly the factor that evoked in Thomas of York the philosophical inspiration for the Sapientiale, - an inspiration distinguishing it from the customary theological commentaries and summas of the age.[24] It is true that other men, including such renowned names as Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Aquinas, were subject to the same influence, and yet none of them wrote a work, the size and scope of the Sapientiale, that was so exclusively metaphysical. We know, however, that learning at Oxford proceeded along scientific lines, in marked contrast with the speculative development at the University of Paris.[25] Similarly, it would seem that English thinkers were inclined to take a more exclusive interest in philosophy than were theologians on the continent. Just as the scientific treatises of the Arabs had a peculiar fascination for Grosseteste,[26] so too the philosophy of Aristotle and the Arabs held a special appeal for Thomas of York. The reason for the appeal would seem to rest in Thomas' awareness that if there was to be any reconciliation between the wisdom of the Christians and the wisdom of

Aristotle and the Arabs, it was to be sought on the level of natural reason. Very much concerned, as he seemed to be, with missionary activity,[27] and obviously interested in education, it is quite possible that he wrote the Sapientiale to promote a sympathetic understanding of the 'pagan' mind among the students of an Order engaged in the work of evangelization.

The Sapientiale is not confined to any one field of inquiry in metaphysics, but is intended to present a complete metaphysics of being. It deals not only with being in general, but with being wherever it is found, whether in God, man, human knowledge, or physical nature. From the structure and content of the work, the reader can readily see that its author respects philosophy or metaphysics as one wisdom enlivening many areas of investigation within it. The Sapientiale is divided into three major parts of unequal length.[28] The first part is devoted to the being of God, and comprises Book I, with forty-eight chapters. The second part considers being in general, or being as being, and is comprised of five books, with a total of one hundred and forty-one chapters. The first of these, Book II, is a study of creation, or of the origin of the world. Book III[29] is concerned with

those divisions of being in general whose members bridge the created and uncreated orders; one member belongs to God, and the other to creatures, as in the division of being into being by essence and being by participation. Books IV and V constitute a study of the division of being into the categories, or into substance and the nine accidents. Book V, which treats of discrete quantity or number, time, motion and place, and the relation of number to the other categories, consists only of eight chapters, and might be regarded as an appendix to Book IV. Book VI is concerned with the divisions of created being. Unlike Book III, it studies those divisions both of whose members belong to the created order, or both of whose members are treated primarily as belonging to the created order.[30] These divisions include the one and the many, potency and act, the finite and infinite, whole and part, prior and subsequent, truth and falsity. Finally, the third part of the Sapientiale is devoted to a study of special being, namely the being of the world and the being of man. This third part is confined to the twenty-three chapters of Book VII.

From this survey, we see that Book VI is located in a General Metaphysics, between a Natural Theology and a

Special Metaphysics. Within this General Metaphysics, it is subsequent to the study of being as predicated of God and creatures, and to the study of being as divided into the ten predicaments. In Book VI, as in the remainder of his General Metaphysics, Thomas conducts his investigation of being by way of division into opposites.[31] Through a study of these opposites in relation to one another, a method that recalls the procedure of dichotomous division in Plato's Dialogues,[32] he seeks to achieve an understanding of created being. Chapters 1-5 are concerned with the division of being into the one and the many; chapters 5-10, with the various kinds of opposition, taken from Boethius' Commentary, On the Categories of Aristotle, and explained with the assistance of various writers, notably Aristotle himself, Averroes and Avicenna; chapters 11-12, with potency and act; chapters 13-16, with nature as opposed to art, - art being given special treatment in chapter 17;[33] chapters 18-19, with the infinite and finite; chapter 20, with the whole and the part; chapter 21, with the prior and subsequent; chapter 22, with the comparable and non-comparable, the proportional and non-proportional, the univocal and non-univocal, the equivocal and analogical. Finally, chapters 23-32 are

concerned with being in the intellect or truth, as opposed to being outside or things themselves.

Out of this wide range of subject matter, it is only possible to choose for consideration material pertinent to the major topics in the Book. Chapters 1-5 on the one and the many, and to some extent, chapters 6-10 on opposition, provide material for our treatment of unity; chapters 11-17 on act and potency, nature and art, provide material for our treatment of causality; and chapters 23-32, the last ten chapters of the Book, provide material for our treatment of truth and knowledge.

Except for a passing reference in the first chapter of our study, no mention is made of another topic, considered by Thomas in Book VI, that would merit attention in a comprehensive presentation of his philosophy of material being. This is Algazel's division of being into the finite and infinite,[34] - a division which is subsidiary to Thomas' prior concern with causality and nature as a whole. In his treatment of the subject, found in chapters 18 and 19, Thomas uses Aristotle to show that the infinite does not actually exist, but that it does exist potentially. It exists through division in the order of continuous quantity, and through addition or 'apposition' in the order of discrete

quantity.[35] Concerning the nature of the infinite, the infinite cannot be defined as 'that outside of which there is nothing'. On the contrary, this is the definition of a 'whole', and a whole is not infinite, insofar as wholeness and perfection accrue to a being from its limits. Instead, the infinite should be defined as 'that outside of which there is always something', as in the division of a continuum and in the addition of number.[36] Accordingly, the finite is that which is received from the infinite, and the infinite has being insofar as there is always something outside to be received.[37] Matter, as the receiver and as that to which the privation of any limit is joined, is the principle of infinity in physical being; form, as that which is received and as the complement of matter, is the principle of finitude.[38]

Against this background, Thomas takes exception with Algazel's position that there is an infinity of souls, - a position based on the erroneous premise that time and motion are infinite.[39] The number of souls in existence up to the present is in the order of accomplished fact, and accordingly, these souls constitute a determinate number. Potentially, however, in the order of successive becoming, an infinite number of souls can come into being.[40]

Finally, Thomas maintains that infinity cannot exist in the physical order as such, but only when physical being is considered mathematically. Insofar as all physical beings tend toward a definite size, and insofar as they require a certain minimal quantity to remain in existence, physical bodies, as physical, cannot be infinite either by way of addition or by way of division. They are infinite only from the viewpoint of mathematics.[41]

Despite the autonomy of VI as a distinct Book of the Sapientiale, it can be regarded as a climactic resolution of problems raised earlier in the work with respect to unity,[42] causality, and knowledge.[43] It also provides a helpful background for Thomas' doctrine of the world soul and of the human soul in Book VII.[44] For that matter, no one Book can be considered apart from the others without running the risk of error or misinterpretation. Thomas of York conceived the Sapientiale as a unity, in which the prior becomes significant in the light of the subsequent, and the subsequent in the light of the prior. Accordingly, although the present study is confined to an analysis of Book VI, it contains references to relevant passages and uses supporting material from the remainder of the work.

Two themes pervade Thomas' thought on the four major topics of the Book. The first constitutes an emphasis

on the perfection of creatures, rather than on their manifest imperfection when contrasted with the absolute perfection of God.[45] Accordingly, Thomas seeks to uphold a primal principle of unity in the created order, a certain efficacy on the part of secondary causes, a first truth that belongs to creatures, a theory of knowledge that would afford man's intellect and things, as created agents, a role in human knowing, and would establish a guarantee of certitude on the natural level. The second theme is subordinate to the first. It consists in a vision of being - the being of reality as well as the being of truth - in terms of a unity that does not exclude multiplicity. Things exist insofar as they are one, but they are simultaneously many; nature is a unity, but it is comprised of potencies and causes that allow for multiplicity; truth is a unity, but this does not prevent us from viewing it as a rightness or correspondence of the mind with reality; finally, whether we are considering the truth in things or the truth in man's intellect, there is one truth in creatures, but there are also many.

These themes are realized within the context of an augustinianism that constantly seeks the support of Aristotle, and within the broader context of an attempted reconciliation

between the sapientes Dei and the sapientes mundi. The former are the traditional Christian authorities; the latter include not only Aristotle and his commentators, but the hermetical writings of Trismegistus,[46] Avicenna's Book of Medicine,[47] and such renowned classical Latin authors as Cicero[48] and Seneca.[49] The reader could readily be deceived by the numerous references to this wide diversity of writers into thinking that the Sapientiale is the work of a mere compiler or even of an eclectic. In fact, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Thomas' remarkable ability to select and adapt the thought of others to suit his own purposes leaves his augustinianism essentially intact. Expressions like Dico igitur, which occur frequently, are not to be regarded as nothing more than personal transitions; they mark definitive statements of his own position in the light of the preceding arguments pro and con. In this respect, they are comparable to the Respondeo used by Aquinas to introduce the body of an article. Sometimes Thomas of York will incorporate large portions of Aristotle, but these portions are set within the framework of his basic augustinianism.[50] At other times, his augustinianism is cast in the mold of aristotelianism, but nevertheless, it remains augustinianism. For example, his

approach to being through division is conducted on the basis of the four modes of opposition in Aristotle,[51] but this does not preclude the possibility of a platonic metaphysics. Nor does the fact that his treatment of reality precedes his treatment of truth[52] necessarily imply that he considers reality to be prior to truth. Following Aristotle's order of treatment[53] does not necessarily entail Thomas' acceptance of any metaphysical presuppositions that might accompany it.

Finally, the reader might be inclined to approach the Sapientiale as a work written by an immature aristotelian, who did not as yet have the opportunity to become adequately acquainted with the works of 'the Philosopher'. Thomas' interpretation, which often appears to be at variance with Aristotle's true meaning, could then be explained on the ground of ignorance. Such an approach, however, would be unfortunate. Far from misinterpreting Aristotle's thought through ignorance, Thomas, with his thorough knowledge of the Stagirite, is able to discern the latent platonism of the aristotelian text, and to choose those elements that are adaptable to augustinianism. In the chapters to follow, we can best appreciate Thomas of York's position when we

view it not as that of an immature aristotelian, but that of a mature augustinian[54] seeking to integrate, through a 'benign interpretation', the wisdom of 'the Philosopher' and the *sapientes mundi* with the wisdom of Augustine and the *sapientes Dei*.

Chapter 1

The Primacy of Created Unity

The prominent role that Thomas of York attributes to unity is reminiscent of the role that unity has in the doctrines of Thierry of Chartres, Clarenbaldus of Arras and Alan of Lille.[1] In common with them, Thomas views unity as the primary source of being and perfection in things.[2] He likewise agrees that this unity is realized first in the Uncreated Unity of God, and then in the created unity of creatures.[3] After an earlier treatment of Divine Unity,[4] however, he devotes special attention in Book VI to the role of created unity.[5] At this point in the development of the Sapientiale, his main object is to show that there is a created unity which is basic and first in importance among causes in the created order.

The reason for this attention to created unity may well be connected with the entry of the 'new learning' into the Latin West. In the process of assimilation, one of the elements that William of Auvergne rejected was the doctrine of 'mediate creation' in Avicenna. According to this doctrine, multiplicity in creatures could not proceed immediately from Uncreated Unity. 'From the One, inasmuch as it is one, only one effect can proceed.'[6]

Consequently, a series of Intelligences had to mediate between the inviolable unity of God and the multiplicity of creatures. The result was that creatures were removed from the immediate governance and control of the Creator.[7]

In opposition to this doctrine, William of Auvergne maintained that God is immediately present to creatures through the unity of the Divine Being.[8] Moreover, he held that the Divine Unity is the root of being and intelligibility in things, as well as the immediate source of multiplicity.[9] In fact, the immediacy of God to creatures becomes so dominant in his mind that creatures, considered in themselves, assume the aspect of a void that can be filled with nothing less than the Divine presence.[10] Accordingly, although creatures enjoy an immediacy to God denied them in the metaphysics of Avicenna, they are, by virtue of that same immediacy, without any unity or perfection of their own.

Now we know that Thomas of York was acquainted with the writings of William of Auvergne, since he refers to them on different occasions in the Sapientiale.[11] Furthermore, it would appear from Thomas' treatment of created nature, which we review in our next chapter, that he was aware of the tendency in the thought of his predecessor

to sacrifice the perfection of creatures for the sake of preserving the absolute omnipotence and omnipresence of God.[12] It is conceivable, therefore, that Thomas of York, in elaborating his doctrine of created unity, was reacting against this tendency, and supplying in its stead a view of creatures that would see them possessing a perfection of their own on the created level.

Likewise associated with the 'new learning', there is a more tenable reason for the special interest shown by Thomas in a created unity. Aristotle's empiricism, with its inquiry into the immediate reality of the world around us, had already begun to make its presence felt among Christian thinkers, as we can see, for example, from the writings of Robert Grossetestе.[13] Similarly, at the very beginning of Book VI, we find Thomas of York briefly considering Aristotle's arguments against Zeno's contention that unity does not exist. The problem, according to Aristotle, arises out of Zeno's failure to recognize the existence of anything but corporeal magnitude, and his failure to distinguish between discrete and continuous quantity.[14] Thomas feels obliged to draw attention to the problem, even though, on the basis of Christian neo-platonism, he is convinced that unity exists in a most

evident manner. In other words, Thomas indicates from the outset in Book VI how aware he is of the confrontation that must take place between the 'this-worldliness' of Aristotle's philosophy and the 'other-worldliness' of Christian neoplatonism. This awareness might well have inspired Thomas' endeavour to find in the created order a basic unity that remains on the level of creatures.

In any case, he maintains that there is a created unity that constitutes the source of all being and perfection in things. At the same time, he holds that although this unity participates in the prior unity of God, it retains its own identity as a created principle.[15] To formulate the doctrine, he relies heavily on a work called the De Unitate et Uno, whose authorship is unknown to him, but which was, in fact, written by Gundissalinus.[16] The greater part of it comprises a skillful linking together of word-for-word quotations from the Fons Vitae of Ibn Gabirol, a work belonging to the Jewish and Arabian neoplatonic tradition.[17] But it also includes some quotations from the New Testament, as well as numerous excerpts from the writings of Boethius and Augustine.[18] These excerpts do not constitute a merely perfunctory recognition of Christian authorities, but bear witness to a striking

resemblance between Christian, Jewish and Arabian neoplatonism.[19]

In keeping with the thought of Boethius, Augustine and Ibn Gabirol, as expressed in the De Unitate, Thomas says that unity is the cause of all the perfection and goodness of being, as well as the cause of being itself. Unity is that by virtue of which each thing is said to be one being, since it is impossible that something be one without unity, just as that which is white cannot be white without whiteness, or as that which is quantified cannot be quantified without quantity.[20] But to say that beings are one by virtue of unity is likewise to say that they are beings by virtue of that same unity. Unity is that which is, since everything which is, not only is one, but is, because it is one.[21] Beings are natures composed of matter and form, and although the perfection of 'being' (esse) belongs to form, it does not belong to form alone, but to form in matter. It is the uniting of form with matter that causes a thing's being. Just as a thing is destroyed through the separation of form from matter, so too being results from the union of these same principles.[22]

In accordance, therefore, with the neoplatonism of the De Unitate, Thomas maintains that 'being' and 'being

one' are synonymous. Matter and form, the two co-principles of every created being, are united through the power of unity, which belongs to every being simply by virtue of its being. Accordingly, the unity proper to the being of each thing becomes the primary cause of that thing.

To support his position, Thomas draws attention to the fact that the properties used by individual authors to describe unity all bespeak this primacy. Augustine says that equality, consistency and measure are found in unity,[23] Boethius, that 'the one'[24] is lovable, delectable and appetible.[25] Gabirol states that 'unity causes and retains multitude, contains and exists in all the parts of multitude, retains and sustains all things.'[26] From this, Thomas concludes that dignity, singularity, indivisibility, and even power belong to unity.[27] 'The ability to contain' may also be attributed to unity, because, as Avicenna says, 'everything that is, inasmuch as it is, is one.'[28] Finally, the property of communicability belongs to unity, since, as Dionysius says, 'there is nothing that does not participate in unity, just as every number participates in unity.'[29] Although these properties belong primarily and principally to the First Uncreated Unity, Who is

precisely Perfection, Goodness, Conservation, and per se all the above attributes, they also belong to the participated unity of creatures.[30]

Despite the fact, however, that created unity and Uncreated Unity share some of the same attributes, they remain distinct from one another. As explained in the De Unitate,[31] Uncreated Unity is immutable, without beginning or end, while this is not true of created unity. The principle that distinguishes them is matter, to which created unity is joined.[32] This does not mean that matter exists independently of unity. Of itself, matter would cease to exist; it would be entirely multiple, dispersed and divided. Only when combined with unity, can it exist, be retained in existence, collected and united to issue in actual being.[33] Understood accordingly, the matter of creatures constitutes the ground of the distinction between the two unities.

Here in Book VI, as well as earlier in Book II, where he treats specifically of matter and form,[34] Thomas, like the other augustinians of the thirteenth century, adopts the doctrine of 'universal hylomorphism'. According to the doctrine, which is inherited from Augustine and Gabirol,[35] matter is the principle that distinguishes all

creatures, including spiritual substances, from the Creator. This is not to say that there is a completely homogeneous matter existing throughout the whole of creation. On the contrary, as Thomas learns from the De Unitate, there is a gradation of specifically different kinds of matter which join with corresponding unities to comprise a hierarchy of being in the created order.[36]

First, there is the matter of the Intelligences and human souls, which is brought into being by a unity that is most truly one in its simplicity and indivisibility, since it exists closest to Uncreated Unity. Secondly, there is the matter of heavenly bodies, which is rarified, simple, inseparably joined with unity, and removed from the opposition that exists between contraries, which opposition is at the root of all corruption. For although these heavenly bodies are subject to change, they are not subject to corruption, because their unity has no end, despite the fact that it has a beginning. Thirdly, there is the matter of corruptible bodies, which is gross and lacking in energy, joined in a loose and feeble manner to unity. These bodies are subject to change and to corruption as well, because their unity has both a beginning and an end, insofar as their matter can be deprived of the unity that it needs in

order to exist. Accordingly, the three grades of matter account for the three orders of created being, namely the order of the Intelligences and human souls, that of heavenly bodies, and finally that of corruptible bodies.[37]

But although matter accounts for the different orders of created being, as well as for the multiplicity within each order, it does not account for the condition of mutability under which created unity exists in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. Multiplicity does not explain mutability. Some source, therefore, other than matter is needed to explain the phenomenon of change. For Thomas, the nature of this source is evident from the writings of Aristotle, Averroes and Boethius.[38] Mutability is caused by opposition in beings, since change occurs between things that are contrary to one another, such as hot and cold, white and black, good and bad. Now there is a first opposition, namely that of 'place', to which all other kinds of opposition can be reduced. It is this opposition that is the cause of all opposition among the substantial and accidental forms of the elements. Consequently, substantial and accidental changes occur insofar as things participate in the basic opposition of 'place'.[39]

This doctrine becomes intelligible only after we realize that 'place' could not refer to the accident of 'place', since opposition in the accidental order cannot be the cause of opposition in the substantial order. On the contrary, 'place' is to be considered as a thing, a nature, or a substance.[40] 'Place', understood in this way, is the root of all change. It is participated in by two different kinds of body: First, by the heavens, especially the moon, which orders the sublunary bodies in 'place'; secondly, by these same bodies, which are ordered in 'place'. In this lower realm, 'place' is participated in by the four elements in decreasing proportions: first, by fire, secondly air, then water, and finally earth. Since earth, for example, participates in 'place' less perfectly than fire, the 'place' of earth is related to the 'place' of fire as 'privation' (<u>privatio</u>) is to 'possession' (<u>habitus</u>).[41] The consequent opposition that exists between the 'privation' and 'possession' of 'place' on the part of the four elements gives rise to the opposition that exists in the orders of substantial and accidental forms. The greater or lesser participation in 'place', therefore, and the opposition that ensues, constitute the ground of mutability.

To recapitulate, we have seen that there is a created unity that is the fount of all perfection and being in

creatures. Although sharing in the same attributes as Uncreated Unity, this unity, insofar as it is united with matter to form creatures, is distinct from Uncreated Unity. The hierarchy of perfection in creatures is based on the various kinds of matter, which are differentiated from one another by a stronger or more feeble union with unity. Matter, which gives rise as well to the multiplicity within each order of created being, is a principle distinct from unity, although it owes its very existence to the conserving power of unity. Likewise, the mutability of corruptible and incorruptible bodies does not arise from unity, which is a principle of perfection, but from the opposition that follows upon the degree to which things participate in 'place'. Accordingly, multiplicity and mutability exist in creatures without detracting from the integrity of unity as the basic principle of perfection and being.

In reflecting on Thomas' position, the major question to be asked is this: What is created unity? If it is not God - and it cannot be, since it is created - what kind of being or principle is it?

Although Thomas' answer cannot be found explicitly in Book VI, it is, nevertheless, implied. We can see,

first of all, that he does not regard created unity as some kind of being existing apart from matter, because he adopts the doctrine of 'universal hylomorphism', according to which every creature is a composite of matter and form. Nor can the unity be a composite, because the being of a composite cannot be caused essentially by something composite, and we have seen how unity causes the composite to exist and to be one. If, therefore, created unity exists, it must be a principle of the composite, that is, either matter or form. It cannot be matter, since unity is a perfection that joins with matter to constitute actual being. Created unity, then, must in some way be identified with form.

It cannot, however, be identified absolutely with form, in such a way that form would be the ultimate source of unity, since creatures are not the cause of their own unity any more than they are the cause of their own being. God alone is the ultimate source of all unity and being, and consequently unity, absolutely speaking, can only be identified with Him. But if form were the principle through which matter and the composite received their unity from God, form would then become a principle of unity, or simply unity in a derivative sense. That this is Thomas' position,

can be inferred immediately from his saying that form is a principle of being, and that being is equivalent to unity.[42] Moreover, he speaks of form uniting with matter,[43] and then of unity uniting with matter,[44] which implies that he considers form to be unity or a principle of unity.

If, however, the form of every composite constituted a unity, there would be as many unities as there are forms. Since there are as many forms as there are composite beings, and there are many composite beings, there would be as many unities. It would seem, therefore, that Thomas should speak of created 'unities' rather than of created 'unity'. In a sense, this is a minor difficulty, since it is possible to speak of form in a universal manner, that is, of form as common to all actual beings. This universal form would then be the created unity that Thomas has described as 'causing, containing and sustaining all things.' Still, we have seen that Thomas upholds the doctrine of a hierarchy in creation.[45] He would maintain, therefore, that the created unity whereby all things have their being belongs principally to the highest form or unity in the hierarchy. This is the form or unity that unites with the matter proper to Intelligences and human souls.

As long as we confine our attention to Book VI, these inferences cannot be explicitly verified. But when we turn to Thomas' treatment of hylomorphism in Book II, we find them fully corroborated. There, first of all, Thomas repeatedly points out that there is no intermediary between the simplicity of God and the composition of creatures. He maintains that just as in numbers, two follows immediately upon one, so also the duality of matter and form follows immediately upon Divine Unity, that is, without the assistance of an intermediary.[46] Every creature, as creature, is composed of these two principles, namely matter and form, and of these two principles alone, with the result that there is no possibility of a third nature existing between God and composite being. Nor is a third nature actually needed to unite matter and form, since the unity of the composite is acquired directly from God. The Divine Will, without the assistance of any intermediary, unites matter and form by simply impressing unity on them.[47]

But although God is the direct cause of the union of matter and form, Thomas maintains, nevertheless, that insofar as matter and form are amenable to union and desire unity, they, themselves, can be considered causes of unity. Matter is the cause of union, insofar as it is inclined towards

form as that through which it seeks perfection and unity. Form is a cause in a more eminent way, insofar as it confers the perfection of unity, which it receives from God, upon matter. With the provision that form is understood to exist in the composite, Thomas does not hesitate to speak of form as an intermediary between God and matter.[48] Form, then, constitutes a principle of unity within every creature. Unity belongs to form in the same way as being itself; just as a thing does not have being except through form, so neither does it have unity except through form.[49] In other words, Thomas is saying that the form of the individual creature receives its being and unity from God, and serves as a principle of being and unity for matter and the composite.

Finally, insofar as every creature is composed of matter and form, it is fitting to speak of a 'universal matter' and a 'universal form' in the sense that matter and form are common to every creature.[50] Understood in this way, there is a universal form corresponding to a universal matter,[51] and whereas universal matter is a principle of division and multiplicity, universal form is a principle of unity.[52] In fact, Thomas expressly identifies universal form with unity. He describes this unity as being

received from God and infused into the whole of matter, whereupon it 'conquers, and contains all things'.[53] In other words, the unity with which Thomas identifies universal or common form is the same unity about which he speaks in Book VI.

There is, however, more than one universal form, just as there is more than one universal matter. There is a universal natural form common to the forms of corruptible bodies; there is a universal corporeal form common to the forms of corruptible and incorruptible bodies; and there is a universal spiritual form common to the forms of the Intelligences and human souls. To explain this diversity of forms and their relation to one another, Thomas uses Gabirol's analogy of light, according to which, the diffusion of form in matter is compared to the diffusion of light in air. Light becomes progressively weaker as it proceeds away from the sun into a greater and greater denity of air. Similarly, in the diffusion of form, there is a hierarchy of higher and lower forms proportionate to the various degrees according to which matter is removed from God as the source of all form. Moreover, in this hierarchy, the lower flows from the higher, so that the higher is said to contain the lower.[54] Accordingly,

universal natural form contains the particular natural forms of individual corruptible bodies; universal corporeal form contains universal natural form; and universal spiritual form contains universal corporeal form. As the highest in the hierarchy, universal spiritual form contains the perfection of all the lower forms, and constitutes the created source of all forms in the created order.[55] Insofar as form is unity, this universal spiritual form is the created unity that Thomas describes in Book VI as 'most truly one in its simplicity and indivisibility, since it exists closest to Uncreated Unity.'[56] This universal form or unity is, in particular, the created unity that constitutes, for Thomas in Book VI, the primary created cause of all perfection in creatures. The unity that belongs to the corporeal world is the unity of universal corporeal form, which receives its perfection from the higher unity of universal spiritual form. It is, in other words, the unity of a 'world soul', which Thomas considers in the seventh and final book of the <u>Sapientiale</u>.[57] The essential point, however, is that Thomas identifies unity with form, and that this form belongs to the created order.

There is a more fundamental question to be considered, namely: why does the intellect conceive of universal form

as a unity specifically, rather than as something else? What is there about the nature of unity that would afford it the role of a primary cause with respect to all things? We have seen that composite beings arise from the uniting of matter and form by unity as the principle of that union.[58] To this extent, the question has already been answered. But the primary causal character of unity becomes fully explicit only when Thomas considers the basic meaning of unity and the first unity to which this meaning applies. Let us now turn to this inquiry in Book VI.

Of itself, the problem concerning the basic meaning of unity presents no problem for Thomas. All authorities, notably Aristotle and Avicenna, agree that unity is synonymous with indivisibility, and Thomas similarly maintains that unity means 'the indivision of being'.[59] There is a problem, however, when he seeks to determine the primary instance of unity from which all other unities are derived, because he is confronted with two distinct replies. According to Aristotle, the basic kind of unity is that of substance. Unity, he says, is primarily found in that which is not divided or diversified according to any mode of division, neither according to time, place, definition, nor anything else. This unity, Aristotle says, is found first

in the category of substance, then in the unity that is the principle of number in the category of quantity, and finally in the unity of a point to which is added the notion of position.[60]

On the other hand, Avicenna maintains that numerical unity is most truly one, because no nature is added to it. This is in contrast to the unity of a point as well as the unity of an Intelligence, where the natures of position and non-position are added respectively.[61] It would seem, therefore, that the term 'one', insofar as it connotes simplicity and indivision, should be predicated primarily of numerical unity.[62] Thomas observes that Aristotle himself seems in some places to support this position, despite his statement upholding the primacy of substantial unity. For example, in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, he says that 'the essence of one is some kind of principle of number'.[63] Later, in the tenth book, he maintains that the most simple, indivisible nature, or in other words unity, in every category constitutes a 'measure' whereby the content of the category is known. This notion of 'measure', Aristotle says, arises from the function that numerical unity possesses as the measure of number in the category of quantity.[64] Accordingly, it would appear

that both Avicenna and Aristotle maintain that the term 'one' applies primarily to numerical, rather than substantial unity.[65]

But how could Aristotle hold at one time that the basic kind of unity is the unity of substance, and at another, that it is the unity which is the principle of number? Moreover, how can unity as a principle of number in the category of quantity be prior to the unity of substance, since quantity is an accident, and as such, is subsequent to substance?[66]

Thomas solves these difficulties in two ways. First, he says that the unity to which Aristotle refers as 'a principle of number' is not an accident and is not in the genus of quantity. On the contrary, this 'unity which is a principle of number' is predicated analogously of both the unity of substance and the unity of quantity.[67] To support his interpretation of Aristotle, Thomas appeals to Averroes, who states that there are two kinds of number, namely quantitative and formal.[68] Earlier, in Book III, as we shall see, Thomas shows how 'formal number' refers to the multiplicity of individual beings that proceeds from form as the active cause of individuation. Multiplicity, when numbered or measured by the unity of form, gives rise to

formal number.[69] Accordingly, 'unity which is a principle of number' is not only predicable of quantitative unity, which is a principle of quantitative number, but also of substantial or formal unity, which is a principle of formal number. In other words, 'unity which is a principle of number', understood in this manner, can be predicated analogously of both quantitative and substantial unity.[70]

Secondly, according to Aristotle, there is a sense in which quantitative unity is prior to substantial unity, even though the opposite is true insofar as substance precedes accident. Quantitative unity, he maintains, is prior as the 'measure' of substance. Nothing, including substance, can be the measure of itself, with the result that substance must be measured by the only other thing existing outside of substance in the created order, namely accident. We speak of the most simple nature, or the unity, in every category as the 'measure' of everything in that category, and the term 'measure' originates with quantitative unity. Accordingly, the accident of quantitative unity, considered as a 'measure', is prior to every other unity, including that of substance. That unity, therefore, which is a principle of number in the category of quantity, considered as a 'measure', is most basic.[71]

Thomas then seeks to corroborate his conclusion by observing that we cannot conceive of anything more indivisible than the unity of 'one' in the category of quantity. In other words, the basic character of quantitative unity is evident from the fact that, of all unities, it is the most absolutely indivisible.[72]

In the light of his references to Aristotle, the position that Thomas is taking can be explained in the following manner: There is a basic unity of nature in every category, which unity is common to the individual members of that category. In substances, the principle of this basic unity is substantial form; in accidents, it is accidental form. The form, in each instance, is the source of perfection for the multiplicity within the category. It is, as well, that whereby the multiplicity is known.[73] Now we express the relationship between the unity of form and the corresponding multiplicity in terms of 'measure'. Accordingly, we say that there is a unity in every category that is the 'measure' of multiplicity or 'number' in that category. But the term 'measure' is basically a quantitative term used to express the relationship between unity and number in the category of quantity. When unity, therefore, is understood as a 'measure',

quantitative unity becomes prior to the unities of all the other categories. It is in this way that quantitative unity is prior to substantial unity.

For a deeper understanding of Thomas' position, it is necessary to review his treatment of substance and accident in Book III, where he conceives of the ontological function of substantial form in relation to quantitative unity. Just as quantitative unity, through a process of enumeration, numbering, or multiplication, gives rise to number in the quantitative order, so too the unity of substantial form acts in an 'enumerative' capacity to give rise to 'number' in the substantial order. Substantial form is an active cause of individuation, and insofar as multiplicity follows upon individuation, substantial form becomes as well an active cause of multiplicity. At the same time, matter co-operates as a passive cause of individuation, since its receptivity for form constitutes the ground and root of all multiplicity. Multiplicity, therefore, among individual substances, results simultaneously from the active individuation of form and the passive individuation of matter.

Now this process of individuation and multiplication can equally well be understood as a kind of 'enumeration'

or 'numbering' on the part of the unity of substantial form. From this viewpoint, the multiplicity of individual substances that follows upon individuation constitutes a kind of 'formal number'. The unity of substantial form, as an active principle of 'enumeration', actively 'numbers' matter, thereby giving rise to a number of substances, with respect to which the unity of substantial form becomes the measure. Matter simultaneously functions as a passive principle of enumeration, or as that which is 'numbered'. Insofar as it is totally without form, which constitutes the active principle of number, matter is said to possess a passive or negative unity of its own. In brief, 'number' in the substantial order is the result of active enumeration on the part of the positive unity of substantial form and passive enumeration on the part of the negative unity of prime matter.

This dual enumeration, which Thomas calls 'formal' and 'material' as well as 'active' and 'passive', similarly accounts for number among accidents. As opposed, however, to the production of substances, which follows primarily upon active and formal enumeration, the production of accidents follows primarily upon passive and material enumeration,

since matter is the cause and principle of accidents. However, unless matter is united with substantial form, or in other words, unless it is actively numbered by the unity of substantial form, it cannot serve as a principle and subject of accidents. Accordingly, accidental number follows upon substantial number, since the unity of substantial form, which causes substantial number, also causes accidental number. The unity of substantial form, therefore, is the proximate cause of number or multiplicity among accidents, although matter remains the basic cause.[74]

Throughout this account of multiplicity among substances and accidents, we have seen that the quantitative concepts of 'enumeration', 'numbering', and 'number' itself, constitute the media through which Thomas understands the ontological causality of matter and form. Even the 'unity' of substantial form, when understood as 'a principle of enumeration and measurement', is a concept derived from the function of quantitative unity. The concept of substantial unity, therefore, considered as a measure and cause of formal number among substances and accidents, is preceded by the concept of quantitative unity.

Against this background, Thomas' position in Book VI concerning the primacy of quantitative unity becomes more significant. Its primacy is not based merely on the fact that when we describe substantial unity as a 'measure', we are using a term borrowed from the order of quantity. Nor is its primacy confined solely to the order of knowledge. It is true that just as quantitative unity is called a 'measure' insofar as it is that whereby quantitative number is known, so too substantial unity is called a 'measure' insofar as it is that whereby substances are known. But the primacy of quantitative unity runs still deeper. In keeping with the dictum, which Thomas likes to repeat, that 'a principle of knowledge is also a principle of being',[75] the unity of substantial form is a measure, because, as a principle of enumeration, it actually causes number, that is, the formal number of substances along with their accidents. In other words, quantitative unity is not only prior as a measure in our knowledge; it is prior as the cause of beings, insofar as beings constitute number.

Seen in this light, Thomas' quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius to the effect that 'nothing exists which does not participate in unity, just as every number participates

in unity'[76] becomes more meaningful. It is to be interpreted in a literal manner, since the multiplicity of things in existence actually constitute a number. This number arises from the active numbering of matter by formal unity, considered as a principle of enumeration. Similarly, when Thomas uses the words of Augustine and Ecclesiastes to extol number as synonymous with, or approximating wisdom, this praise stems from his vision of reality as a kind of number proceeding from the enumerative capacity of the unity that belongs to substantial form.[77]

Thomas' approach to the primacy of ontological unity through the primacy of numerical unity and the accompanying conception of reality as a kind of number together constitute a common ingredient of mediaeval neo-platonism. By way of Plotinus, it stems from the pythagoreanism of Plato's Timaeus and Plato's suggestion in the Parmenides that plurality unfolds itself from unity by a necessary mathematical process.[78] This insight into the nature of being by way of number is epitomized in the words of Plotinus, when he says: "In numbers the sharing in unity is what gives rise to quantity; here, the trace of the One gives rise to reality, and being is nothing more than the trace of the One. And were we to say that the word einai (to be)

is derived from en (one), we would no doubt tell the truth".[79] Similarly, Thomas of York maintains that the duality of matter and form in composite being follows upon Divine Unity in the same way that the number 'two' follows upon 'one'.[80] Moreover, he holds that being exists insofar as it is one, with the result that composite being exists insofar as its dual principles of matter and form constitute a unity.[81] The unity of substantial form gives rise to the unity of the individual composite, and simultaneously, as a principle of enumeration, it gives rise to multiplicity, or formal number.[82] In other words, the unity and being of the individual composite, as well as multiplicity itself, proceed by way of the unity of substantial form from Divine Unity, the ultimate source of all being, perfection and unity.

For Thomas of York, however, the manner in which creatures proceed from God differs from the manner in which the world proceeds from 'the One' in Plotinus. Unlike Plotinus, for whom 'the One' transcends all being,[83] Thomas identifies the First Supreme Unity with Divine Being.[84] Given this identification, creatures could not proceed from God by way of Plotinian emanation without becoming a part of

the Divine. In other words, creatures would not be creatures at all, and all unity would be a Divine Unity. On the contrary, Thomas maintains that creatures proceed from God through a simple act of creation, which does not allow for the necessitarianism and mediacy of Plotinian emanation. According to Thomas, God did not have to create, nor did He act through the intermediary of a 'Nous', or subordinate Intelligence, as 'the One' does according to Plotinus.[85] Instead, matter and form, the two principles of created being, stem from a free creative act of the Divine Will that simultaneously causes their union.[86] It is true that this union, which gives rise to actual being, takes place through the mediation of form. Nevertheless, since form, along with its co-principle, matter, is intrinsic to the being of the creature, form does not constitute an intermediary between God and the creature as a whole, but between God and matter. As an intrinsic principle of created being, it remains strictly on the created level,[87] yet sharing in a secondary manner the attributes of the Divine,[88] from which it receives its perfection of unity.

There are certain difficulties, posed by Avicenna in the order of knowledge, that Thomas considers before bringing

to a close his treatment of unity. Bearing in mind that, for Thomas, what is true in our intellectual knowledge is also true in reality, it is necessary that his doctrine of unity satisfy the requirements of both knowledge and being. Avicenna's first difficulty poses a threat to the primacy of unity. When unity is defined as 'that in which there is no multitude', it would seem that the concept of multitude is prior to the concept of unity, since the definition of anything must be better known than the thing being defined.[89]

In keeping with the manner in which Avicenna answers the objection, Thomas maintains that unity cannot be defined, but only described, and that the above 'definition' of unity is not truly a definition, but a description. This judgment is based on the premise that the concept of unity is primary and irreducible; there is no previous concept in our intellect through which unity can be understood. But although unity is primary, and therefore better known to the intellect than multitude, yet multitude is better known than unity to the imagination. Accordingly, insofar as imagination is a way to understanding, the image of multitude can serve as a means of more fully comprehending the concept of unity. This is precisely

the case when we say that unity is 'that in which there is no multitude'. Here 'multitude' is an image, through which we approach an understanding of unity in the conceptual order. Therefore, far from denying the primacy of unity in our intellectual knowledge, the 'definition' implicitly affirms it. The concept of multitude is subsequent to the image of multitude, and it is by means of the latter that unity is being 'defined'.[90]

The second difficulty, considered by Thomas, presents an obstacle to accepting unity as the cause of multitude, when unity and multitude are two distinct and opposed concepts.[91] According to Aristotle, for example, they are opposed in many ways, but especially in terms of 'possession' (habitus) and 'privation' (privatio). Multitude 'possesses' the perfection of division, whereas unity constitutes the 'privation' of this perfection, which 'privation' is expressed by the term 'indivision'.[92] But how can unity be opposed to multitude, if unity causes and constitutes multitude? Secondly, how can unity, under any circumstances, be regarded as a 'privation', if unity is the primary cause of all things?[93]

With Avicenna, Thomas sees the first difficulty as superficial. The problem disappears when we distinguish

between unity and multitude in themselves, and in their properties. In themselves, unity and multitude are not opposed; but in their properties of division and indivision, they are opposed according to 'possession' and 'privation'. Moreover, when unity is considered as a measure, and multitude as that which is measured, they are opposed according to 'relative opposition', in the same way, for example, as double and half, and father and son are opposed. This is not to say, Thomas adds parenthetically, that 'unity' and 'measure' are synonymous terms, because unity would then be opposed in itself to multitude. Considered in themselves, therefore, unity causes and constitutes multitude, but according to their properties, they remain opposed.[94]

With respect to the second question, Aristotle maintains that 'privation' is known by way of 'possession', as sickness, for example, is known through health. Similarly, indivision or unity is known through division or multitude, with the result that multitude is a 'possession' through which unity is known as a 'privation'.[95] On the other hand, Gabirol holds that unity is a perfection that causes and retains multitude, gives it being and exists in all its parts. 'Privation', however, does not give being

to 'possession', but, as the word itself signifies, deprives it of being.[96]

To dispel the disagreement, Thomas has only to recall his earlier distinction between imagination and understanding.[97] As Avicenna has said, unity is better known to the intellect than multitude. This is synonymous with saying that unity, when considered absolutely, or according to nature itself, is better known than multitude, whereas multitude is better known than unity to sense and imagination.[98] In apprehension, which takes place by way of sense and imagination, we arrive at an intellectual knowledge of unity through the image of multitude in the senses. In this respect, multitude becomes a 'possession' or perfection in relation to unity as the corresponding 'privation'. According to nature, however, or with respect to the intellect alone, the contrary must be maintained; unity is a 'possession', and multitude a 'privation'.[99] In other words, Aristotle and Gabirol are both right, but Aristotle is speaking according to the process of knowing, while Gabirol is speaking according to nature and intellectual truth.

The next inquiry concerns the kind of unity that is opposed to multitude. We have seen that there is a sense

in which the unity that causes and measures multitude is quantitative unity. Is it this same unity that is opposed to multitude, or is it ontological unity, or is it both?[100]

As a propaedeutic to his own reply, Thomas presents the solution of Averroes. According to 'the Commentator', numerical or quantitative unity is opposed to multitude in the order of quantity, but not to multitude in the order of being, unless we identify, as Avicenna does, numerical unity with ontological unity.[101] But if we properly distinguish between these two kinds of unity, then 'the one' and 'the many' in the order of quantity are both subordinate to 'the one' convertible with being. Accordingly, it would be impossible to conceive of an opposition between ontological unity and quantitative multitude, or between numerical unity and entitative multitude.[102] Here Thomas draws attention to the fact that Averroes, who insists on the primacy of numerical unity,[103] still maintains that numerical unity cannot be opposed to entitative multitude. In other words, even though Averroes considers numerical unity to be the most basic kind of unity, he denies that it is the unity that is opposed to entitative multitude.

Proceeding to ontological unity, it is evident that this unity is opposed to multitude, because being is

divided into 'the one' and 'the many', which are mutually opposed to one another. On the other hand, it would seem that 'the one' and 'the many' cannot be opposed, but are co-extensive with one another, insofar as 'the many' exists, or possesses being, and being is convertible with 'the one'.[104]

Averroes, however, resolves this difficulty by distinguishing between the mode of signification and the subject of signification. In the signification of any term, there is the quality, notion or mode according to which the term signifies, and there is the subject or thing signified. Now although 'one' and 'being' signify the same thing according to subject, they do not signify the same thing according to mode. The term 'one', according to its mode of signification, contains the quality of indivision, which distinguishes it from the signification of 'being'. It is by virtue of this quality of 'indivision', which belongs to the signification of the term 'one', that 'the one' and 'the many' in the order of being are opposed, or that ontological unity is opposed to entitative multitude.[105]

From Thomas' presentation, it would appear at first that he is adopting the solution of Averroes as his own. But if he were, Thomas' doctrine of unity would be subject to the same inconsistency that he observed in the thought

of 'the Commentator'. Ontological unity, and not numerical unity, would be opposed to entitative multitude, even though numerical unity is more primary and more worthy to be called 'one'. On the other hand, he cannot affirm that numerical unity, considered wholly in the category of quantity, is opposed to entitative multitude, because this is only possible when numerical unity is identified with ontological unity. To do this would be to repeat the error of Avicenna that was duly criticized by Averroes. Although Thomas seeks to understand the function of ontological unity in the light of numerical unity, and accordingly considers numerical unity as primary, he nevertheless draws a distinction between the two.

Thomas tries to escape the dilemma by transcending the cleavage between the two kinds of unity. He maintains that the quality of indivision belongs not only to ontological unity but to numerical unity as well.[106] Consequently, just as Averroes holds that ontological unity, through its quality of indivision, is opposed to entitative multitude, so too numerical unity is similarly opposed. The two unities are different from one another not through their common quality of indivision, but through their respective subjects, which place them in two diverse

orders, namely that of quantity as distinct from that of being. Viewed, however, in relation to their common quality of indivision, both unities are equally opposed to the division of any kind of multitude. In this manner, Thomas endeavours to oppose numerical unity and entitative multitude, without falling into Avicenna's error of wholly identifying numerical and ontological unity. The alternative solution of Averroes, which maintains that ontological unity alone is opposed to entitative multitude, is not satisfactory to Thomas, since it detracts from the primacy of numerical unity.

Simultaneous with Thomas' inquiry concerning the kind of unity that is opposed to entitative multitude, we have gained a further insight into his position on the primacy of numerical unity. Considered in its complete signification, that is, according to both mode and subject, numerical unity is distinct from, and subordinate to ontological unity, similarly considered. But when numerical and ontological unity are viewed solely in relation to their common mode of signification, or in other words, in relation to their common quality of indivision, numerical unity is primary. This is true because the notion of indivision has its origin in numerical unity rather than

in ontological unity. For this reason, Thomas has said that since we cannot conceive of anything more indivisible than the unity of 'one' in the category of quantity, this unity is absolutely one, and prior to all other unities.[107]

To climax Thomas' philosophy of unity, there is one final question, which concerns whether or not the proposition Only one exists is true. It would appear that since being is divided into 'the one' and 'the many', any proposition that excludes 'the many' is false. Moreover, as a corollary to the conclusion that every unity is opposed to multitude, it would seem to follow that the proposition Only one exists is absolutely false. For the term 'one', through its quality of indivision, always excludes 'the many', even when 'one' represents ontological unity.[108]

When, however, we take into account both aspects of signification, we realize that the exclusion can be made with respect to either the mode or the subject of signification. Now since ontological unity is convertible with being, the subjects of 'one', understood ontologically, will be equivalent to the subjects of 'being'. According to subject, therefore, the term 'one', understood ontologically, is all-embracive, since there is nothing outside

of ontological unity to be excluded, just as there is nothing outside of being. In this respect, 'the many' is included in the signification of the term 'one', with the result that the statement Only one exists is true. But according to the mode of signification, the term 'one', through its quality or notion of indivision, excludes 'the many' with its opposing notion of division. When the term 'one' is viewed in this manner, the proposition is false. Thomas does not resolve the question further, but concludes that a decisive answer must wait for a more profound investigation.[109]

In actual fact, however, Thomas has already given his answer, but it is one that favours neither side to the exclusion of the other. The proposition Only one exists is true and false at the same time, but in different respects, consequent upon the ambivalent nature of signification. From the viewpoint of the quality of indivision, which belongs to the signification of the term 'one', the proposition is false, since 'the many' is excluded. From the viewpoint of the subjects of the term 'one', the proposition is true, since 'the many' is included under 'the one', just as 'the many' is included under 'being'. On the basis of Thomas' formal manner of procedure in dealing

with a problem, we can be reasonably sure that this is his position. As a rule, he presents the two sides of a question, and then affirms the truth of both sides in different respects, rather than decide in favour of one to the exclusion of the other. In the present instance, therefore, if he remains true to form, he is maintaining that the proposition Only one exists is true and false at the same time.

Moreover, when we consider the subject-matter involved, the probability of this being Thomas' true solution approximates certitude. The simultaneous affirmation and denial of the proposition is the only solution compatible with the stand he takes throughout his exposition of unity. A solution that involved an exclusive affirmation or denial would vitiate the whole trend of his thought. At the very beginning of Book VI, he rejects the position that everything is one to the exclusion of many, and similarly, that everything is many to the exclusion of one.[110] He then proceeds to develop his doctrine of unity, constantly bearing in mind the existence of multiplicity. Tacitly accepting multiplicity as a fact, he seeks for its causes in the passive numbering of matter and the active numbering of substantial form, which leads him to the primacy of

numerical unity as an active cause and measure of number. Finally, the difficulties in the order of knowledge, such as the 'definitions' of unity in terms of multitude, and the opposition between unity and multitude, stem from his assent to the existence of multiplicity. His whole philosophy of unity, which is in the neoplatonic tradition of an all-encompassing unity, is tempered by the empiricism of Aristotle, with its recognition of multiplicity as an indisputable fact of experience.

Under the influence of the Aristotelian inquiry into the world of nature, and, perhaps, in reaction to the universe described by William of Auvergne, Thomas has, philosophically speaking, proceeded beyond the School of Chartres to emphasize the role of a created unity. His doctrine is inspired mainly by Gabirol, Boethius and Augustine, and is nourished throughout by the effective use of Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes. It is universal form in general that constitutes created unity. Specifically, when we take into account the hierarchy that exists in creation, it is the highest form, namely universal spiritual form, that constitutes created unity. This unity, through which spiritual creatures exist and become one, contains as well the lower unities of a universal corporeal form,

through which corruptible and incorruptible bodies exist and become one, and a universal natural form, through which corruptible bodies exist and become one. None of these universal forms exists as such, but each is 'universal' in the sense of something common to the many substantial forms of existing composites. The unity, through which each composite exists and becomes one, is the individual substantial form of the composite. Although this unity is received immediately from God, Who is the primary source of all unity and perfection, its perfection in the created order is first present in the highest form, namely the universal form of spiritual substances.

Concomitant with its unifying function, the unity of substantial form actively numbers matter to cause 'formal number', or multiplicity among substances and accidents. The primacy of numerical unity is implicit in this role of substantial unity, since the notion of numbering originates with numerical unity. This primacy is also realized from the fact that the essential perfection of unity, namely indivisibility, is found first in numerical unity. But the basic reason why Thomas considers numerical unity as prior to all other unities is that he views the being of reality, in its multiplicity, as a kind of number, and

number is measured and caused by numerical unity. In brief, created unity is universal form, primarily universal spiritual form; and the perfection of unity possessed by form is fundamentally the perfection of numerical unity.[111]

Chapter 2

Created Nature and Secondary Causes

In his doctrine of unity, we have seen Thomas of York presenting a metaphysics of created being in terms of a primary causal unity. Turning now to his doctrine of created nature, we see him endeavouring to show how one kind of being, namely that of corporeal substance, can produce other beings of a similar nature. Just as he attributes to creatures in general a fundamental unity of their own, so too, in this new endeavour, he seeks to attribute to corporeal creatures the capacity necessary to generate their kind.

The significance of Thomas' effort can be appreciated in the light of William of Auvergne's reaction to Avicenna's doctrine of 'mediate creation'. According to Avicenna, the First Cause has only one immediate effect, a first Intelligence, which arises from the First Cause through a necessary intellectual procession. Similarly, a second Intelligence proceeds in a necessary manner from the first, a third from the second, and so on, down to the tenth and lowest of the Intelligences. The forms of all things that exist, or can exist, are contained in this last Intelligence as possible beings with an existence of their

own. These 'possibles' or forms are constantly and necessarily being radiated into the matter of the universe below, and accordingly, the Intelligence from which they emanate is aptly described as a dator formarum, or a 'giver of forms'. Whether beings actually come into, and remain in existence is contingent upon the disposition of matter for the reception of form. If matter is suitably disposed, a form is necessarily received, and an actual being results; if not, no form is received, and no being results. Moreover, when the matter of an actual being ceases to be suitably disposed, the form necessarily departs from matter, and an actual being ceases to exist. The contingency of material being arises from matter; its necessity, from the necessary emanation of form. An actually existing material being, therefore, when considered in relation to the dator formarum, and ultimately to the First Cause, exists necessarily, and at the same time, considered in itself, retains the possible existence it has independently of its union with matter. For this reason, Avicenna can describe an actually existing material being as a 'possible-by-itself-necessary-by-another'.[1]

William of Auvergne finds fault with this metaphysics on two counts: first, the explanation of the procession

of creatures from God, and secondly, the status attributed to creatures in themselves. With respect to the procession of creatures, he is opposed to the restriction of God's immediate causal efficacy to one effect, and to the Intelligences sharing in the creative causality of God and mediating between Him and creatures. He is also opposed to the necessitarian character of this procession, according to which forms proceed necessarily from a separate Intelligence, and in which a series of Intelligences proceeds necessarily from God as the First Cause. With respect to the status of creatures in themselves, he is opposed to making matter the cause of contingency, and to the notion that things have a possible existence of their own apart from any outside cause. Finally, he is opposed to the pre-supposition on which the latter is based, namely that potency exists with a being of its own prior to its actualization.[2]

The world of William of Auvergne can be viewed as a reaction against these elements of Avicenna's thought. Concerning the procession of creatures, William of Auvergne maintains that God is more immediately present to creatures than they are to themselves, for He is at the heart of every creature.[3] Accordingly, the separate Intelligences

cannot perform the role of 'creative' substances interposed between God and His effects, nor can they act even as simple, 'motive' substances. There is, therefore, no series of mediating causes through which the work of the creator is channelled. On the contrary, creatures derive their existence as well as their natures and operations directly from God.[4]

Concerning the status of creatures, William holds that the causal power of creatures is nothing but the will of the Creator; their contingency and operations are solely dependent upon the Divine Will, and not on the disposition of matter. Accordingly, God is not only the proper and unique cause of things, but the sole cause; created causes are not really causes at all. Everything outside God is but a window, through which passes the light of Divine causality,[5] with the result that, outside God, everything is false in itself. The universe in itself does not exist, since it cannot exist by virtue of an intrinsic nor an extrinsic cause. It cannot exist by intrinsic cause, since only falsity and nothingness exist in the universe, considered in itself. Nor can it exist by an extrinsic cause, since there is nothing in the universe, considered in itself, to receive existence from an outside agent.[6] The

possibility of the universe is to God as air is to light, insofar as air has no illuminative capacity of its own.[7] In other words, potency in itself does not exist; it possesses existence only in actual being, since actual being is the only kind of being that exists.[8]

It is against this doctrinal background that Thomas of York enters the picture. Whether or not his opponent is actually William of Auvergne is difficult to establish, but it is certain that he is opposed to those who accept the kind of universe described by William. In particular, he objects to the notion that God alone is a true agent or active power, and that created causes are not really causes at all. He objects as well to the subsequent position that potency cannot exist prior to its actualization.[9] Some men (aliqui), Thomas says, have maintained that potency does not exist prior to its actualization, - that it exists only when actualized. But to say that potency exists only when it is actualized amounts to saying that potency does not exist at all. When potency becomes actualized, potency no longer exists as potency, since it has passed into act. Moreover, potency and act cannot exist simultaneously, or something cannot be in potency when it is in act, because potency is opposed to act.

Unless, therefore, potency exists prior to its actualization, it does not exist at all. Those who say, consequently, that potency does not exist prior to its actualization, and that it exists only when actualized, deny the existence of potency entirely.[10]

Thomas points out that to make such a denial would be to affirm the various impossibilities outlined by Aristotle against the Megarian school.[11] Nobody would be a builder except when he is building. Even if one should admit that a man could be a builder when he is not actually building, and yet should deny that potency preceded act, a man would be a builder when he did not have the capacity to build. Sensible things, for example that which is hot or cold, would not exist except when they are actually being sensed. The same animal on the same day would be alternately blind and seeing, because as often as he closed his eyes, he would be blind; he would have no capacity or natural aptitude to see. It would also follow that nothing could exist that does not already exist, and this is impossible. It would be necessary for one who proposed this doctrine to deny the existence of prime matter, because prime matter is essentially a potency to form. Likewise, a person who is now sitting

would always be sitting, because he would not be able to rise. Furthermore, when someone performs an act, either he performs an act for which he had a prior capacity or not. If he had this capacity, then potency would exist before act; if not, then he performs the impossible. There would be no difference between the possible and the impossible, with the result that the impossible could be said to follow from the impossible.

According to Thomas, those who maintain the contrary, namely that potency as such does not exist, were of the opinion that only actual beings exist, and that there is only one agent, the First Cause, that possesses any active potency or power. They maintained that there is nothing in caused beings except passive potency, and consequently, God was considered to be the immediate active cause of all things.[12]

In the light of our review of William of Auvergne's thought, there is no doubt that the position Thomas of York is attacking belongs either to William of Auvergne or to someone whose views bear a striking resemblance to those of William of Auvergne. Assuming that the <u>aliqui</u> to whom Thomas refers is actually William of Auvergne, Thomas is saying that according to him, if potential being possessed

an existence of its own, as Avicenna maintains, created causes might be regarded as capable of rendering this being actual. But if potency in itself did not exist, created causes would be powerless to bring beings into existence, since they could not actualize that which did not exist. The only way in which actual beings could come into existence would be through the creative power of God. He could then be regarded as the immediate active cause of all things, to the exclusion of all other causes. Because this is the very position that William of Auvergne wishes to assert, he denies the existence of all potency in creatures except passive potency, and maintains that potency does not exist prior to act. The result is that not even passive potency can be considered to exist outside of actual being. Moreover, since potency cannot exist simultaneously with act in actual being, Thomas argues that this position entails the denial of potency altogether in creatures.

Having shown the irrational conclusions to which such a denial leads, Thomas rejects the doctrine that inspired it. He states that if God were the immediate, active cause of all things to the exclusion of all other causes, there would be no multiplicity of operations or powers,

or principles of operation. If there were no multiplicity of powers, there would be no multiplicity of essences to which powers belong. In other words, all things would be one, - a position which Thomas dismisses as absurd.[13] With this, Thomas brings to a close his arguments against the kind of universe described by William of Auvergne.

He then begins to explain his own position on the nature of potency and the existence of active potencies and causes in creatures. On the nature of potency, he maintains that although potency does not exist as being absolutely, it is not non-being or nothing.[14] If potency did not have some kind of being, that which is potential in things could not have actual existence in our knowledge; it could not be known. Moreover, definitions of potency and act imply the existence of potency as well as act. Potency and act are relative to each other, and accordingly, the definition of one involves the definition of the other. To exist actually is to exist, and not merely potentially, whereas to exist potentially is indeed to exist, but not actually.[15] Potency, then, does exist. It is neither being absolutely nor non-being. It exists with a degree of being between these two extremes.[16]

The amount of being that Thomas attributes to potency can be seen from the way in which he regards potency in

terms of its relationship to different kinds of act. Act is basically of three different types. There is, first of all, the division between perfect act, which is the complement and form of matter, and imperfect act. The latter is twofold. There is imperfect act, which is perfectible, namely motion, and there is imperfect act, which is not perfectible, namely the parts of a continuum. With respect to the latter, some potency always remains attached to the act of any part, so that potency for further division accompanies successive acts to infinity. The first two kinds of act - form and motion - are truly and properly acts; the third kind is not truly act because of its accompanying potency.

To each of these acts, there is related a corresponding potency. Accordingly, the potency of matter for form and the potency for movement are truly and properly potencies; they are related to acts that complete and fulfill them. On the other hand, the potency in the division of a continuum is not truly and properly potency, since it is not related to an act completing and fulfilling it. Instead, it is related to the individual parts that become actual through the division, which parts are in potency to further division, and so on, to infinity.[17]

The potency with which Thomas is concerned is proper potency, - the kind of passive capacity for act that exists in matter and motion. Speaking of this potency, he says that it is impossible for something to be eternally in potency without ever passing into act, because it is impossible for something possible never to become actual.[18] Otherwise, potency would be purposeless, and there is nothing purposeless in nature. As Gabirol says, 'the cause of potency's existence is that its perfection passes into act'.[19] For example, a thing is not corrupted by the power of some agent, but through the potency or capacity of the possible to become actual.[20] This is to say that the true cause of the change involved in corruption is not found in the efficient cause, but in the potency for change in the subject. Given the existence of potency for corruption, actual corruption must sooner or later occur. The being of potency is such that it must pass into act; otherwise, potency would not be potency.

The kind of being, therefore, that Thomas considers potency to have is a mode of being between absolute being and non-being, with such an exigency for act that it could not exist unless it were to become actual. In advancing this position, Thomas is preparing the way for attributing

some role to efficient causes in nature. If one admits a sufficient measure of perfection and being to potency, one can consider created agents to be capable of rendering such being actual. We shall see that this is the direction his thought takes, - the same direction, it might be added, that was taken by his renowned contemporary, St. Bonaventure. In a vein similar to Thomas of York, Bonaventure maintains that act and potency are simply two different modes or dispositions of being with a real continuity between them permitting the development of one from the other. The difference, he says, separating these modes of being is not very great, since the action of a created agent can bridge the gap between them.[21]

Nor does the resemblance between their doctrines of potency and causality end here. Like St. Bonaventure, Thomas of York proceeds to make the task of secondary causes still less difficult with a doctrine of 'active potencies'.[22] According to Thomas, although that which is potential must become actual, it needs the act to which it is in potency in order to become actual. The passive potency of matter becomes actualized only upon the reception of form or active potency. Now there are two possible sources for this form or active potency. It may be

received from an outside agent, or it may co-exist in some way within the passive potency of matter. In works of art, the form is received from the artist, who is outside the product of his art. Similarly in the case of the Intelligences and the human soul, the form is received by matter from God as an extrinsic cause. The matter of Intelligences and human souls is purely passive, and consequently, their forms must come from without.[23]

But in natural things belonging to the material order, matter cannot be purely in a state of passive potency receiving forms from outside, because then there would be no active principle of change in nature itself. Nature would assume the aspect of violence, in which forms are forced upon a subject, or art, in which forms are impressed upon a subject. As opposed, therefore, to the purely passive potency of matter found in subjects of violence and art-products, as well as in Intelligences and human souls, the matter of natural bodies must be accompanied by active potency or form, if nature is not to lose its meaning as an 'intrinsic active principle of change'.[24]

To explain his notion of nature as an 'intrinsic active principle of change', Thomas turns to the second book of the Physics, where Aristotle defines nature as

'a principle of motion and rest belonging to that in which it exists essentially and not accidentally'.[25] Aristotle explains that 'belonging to that in which it exists' distinguishes nature from things that are not natural, in which the principle of motion comes from without. 'Essentially' distinguishes it from art, which exists in the artist, but is by its very nature operative with respect to the art-product in which it exists accidentally. Of course, sometimes the art is operative with respect to the artist himself, but this is accidental, as in the case of a doctor curing himself.[26] Nature, on the other hand, is a principle of motion that exists essentially in that which moves, and not in another. It is not a principle existing in another, but in the essence of the thing moving, inasmuch as it is the essence of the thing as moving.[27]

Not only does Aristotle describe nature as 'a principle of motion', Thomas continues, but also as 'a principle of rest', because just as something is naturally moved, so it may naturally be at rest.[28] Just as movement to form is natural, so rest in that form is natural insofar as the movement is ordered to that form.[29] Nature, therefore, is a principle of movement to form as to an end, and a principle of rest in that form as in an end.

For Aristotle, accordingly, the term 'nature' is predicated primarily of form, and only relatively of matter and the composite. It is predicated primarily of form, because form is the essential and primary principle of movement and rest in natural things. It is predicated relatively of matter and the composite, because matter receives form, and the composite already possesses form.[30]

Thomas concludes that in view of Aristotle's explanation of 'nature', the 'nature' of a thing might be aptly described in the words of Averroes as an 'active natural potency'.[31] 'Nature', understood in a universal sense, would signify all 'active natural potencies', taken collectively. Thomas explains that 'active potency' is the term used to describe any active principle of movement or change. The term 'natural' is used to distinguish the active potencies of nature from those of art, which exist first in the artist, and then accidentally in the thing made by the artist.[32]

In this way, Thomas identifies Aristotle's conception of nature with the doctrine of active natural potencies. He is saying that, according to Aristotle, unless forms are already in matter prior to the existence of actual being, they would have to come from an outside agent.

This would make nature no different from art, or reduce it to a kind of violence. Nature, as an 'intrinsic active principle of movement', would cease to exist, with the result that nature could no longer be described in terms of 'active natural potency'. Nature, as defined by Aristotle, would be destroyed if these active potencies did not exist in the passive potency of matter prior to the becoming of actual being, because nature is one with these potencies.

In order to make such an identification, Thomas has had to take considerable liberty with the original doctrine of nature and change in Aristotle. Although Aristotle speaks of natures or forms as 'intrinsic active principles of change',[33] he does not mean that they are active powers present in matter prior to generation. He means, rather, that they are intrinsic to the actual being of the composite, in which they are active principles of operation. The forms of composites exist only in composites; they do not pre-exist actually in matter. It is the privation of form, not form in some inchoative sense, that pre-exists in matter as its subject. Although Aristotle speaks of forms existing potentially in matter, this merely means that matter is in potency to receive form, or that it is

inclined towards form as its end. This potency or inclination can only be fulfilled through the reception of form from an outside agent, since there is nothing in matter but the privation of form, and matter, in itself, is purely the passive capacity for form and the substratum of change.[34]

For Thomas, on the other hand, if forms were received by a purely passive matter from an outside agent, nature would lose its meaning as an intrinsic active principle of change. The forms must in some way be present in matter prior to change, and we have seen how Thomas chooses to speak of their presence in matter as 'active natural potencies'.

To explain the kind of being that these potencies possess, Thomas finally turns to the true source of his doctrine, namely Augustine's doctrine of nature. According to Augustine, the customary course of nature has certain laws of its own, certain determined inclinations, directive forces, primordial causes, numbers or roots. From these, arise the birth and development, the harmony and proportion, as well as the death and corruption of all things.[35] because their perfection resembles the germinal power of seeds, these laws or forces of nature are called <u>rationes seminales</u> or 'seminal principles'.[36]

Augustine tells us that these seminal principles, whether they be called potencies, causes or numbers, do not possess material quantity, but quantity in the form of power. Their nature cannot be divided quantitatively, since it is wholly present in each individual part. For example, a whole tree or animal can develop from half a seed, and many can be born from just one seed.[37] They are invisible; the eye cannot see the hidden nature of a thing any more than it can see boyhood in a boy or youth in a young man. But although hidden to the eyes of sense, their nature is not hidden to the eye of the mind.[38] They are incorporeally woven into corporeal things.[39] From these potencies or 'numbers', arises everything that exists in the natural order. All things that come into being from these hidden 'seeds' owe their origin, development and formal differences to them as original, regulative causes. The qualitative and quantitative perfections of things owe their existence to the immaterial nature of these causes.[40] Consequently, it might be said that there is traced in the corporeal nature of matter that which does not yet exist, or even that which is hidden, but which will exist or appear in the course of time.[41] According to Augustine, therefore, nature is composed of seminal

principles that are virtually, immaterially and invisibly present in matter, and constitute the source of all material being.

Thomas says that these seminal principles are what he himself has described as 'active natural potencies', and that they comprise what Aristotle means by 'nature'.[42] They are the aristotelian forms or natures, although, as they exist in matter, they are incomplete, since they are in a state of privation with respect to the complete forms of actual composites.[43]

Thomas now proceeds to state his true motive for maintaining the doctrine of active natural potencies. He says that the incomplete being of these forms, active potencies, or seminal principles requires an efficient cause to bring them to completion.[44] The incomplete forms, however, are not affected essentially as forms by the agent or efficient cause, but only accidentally, insofar as they are in the passive potency of matter.[45] It is their presence in matter that requires the agency of an efficient cause. The forms of Intelligences and human souls, which are not in matter previous to the actual existence of the Intelligence or soul, are not caused, even accidentally, by some created agent. But since the forms of bodies

already exist as active potencies or seminal principles in matter, they accidentally require an efficient cause, insofar as they are in the passive potency of matter, although they do not require one essentially. Even though Thomas has in this manner reduced the role of efficient causes to the accidental order, the fact remains that he regards them as necessary, and he claims that the various names attributed to the forces of nature by Augustine bear out this necessity. 'This is the true reason', Thomas says, 'for using these names to describe nature'.[46] In other words, the term 'seminal principles', for example, aptly expresses the meaning of 'active natural potencies', because these potencies are like seeds, which have to be nourished and cultivated by an extrinsic cause in order to develop and grow to maturity. 'Seminal principles' is a most suitable expression to describe nature or active natural potencies, because it brings to mind the extrinsic role of an efficient cause, just as the term 'seed', itself, brings to mind a planter and cultivator.

To render his position on active potencies and causes in nature more evident, he points out its advantages over two opposing positions, which he regards as erroneous. These are the doctrines of the <u>dator formarum</u> in Avicenna,

and the latitatio formarum, which Thomas attributes to Empedocles.[47]

Avicenna's position that all forms proceed from a separate Intelligence that acts as a dator formarum is unacceptable, because this would destroy any notion of nature as an intrinsic active principle of change. We have already seen that every creature receives its perfections and modes of being from hidden and invisible principles within the creature itself. Everything contains beforehand in a hidden, virtual and causal manner that which comes forth and unfolds at a fitting time in the progress of nature. This is so true that all forms may be said to have 'seeds' in matter. Just as the art-form is potentially in the artist, so the natural form to be generated is potentially in the 'seed'. As Averroes says, in the same way that in things generated from seeds, the forms are from the generating seeds, so in things not generated from seeds, the forms arise from that which resembles seeds. The 'seed' from which the complete being of a thing develops is implanted in nature by God. Consequently, the form that develops from the 'seed' is not given, any more than the 'seed' itself, by some created dator formarum mediating between God and creatures.[48]

Similarly, if active potencies are like seeds, the error of Empedocles in maintaining that forms are completely actual, but hidden, is evident. Natural forms do not exist as completely actualized forms in 'seeds', but only virtually and causally. If the forms are hidden in the 'seeds' or principles, they are hidden in the same way that effects are hidden in causes, that is to say, naturally and potentially. Thomas then concludes with the statement that because the forms are only potentially in matter, they need an efficient cause to actualize them.[49]

Prior to their actualization, therefore, forms are not merely potential in matter after the manner of passive potency. This would mean that matter has nothing more than the passive capacity to receive forms, as in the doctrine of the dator formarum. In this doctrine, the forms are received completely from without, leaving no room for efficient causes in nature. Nor are they present as wholly actual, because then there would be no need for an efficient cause to actualize them. For this reason, Thomas concludes that Aristotle chose wisely a position mid-way between the doctrine of a latitatio formarum and the doctrine of a dator formarum.[50] The mid-position to which Thomas refers is his own doctrine of active

natural potencies, according to which forms are present in matter as seminal principles. Of course, as we have seen, this is not the position of Aristotle, but Thomas' interpretation of it, in the light of his basic augustinian formation and his reading of Averroes.[51] The doctrine of active natural potencies is a 'wise' choice, because in Thomas' eyes it is the only one of the three doctrines that affords secondary causes any place in the universe.

St. Bonaventure suggests the same three possible solutions to the problem of secondary causality, namely that of a dator formarum, a latitatio formarum, and thirdly, that of rationes seminales, or 'seminal principles', which he similarly accepts as the true solution.[52] Like Thomas, St. Bonaventure describes these principles as forms existing virtually in matter that give rise to actual forms. They are essentially forms in a state of incomplete being. In the minds of both, the germinal and incomplete character of these principles requires that there be an extrinsic agent, which causes the seminal principles to develop and become actual. According to St. Bonaventure, the only real function of such an agent is to excite and awaken the potentialities existing in these principles.[53]

The doctrines of active potency and efficient causality become clearer when Thomas considers the principles involved in natural phenomena as opposed to miracles. Thomas says that there are two kinds of principles: those that exist only in God, and those that exist in creatures as well as in God. The latter exist as completely actual in God, but as partially potential in matter, where they exist as active potencies, or principles that constitute the laws of the customary course of nature. Things that come into being in the usual manner do not owe their existence to a dator formarum, nor to the prior presence of completely actual forms in matter, however hidden they may be. Rather, things owe their existence to principles that are concreated with matter, called 'active natural potencies'. They are not potentially in matter simply in the sense that matter can receive them from an extrinsic source, nor are they present in matter as wholly actual, although hidden. They are present, rather, as incomplete forms that can only be completed through the agency of an efficient cause. They are present as seminal principles, whose generative power produces all corporeal things with the co-operation of an efficient cause.[54]

Thomas says that besides these principles of nature, there are other principles, which God possesses in Himself, concealed from creatures. That is to say, they are not given to those things that He has made. These are the principles of those events that happen outside the ordinary course of nature, such as the miracles described in Scripture: 'Dry wood without roots flowering from earth and water and bearing fruit; a sterile woman giving birth; or an ass speaking, and things of this kind.'[55] Although nature does not possess these principles actually, or as active potencies, it does possess them in passive potency, or in the sense that matter can receive them from an extrinsic cause. This cause cannot be found in the created order; it can only be found in God, the First Cause and Creator of all things. Accordingly, Thomas says that although God did not give these principles to nature as active natural potencies, He gave them in another way, so that nature would be subject to a more powerful will than nature itself. These principles resemble the 'Ideas' of Plato, with whom, according to Thomas, Aristotle may have disagreed more in word than in fact. 'Because Aristotle did not know these principles', Thomas says, 'or because he knew that they did not exist in the

production of natural things according to the customary course of nature, he denied the existence of a dator formarum absolutely. However, these causal principles, are, perhaps, what Plato meant by the Ideas, which, he maintained, were necessary for generation, and which he regarded as datores formarum. Although Aristotle and Averroes opposed his position, it may have been more a verbal than a true disagreement.'[56]

Thomas, therefore, does not rule out absolutely the doctrine of a dator formarum, but uses it to explain the miraculous. In his philosophy of nature, he wishes to allow for the possibility of events outside the ordinary course of nature that come into being directly from God as the 'giver of forms'. Besides active potencies, then, there exist in matter passive potencies for the reception of forms beyond the natural order. The incomplete forms of active potencies can be brought to completion by created efficient causes. The passive potencies, however, can only be actualized by God, since they constitute nothing more than the passive capacity of matter to receive forms.

In this respect, Thomas' doctrine of passive potencies in matter is the same as the doctrine of 'obediential

potencies' in St. Bonaventure. St. Bonaventure defines 'obediential potency' as the possibility inherent in created nature to become what God can will and does will. As such, it is a purely passive potency, which unlike the active potencies of seminal principles, excludes all aptitude for self-realization.[57]

Throughout Thomas' explanation of active natural potencies, he has consistently shown how the doctrine calls for the presence of efficient causes in nature. This can be seen in his description of these potencies as seminal principles, in conjunction with his treatment of the advantages that his position holds over those of Avicenna and Empedocles. Similarly, his delineation of the natural in contrast to the miraculous serves to bring into relief the effective role of secondary causes in nature. As seminal principles, active natural potencies require an outside agent to awaken their virtual powers and to cultivate and nourish them to maturity. This position is a 'wise' choice over those of a <u>dator formarum</u> and a <u>latitatio formarum</u>, because it alone allows for the presence of efficient causes in created nature. As principles of nature, active natural potencies can be brought to completion by created agents, while the passive potencies of miracles can only be actualized by God.

In Thomas' notion of nature as a whole, we have seen that he attributes to creatures the perfection that William of Auvergne's philosophy denies them. In opposition to Avicenna, William of Auvergne maintains that there is nothing but passive potency in creatures. Inasmuch as this passive potency has no existence of its own prior to act, no created agent can draw being out of potency into act. The result is that God is the only true cause. Thomas disagrees with this conclusion, and proceeds to refute what he considers to be the premise on which it is based. It is not true to say that potency has no existence of its own prior to act, because this amounts to saying that potency does not exist at all, and this is absurd. On the contrary, not only does potency exist, but it exists in such a way that it must, of necessity, become actual. Accordingly, matter, which is an example of potency, possesses a being of its own and an inner necessity for act. In addition, it possesses active potencies, incomplete forms, or seminal principles, which have a germinal power and directive energy to develop into the complete forms of actual beings. Since matter contains these capacities for self-development, Thomas does not find it necessary to call upon God as the only cause

capable of assisting in the 'education' of forms from matter. Created agents are equal to the task. It is true that active potencies do not essentially require an efficient cause to actualize them, since they already possess a degree of actuality. Nevertheless, the incomplete forms of active potencies accidentally require an efficient cause in order to become wholly actual, since they exist in the passive potency of matter. In short, the desire to attribute an efficacy to created agents underlies Thomas' whole conception of nature, which involves his doctrines of potency and active natural potencies.

Chapter 3

The Unity of Created Truth

Up to now, Thomas of York has been concerned with the nature of being in the real order. First, he has shown that there exists in things a created unity that is the first created source of perfection and being in creatures. Secondly, he has shown that there exist natural active potencies, which, with the aid of created agents, give rise to physical being. In attributing a basic unity to creatures, and a causal efficacy to created agents, we have seen that he is trying to uphold the perfection of created being.

But there is another kind of being to consider, namely the being of truth, or the being of things as they exist in our minds. Is the nature of being in our minds, like the nature of being in reality, essentially a unity? Moreover, can truth, like unity and causal efficacy, be attributed to creatures? In other words, are creatures true by virtue of a created truth proper to them, or are they true solely by virtue of Divine Truth?

Thomas poses the question concerning the created or uncreated nature of truth not only in these terms, but in terms of the problem of 'the one and the many' in the

order of truth. If the truth by which creatures are true is Divine Truth alone, truth will be one; if the truth by which creatures are true is not only Divine Truth, but created truth as well, then there will be at least these two kinds of truth. Not only that, but insofar as every creature is a true creature, there will be the same number of truths as there are creatures. Accordingly, truth will be many. But, as in his doctrines of unity and causality, Thomas is fundamentally interested in the perfection that can be ascribed to creatures. Do creatures, then, possess a truth of their own, or is it simply the presence of Divine Truth in them that causes them to be true?[1]

The problem arises out of the Christian platonism of Augustine and Anselm. Plato himself was understood by mediaeval writers like William of Auvergne to maintain that things possess no truth in themselves, but are true solely in the one separate Idea of truth.[2] Similar to this interpretation of Plato, Augustine and Anselm hold that there is only one truth, namely the Divine.[3] At the same time, however, they both speak of truth as though it were many.[4] Thomas recognizes that the seeming contradiction stems from their common understanding of the nature

of truth. Consequently, before presenting the arguments pro and con, as well as his resolution of the problem, Thomas inquires into the augustinian-anselmian conception of truth.

Every truth, Thomas says, is an 'adequation' or 'rightness'. The notion of truth as an 'adequation' can best be understood from what is meant by a man's speaking the truth. A man speaks the truth when a thing is as he says it is, or in other words, when there is an adequation or correspondence between his words and the thing. Similarly, but in a more perfect manner, truth can be said to exist in the mind when there is an adequation of the concept with the thing. Even Divine Truth can be understood in terms of 'adequation', provided that we conceive of God as Adequation Itself as well as That Which Is Adequated, since He is an absolutely simple being.[5]

Truth can also be understood as a 'rightness', since adequation is a kind of rightness.[6] Anselm describes the truth of anything as a rightness, insofar as that which is true, is true when it is 'right', or when it is what it 'should' be and does what it 'should' do. For example, a proposition is true when it signifies what it should. A man holds a true opinion when what he thinks of as

existing, actually does exist, and when what he thinks of as not existing, actually does not exist. In other words, a man holds a true opinion when he thinks as he should, or when his thought is right. A will is true when it wills what it should, or when it wills that for the sake of which it was made. An action is true when it is right, or when it is what it should be and does what it should do. Similarly, the senses are true when they report what they should. Finally, one can regard the truth of things as a rightness, because their truth is what they are in the highest Truth. When a thing is what it is there, it is what it should be, and since everything that exists corresponds to its source in God, everything that exists, exists rightly and truly.[7]

Anselm goes on to say that the rightness of truth, as seen in these examples, is not visible to the eyes of sense, like the rightness or straightness of a rod. The rightness of truth is a rightness seen only by the intellect upon reflection. Accordingly, Anselm defines truth as "a rightness perceptible to the mind alone".[8] The notion of truth as adequation, understood in terms of 'rightness', runs throughout Thomas' entire explanation of the nature and existence of truth.

Thomas, however, is interested in a still more fundamental definition of truth, - a definition that is basic not only to Anselm's conception of truth, but to all the definitions he has inherited. He is in search of a definition that will most completely express the very essence of truth wherever it is found in the created order. With this as his object, he proceeds to review the various ways in which created truth is divided and defined.[9]

Created truth, he says, can be divided into the truth found in things, and the truth found in a knowing power such as the human intellect.[10] In turn, the truth of things can be considered materially or formally. Formally, the truth of a thing is its conformity to the Divine Mind, or its adequation with the First Truth. It is this formal truth of a thing that Anselm defines as "a rightness perceptible to the mind alone"; it expresses the way a thing should be in relation to the mind of the Creator.[11]

Materially, the truth of a thing, Avicenna tells us, is a property of its being.[12] It is, as Isaac Israeli says, 'that by which a thing is what it is', or 'that by which a thing truly exists', whereas what is called 'the true' is simply 'that which is'.[13] This does not mean that truth and being are synonymous, but that truth is

a property of being, since, according to Augustine, where there is no truth, there can be no being.[14]

Besides the truth of things, there is, as well, the truth that exists in our minds. This truth is defined as 'an adequation of the intellect and the thing'.[15] Insofar as things can be simple or composite, there will be, therefore, the corresponding kinds of truth in our intellects, which Aristotle describes as 'incomplex' and 'complex'. Incomplex and complex truth differ from one another respectively as the essence of that which is simple from the essence of that which is composite.[16] According to Aristotle and Averroes, the incomplex truth of a simple object is merely its 'quiddity' or definition, while the complex truth of a composite object consists in the truth of a proposition.[17]

This brings to a close Thomas' review of the common divisions and corresponding definitions of created truth. But there is one final definition that does not belong exclusively to any one of these divisions. It is the definition that "truth is the indivision of being or of reason and of being", which Thomas ascribes to Avicenna and Gabirol.[18] For Thomas, this definition expresses the essence of both complex and incomplex truth.

'Indivision of reason' refers to the indivision of a proposition, which constitutes complex truth; 'indivision of being' refers to the indivision of a definition, which constitutes incomplex truth.[19]

Seeking even greater simplification, Thomas maintains that the expression 'indivision of being' alone adequately defines both these kinds of truth. Speaking first of the incomplex truth of definition, he says that its indivision consists in the indivision of form from matter, since being and truth are essentially the same, and being issues from the union of form with matter, or from their indivision. Phrasing it in another way, just as being is the indivision of form from matter, so too incomplex truth is the indivision of form from matter, since the being of a thing and its truth are one and the same. In this manner, incomplex truth is seen as the indivision of being.[20]

Similarly, complex truth can be regarded as the indivision of being, and not merely as the indivision of reason. The truth of a proposition consists in the indivision of the predicate from the subject. Since we can consider the predicate to be a kind of form and the subject to be a kind of matter, we can consider the truth of a

proposition to be the indivision of form from matter. Accordingly, complex truth can be understood as the indivision of form from matter, or simply as the indivision of being. Truth in the human intellect, therefore, whether complex or incomplex, can be defined as the indivision of being.[21] What Thomas is actually saying is that the truth in our minds is basically a kind of unity, since the expression 'the indivision of being' is nothing else than the definition of unity.

Likewise, Thomas implicitly maintains that the truth of things, considered materially, or apart from their relation to the Divine Mind, is reducible to unity. This is evident insofar as he regards this kind of truth as the self-identity of a thing, or the unity of a thing with itself. "Truth", he says, "is that by which a thing is what it is", and "the true is that which is".[22] Ultimately, therefore, Thomas understands the truth of things, materially speaking, as well as the truth in our minds, as a kind of unity.[23]

There is another division of truth that remains to be considered, namely the truth of creatures, understood formally, insofar as they are adequated to the First Truth.[24] Does Thomas similarly view this kind of truth as a unity?

To ask the question is to ask whether, for him, the notion of truth as 'an adequation of things to the First Truth' implies the existence of Divine Truth alone, or the existence of created truth as well. If the former is the case, truth would obviously be one; if the latter, truth would be basically of two kinds, namely created and uncreated. Moreover, given the existence of created truth, truth would be as multiple as created things themselves. Accordingly, the question as to whether truth, considered formally, is reducible or not to unity is none other than the question 'Is the truth of things created or uncreated, one or many?'. This is the major problem that engages Thomas' attention throughout his treatment of truth.

To introduce the subject, Thomas first shows how the same authorities can be quoted in favour of either position. On the one hand, it would seem that Augustine and Anselm hold that there is only one truth, namely the Divine, by which all things are true.[25] Just as there is one time for all temporal things, Anselm says, or one light for all things illumined by that light, so too there is one Truth for everything that is true.[26] According to Augustine, truth, which the human mind seeks, is not something possessed by the mind, but is above the mind as

that toward which the mind tends. Since only God is above the mind, He alone must constitute truth, with the result that truth must be one.[27]

But on the other hand, Augustine and Anselm just as emphatically maintain that truth is many.[28] Augustine speaks of the truth of contemplation and the truth of speech; of corruptible and incorruptible truth.[29] Anselm likewise speaks of truth as many, when he considers the truth of propositions, of opinion, will, action, and so on.[30] In addition, Ambrose, commenting on 'the truth' of Romans i, 25, they changed the truth of the immutable God, says plainly that there is a truth that belongs to creatures which is from God, but is not identified with Him.[31]

Which of these positions is correct? Since the question cannot, apparently, be settled on the basis of authority, Thomas appeals to reason itself.[32] Reason, he says, would seem to support the position that truth is many. Let us assume that there are two kinds of truth, namely necessary and contingent. Accordingly, if truth were one, all truth would be necessary, or all truth would be contingent, both of which consequences are impossible. Moreover, one cannot assert the existence

of contingent truth without asserting the existence of necessary truth, insofar as the former implies the latter.[33] That truth is many can also be inferred from the fact that truth is convertible with unity and goodness, and that there are many unities and many forms of goodness subsequent to the First Unity and the First Goodness.[34] With Augustine, we must admit that man perceives some truth in this life, and since this truth cannot be the First Uncreated Truth, there must be another kind.[35]

If there were only one truth, every other truth would be false, which is a contradiction in terms.[36] Not only that, but insofar as the truth of a thing, by which the thing is true, is the same as a thing's beingness', by which the thing exists, there would be only one 'beingness' for all things. As a result, one being would not differ essentially from another. All things would be one; there would be no multiplicity,[37] - a position which he has rejected as absurd.[38]

Considered in another way, if there were only one truth, and every other truth were false, nothing except the First Truth would be 'per se' true, and nothing except the First Being would exist 'per se'. But in fact, besides the First Being, some things do exist 'per se', as

wood, for example, or a stone, or any other body. Consequently, they must also be true 'per se', and if they are true 'per se', they must possess the truth by which they are true. There are, therefore, many truths besides the First Truth.[39] If things did not possess the truth by which they were true, but were true by virtue of a truth extrinsic to them, they would be true by virtue of something distinct from themselves. Thomas rejects this position as false. Things possess the truth by which they are true, and consequently, there are many truths.[40]

These many truths can be divided in certain basic ways. Using Augustine as his source, Thomas proceeds with the division of truth, considered formally or in relation to the Divine Truth.[41] There are three kinds of truth, namely a truth that is truly true, a truth that is true by imitation, and a truth that is predicated of both.[42] The truly true is of two types: that which is absolutely and 'per se' true; and that which is true 'ab alio', but at the same time true 'per se'. The former is the Unparticipated First Truth; the latter is the participated truth of our minds, or the truths possessed by our minds, such as 'two and three are five', or the

notion of a circle, and truths of this sort.[43] The true that is true by imitation is likewise divided in two ways. There is the truth belonging to bodies which is true 'ab alio', but at the same time true 'per se', or true in itself; and there is the truth of art which is not in itself true, but is only true insofar as it is a likeness of the truth which art depicts.[44]

If the note of participation is excluded from the term 'truth', only the First Unparticipated Truth will be truly true. But if 'participation' is included, then the truth of our minds can be regarded as truly true and the first truth in the created order. It is first, because it is true in itself, and because there is no other truth prior to it except Uncreated Truth.[45] It is also first because the remaining two kinds of truth, namely the truth of bodies and the truth of art, are subsequent to it. The truth of bodies is, in fact, partially false. It is false to the extent that it fails to fulfill the truth in our minds and the First Uncreated Truth, both of which it imitates. The truth of art is true insofar as what is represented in the art is false. The picture of a horse, for example, is a true picture insofar as the horse in the picture is a false horse.

In contrast to these two forms of truth, the truth in our minds is wholly true, and accordingly the first truth in the created order.[46]

From all this it is abundantly clear that there are many truths in existence besides the First Uncreated Truth. Yet, some arguments of Augustine and Anselm, which Thomas quoted earlier, would seem to uphold the contrary. Truth, they maintained, is not something possessed by the creature, but something above and beyond the created order, namely God Himself. Creatures are true by virtue of the one Divine Truth in a manner comparable to the way in which many things are illumined by one light. Accordingly, truth would appear to be one rather than many.[47]

Thomas now attempts 'to put our minds at rest', as he says, first by trying to resolve what seems to be a contradiction in the thought of Augustine and Anselm. Just as there are two kinds of form, so there are two kinds of truth, since form and truth, though different, are similar insofar as they are both defined as 'that by which a thing is what it is'. There is a First Form, which is unformed, or not formed by any prior form, namely God, who is the form of all things.[48] There is another form, formed by the First Form, which constitutes the

very essence of things and is as multiple as things themselves. Among these forms of things in the created order, there is, as Gabirol says, one first form, which is the source and fount of all other created forms, containing all and perfecting all.[49]

The same can be said with respect to truth, since the First Form is Truth, and since every truth is a kind of form or light. Accordingly, there is a First Truth, by virtue of which everything that is true is actually true. This First Truth is, as well, that by which everything in existence actually exists. A thing is not only true insofar as it is in conformity with the First Truth; it exists insofar as it bears this same conformity. To the extent that a thing does not possess this conformity, it is not only false, but non-existent, with the result that if things lacked this conformity entirely, they would not only be false, but they would not exist. Accordingly, we can say that whatever exists, exists and is true by virtue of the First Truth.[50]

Similarly, there is another truth which is the very essence of a thing, differing only conceptually from that essence. It is by virtue of this truth as well, which is intrinsically present to things, that a thing exists

and is true. As Augustine says, a wall exists insofar as it is a true wall, and a body exists insofar as it is a true body.[51] Things are true because of the truth in them, which makes them to be what they are, and accordingly, there are as many truths as there are things in existence.[52] Among these truths in the created order, we have seen that there is one first truth, namely the truth in our minds, which is prior to all others, just as there is one first form prior to all others.[53]

In other words, Thomas is maintaining that creatures are true by virtue of created truth and Uncreated Truth at the same time. To affirm a truth intrinsic to creatures does not, he says, exclude an extrinsic cause of their truth.[54] The fact that there is a truth that belongs to creatures does not detract in any way from God as the source of all truth. Accordingly, in terms of 'the one and the many', truth is one insofar as creatures are true by virtue of Uncreated Truth, while truth is many insofar as creatures are true by virtue of created truth. Since creatures are true by virtue of both, truth is one and many simultaneously.

In contrast to the opposition seen between Thomas of York and William of Auvergne in the previous chapters, we

find a similarity of doctrine between them in the present instance. According to William, although Divine Truth is the cause of all truth, there is as well a truth that is proper to creatures. He considers this position to be contrary to that of Plato. In William's eyes, Plato's position amounts to saying that things are true solely by virtue of their archetypes in a separate world of Ideas. This is unacceptable to William, because, he maintains, the truth of a thing cannot be outside it, but on the contrary, must be within it. A thing cannot have its own being, and yet have a truth other than its own. The truth of a thing is its substance, essence or being.[55] In brief, William of Auvergne, like Thomas of York, holds that creatures have a truth of their own by which they are true, even though it must be said that God is the cause of all truth. Accordingly, insofar as there are many creatures, and therefore many created truths, they both maintain that truth is many. Insofar as all truths exist by virtue of the one Divine Truth, they both maintain that truth is one. In other words, for both William of Auvergne and Thomas of York, truth is one and many at the same time.

Thomas of York, however, is not content to let the matter rest here, but proceeds to resolve the seeming

contradiction. The difficulty lies in understanding the relation of the truth in things to the First Truth. To explain the nature of this relation, Thomas uses the analogy of a vase of water, where the water takes on the shape of the vase, or where the shape of the vase causes the shape of the water. The water has a shape only because its container has a shape; without the container, the water would be shapeless. But although the shape belongs directly and primarily to the vase, it belongs also to the water apart from that of the container, even though the water's shape is caused by the container's. The shape, therefore, belongs to the vase and to the water as well.[56]

Similarly, there is in any adequation that which adequates and that which is adequated, with adequation belonging to both. The adequation or truth in things, which corresponds to the shape of the water, is caused by the Adequation or Truth of the Divine Mind, which corresponds to the shape of the vase. Accordingly, without the Truth of the Divine Mind, the truth in things could not exist. Nor could the thing itself exist, unless it were in conformity with the First Truth, by which it is supported in being. But although truth and being belong directly

and primarily to God, they belong to creatures as well. They belong to creatures, however, indirectly and secondarily, just as the shape of the vase is predicated indirectly of the water. Things, then, truly exist by virtue of a being and truth intrinsic to them, although their being and truth are caused extrinsically by the First Truth.[57]

Thomas goes on to explain further the manner in which the First Truth is an extrinsic cause. The First Truth is said to be the truth of all things, just as the First Form is said to be the form of all things. It does not properly belong to things in the sense that it exists in them or that it depends on them for existence. Things have their being and truth in the First Truth, as the cause upon which they depend.[58] Things exist and are true, insofar as they are in conformity with the First Truth. In other words, the First Truth is predicated of things, just as the shape of a container is predicated of the contents. Using Anselm's analogy, the First Truth is predicated of things, as time is predicated of this or that reality, not because time is in them, but because they are in time.[59]

What, then, for Thomas, is the truth intrinsic to things in the created order? It is their adequation or

conformity to the First Truth, just as the shape of the water consists in the adequation or conformity of the water to the shape of the container. A thing is what it is by virtue of its adequation to the First Truth. When the adequation is present, the thing exists; when it is absent, the thing does not exist. The same can be said of truth, since truth, like adequation, is that by which a thing is what it is. The perfection, therefore, truth and plenitude of a thing's being is its adequation to the First Truth.[60] In other words, Thomas is saying that the truth present in things is not the Divine Truth, but the adequation of things to the Divine Truth.

What, however, is the nature of this adequation that permits creatures to be true by virtue of uncreated and created truth at the same time, or that permits truth to be one and many simultaneously? If this adequation belongs to the created order, it would seem to be either in the category of substance or in the category of accident. Is it, therefore, an accident of the thing of which it is the truth, or is it a substance? If it is a substance, is it a substance apart from the thing, or is it the substance of the thing itself?[61]

At first, it would seem that the adequation or truth of a thing is an accident, since the thing adequated is distinct from the adequation itself.[62] Moreover, the analogy of the vase of water would tend to support this view, because the shape of the water is an accident, and is subsequent to the water in which it inheres.

Nevertheless, Thomas says, it is impossible to accept this position, since the adequation or truth of a thing is that by which a thing is what it is, and a thing cannot be what it is, or exist, by virtue of an accident.[63] A thing is not accidentally that which it is; otherwise, accident would be the cause of substance. Similarly, insofar as the truth of things consists in an adequation to the First Truth, the truth of things can be said to be that which is in the First Truth. But accidents do not belong to the First Truth, nor is the First Truth in any way an accident. Furthermore, if truth is the indivision of being, or the indivision of form from matter, and indivision is synonymous with union, then truth consists in the union of form with matter. But accidents are subsequent to this union; they exist only in an already constituted substance.[64] It is clear, therefore, that truth cannot be an accident of the thing, and in this

respect, the analogy of the vase of water is not wholly satisfactory.[65]

If the adequation or truth of a thing is not an accident, is it a substance independent of the thing of which it is the truth? To this Thomas replies that the adequation or truth of a thing cannot be another substance apart from the substance of the thing, because the adequation of this second substance would require a third substance, and the third a fourth, and so on. In other words, we would be involved in an infinite regress.[66]

The remaining possibility, namely that the adequation or truth of a thing is the substance of the thing itself, proves equally unsatisfactory to Thomas. If truth were identified with the substance of the thing itself, it would either have to be identified with the whole composite, or with one of its parts, - matter or form. But it cannot be identified with the whole, because then neither matter nor form would be true 'per se'. Moreover, since that which is not true 'per se' does not exist 'per se', matter and form would not exist in themselves, but only in relation to one another. Neither can truth, by which a thing is what it is, be the matter of a thing. If it were, truth would not exist, since form rather than

matter is that by which a thing is what it is. Nor can truth be identified with the form, because then neither the essence of the composite nor matter would be true except through form. But this is wrong, because matter and the composite are knowable and true in themselves apart from form. For Thomas, therefore, the truth or adequation of a thing can be identified neither with the whole composite nor with either of its parts, - matter or form.[67]

The truth, then, or adequation of a thing, is something other than substance or accident; its nature lies outside the categories. What this nature is, which enables us to say that the truth of things is one and many at the same time, still remains to be seen.

For a definitive statement on the question, Thomas turns to Avicenna, who says that truth is a property of a thing's being, the 'determination' proper to a thing, by which a thing is what it is.[68] The 'determination' of a thing is its 'quiddity', the essence signified by a term, or the definition of a term. Accordingly, truth is 'the determination or quiddity proper to a thing, by which a thing is what it is'.[69] This 'determination', 'quiddity' or property is not the substance or being of

a thing, but the 'beingness', 'essentiality' or 'substantiality' by which a being is a being, and a substance, a substance. As such, the truth of a thing cannot be identified with its substance, nor with the matter or form composing the substance, since these are subjects of being, not the 'beingness' or 'substantiality' of substance.[70] Similarly, the truth or adequation of a thing is not an accident; it is not subsequent to the thing adequated, but simultaneously and essentially the same as the thing.[71]

The manner in which the truth or adequation of a thing is essentially the same as, yet different from the thing itself, is comparable to the way in which 'creation' is related to created things. 'Creation' does not differ either accidentally or essentially, but only conceptually, from 'the created'. In like manner, being and truth differ conceptually; they do not differ essentially or accidentally. Similarly, the essence of a thing is not essentially different from its adequation to the First Truth, but only conceptually different. That is to say, the term 'adequation' expresses a concept distinct from the term 'essence'. Consequently, 'adequation' cannot be formally and directly predicated of that which is adequated, namely the essence of the thing, any more than 'creation' can be predicated of that which is created.[72]

According to Thomas, however, although the term 'truth' signifies adequation, it can, as opposed to the term 'adequation' itself, be predicated directly of things. He explains how this is possible by distinguishing between the subject, of which the term is predicated, and the form or the perfection signified by the term. 'Truth', unlike 'adequation', is predicated according to the subject of the term, and not according to the form, which consists in the perfection of adequation to the First Truth. As distinct from the term 'adequation', Thomas says, 'truth' does not express the concept which it adds over and above 'being', and consequently, 'truth' can be predicated of being, whereas 'adequation' cannot.[73]

In short, Thomas is maintaining that insofar as truth or adequation is the 'essentiality' of a thing, it is essentially the same as, but conceptually different from, the thing itself. Both the term 'adequation' and the term 'truth' add something conceptually to the being of a thing. The term 'adequation', however, expresses the concept it adds, and in this respect, is not predicable of the thing; while the term 'truth' does not express the concept it adds, and accordingly is predicable of the thing. In other words, 'adequation' expresses the formal perfection

of the term, whereas 'truth' does not, thus allowing it to be predicated of things.

It must be granted, however, that Thomas does not show how both 'adequation' and 'truth' can be conceptually distinct from the being of a thing, and yet how 'adequation' alone expresses the added concept. In terms of his distinction between the subject and form of a term, he gives no reason why 'truth' should not be predicable according to its formal perfection instead of merely according to its subject. Of course, if it were, it could not, according to Thomas' reasoning, be predicated of things, just as 'adequation' cannot be predicated of things. Thomas wishes to maintain that truth is predicable of things, and at the same time, that it is distinct from things. To maintain its predicability of things, he excludes the formal perfection of the term in the predication of 'truth'. But to maintain a distinction between truth and things, he identifies 'truth' with 'adequation'. Since 'adequation' expresses a formal perfection over and above the being of a thing, and accordingly is not predicable of the thing directly, 'truth' like 'adequation', remains conceptually distinct from things. In other words, 'truth' can be predicated of things because

the formal perfection of the term is excluded in predication; truth is distinct from things because the formal perfection of the term is included, or expressed, in its predication. Here there is clearly an unresolved contradiction in Thomas' thought, since he includes or excludes the formal perfection of the term 'truth' to suit his convenience.

Nevertheless, Thomas apparently thinks that he has now set the stage for a final resolution of the problem as to whether the truth of things is one or many. But again, his arbitrary inclusion or exclusion of the formal perfection of 'truth' figures prominently. First of all, he says that it is possible to speak about the truth of things, because 'truth' can be predicated of them insofar as the formal perfection of the term is excluded. Then, in order to resolve the problem as to whether this truth is one or many, Thomas considers it necessary to include the formal perfection of the term. He maintains that although the term 'truth' is predicated according to subject, adequation remains as the form of the predication, and it is by virtue of this formal perfection of adequation that the term 'truth' is meaningful when predicated of things. Retaining the subject as well as the form of

'truth' in predication permits Thomas to say that, from the viewpoint of subject, truth is many, since there are as many truths as there are things of which 'truth' is predicated. From the viewpoint of form, however, there is only one truth, namely the Divine and Uncreated, to which all truths are adequated. Of this Truth, Thomas says that it is more truly predicated of things than any other, since all other truths are true by virtue of their adequation to It.[74]

In other words, Thomas tries to maintain that truth is one and many at the same time by distinguishing between the subject and the form of the term. Contrary to his previous use of the same distinction, he includes the formal perfection of the term 'truth' in its predication of things. It is by virtue of this formal perfection, which consists in the adequation of things to the First Truth, that truth is one. At the same time, insofar as truth is predicated of many things, the consequent multiple character of the subject of the term renders truth many. Thomas of York reminds us, however, that these many truths are formally true by virtue of the one Divine Truth.

The question then arises as to the status of created truth. In response, Thomas says that if one should ask

whether created truth is itself true, it should be said that it is. But if one should ask whether created truth is true by virtue of its own truth, the distinction between the subject and the form of 'truth' must be observed. If, when we speak of the truth belonging to creatures, we mean the truth formally understood, or simply the Divine Truth, then truth does not belong to creatures. But if we mean the subject of truth, or in other words, that of which the Divine Truth is predicated, then truth does belong to creatures. In this respect, created truth is its own truth. According to Thomas, therefore, the truth of creatures, formally considered, is one and uncreated, but materially, or according to subject, the truth of creatures is many and created.[75]

In advancing this solution of his problem, Thomas is once more endeavouring to uphold the perfection of creatures without detracting from the perfection of God. Creatures are true by virtue of a truth of their own, but, at the same time, they are true by virtue of Divine Truth. This is not to say that creatures are true by virtue of two distinct truths, namely created and uncreated, but rather by virtue of one truth considered in two different ways. Considered formally, the truth whereby creatures

are true is one and uncreated; considered materially, or according to subject, this truth is many and created. It is by means of this purely logical distinction between the form and the subject of the term that Thomas chooses to resolve the metaphysical problem as to whether creatures are true by virtue of created or uncreated truth, or as to whether the truth of things is one or many.

Thomas of York's solution resembles that of his predecessor, Robert Grosseteste, who was likewise concerned with the same conflict indigenous to the Christian platonism of Anselm and Augustine. In the words of Grosseteste: "Truth, therefore, signified and predicated everywhere by this name truth, is single, as Anselm holds, namely, the supreme truth. But that one truth is called many truths in the many truths of things".[76] Again: "Wherefore, the intention of truth, as the intention of being is ambiguous; from one part it is one in all truth and nevertheless, by appropriation it is diversified in particulars".[77] Nor does the resemblance between Grosseteste and Thomas end here. Many of the arguments pro and con, which they quote as a preamble to the resolution itself, are the same. They both explain the nature of truth in terms of Anselmian 'rightness', and they both

use the analogy of the vase of water to clarify the relationship between Divine and created truth.[78]

In the early part of the chapter, we reviewed Thomas' analysis of truth, considered materially, or apart from any relation to the Divine Mind. We saw that he reduced this kind of truth, whether it be in things or in the human intellect, to a kind of unity. Throughout the remainder of the chapter, we showed how Thomas tried to maintain that the truth of creatures, considered formally, or in relation to the Divine Mind, is materially many and created, but formally one and uncreated.

So far, however, Thomas' treatment of created truth, considered in relation to the Divine Mind, involves only the truth of creatures in general. It does not involve truth specifically in the human intellect. As a matter of fact, Thomas deliberately sets aside that argument of Augustine's in favour of truth as one, which states that insofar as truth is prior to and above the mind, this truth can be none other than God.[79] His reason for doing so is that the question as to whether truth in the human intellect is created or uncreated, one or many, requires special study. But, having resolved the question with respect to the truth of creatures in general, Thomas is now prepared to consider the question with respect to the truth possessed by the human intellect in particular.

Chapter 4

The Origin and Nature of Created Truth in the Human Intellect

According to the augustinian doctrine of divine illumination, true knowledge is made possible through the light that God sheds upon every creature, and upon man in particular. God is considered to be the source of truth in our knowledge, and accordingly, the truth by which we know is seen as one and uncreated.[1] Although the doctrine justifies the necessary, immutable and eternal quality of truth in our intellect, it has difficulty in explaining the natural character of human knowledge. If the truth by which man knows is exclusively divine, man's natural cognitive powers are not adequate to the task of knowing, for which they were created. Instead, God becomes the sole cause of human knowledge.[2] This is the significance of Thomas of York's question as to whether the truth by which we know is created or uncreated, one or many.[3]

He is made acutely aware of the problem through the recent entry of the aristotelian doctrine of abstraction into the Latin West. According to this doctrine, sensible things are the source of truth in our knowledge, with the result that the truth by which we know is many

and belongs to the natural order. Since truth does not transcend man's own powers of knowing, the natural character of human knowledge is assured. In view of the fact that the augustinian position does not seem to give this same assurance, Thomas is led to reflect on whether God actually is the source of human knowledge.[4]

But before considering Thomas' inquiry into the origin of knowledge and the created or uncreated character of truth in our intellect, let us note that he is aware of a still more basic problem brought to the fore by the aristotelian theory of knowledge. This is the problem of the validity of knowledge. Among the augustinians, the existence and certitude of truth were accepted without question on the basis of the divine guarantee contained in divine illumination.[5] Any treatment of the subject is merely occasioned by Augustine's account in his Contra Academicos of the sceptics belonging to the New Academy.[6] But Thomas recognizes that with the change in the doctrine of the origin of our knowledge proposed by the new aristotelianism, the same guarantee no longer remains. On the contrary, another guarantee of truth and certitude must be sought in the trustworthiness of sense and intellect.[7] Accordingly, Thomas devotes an

entire chapter to the question whether true knowledge exists.[8] The arguments for scepticism, with which he introduces the question, are not those of Augustine's Contra Academicos. Instead, they are the arguments of Protagoras and Democritus, the Heracliteans and the Sophists, as reported in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Likewise, the refutation he uses to dispose of them is the refutation advanced by Aristotle.[9]

Briefly, that refutation is as follows: The position of Protagoras, which maintains that everything is true and nothing is false, implicitly contains its own denial, since the statement 'Everything is true' requires that its opposite 'Nothing is true' be false. Moreover, it is based on the erroneous premise that things are true because they are judged to be true, and accordingly, that beings exist because they are judged to exist. Similarly, the position of Democritus and the Heracliteans, that nothing is true and everything is false, stems from false premises. Contrary to these premises, there is a stability in the sensible world, and our senses are essentially trustworthy. Furthermore, all our knowledge is not sense knowledge; we have as well intellectual knowledge, by which we can grasp the immutable and true. Finally, the position

of the Sophists, that something can be true and false at the same time, violates the principle of contradiction. Their error arises from a failure to distinguish between the principles of act and potency, according to which something actually true can at the same time be potentially false, and conversely, something actually false can at the same time be potentially true.[10]

After confronting the new scepticism in its own milieu, Thomas advances an array of arguments primarily from Augustine, but from Aristotle and the Arabs as well, that upholds the existence of truth in our knowledge. To concede anything is to concede the existence of truth. For example, given that knowledge, desire, or actual being exists, then truth must exist. Even if we begin with falsity, denial, doubt and ignorance, the existence of truth emerges as a necessary presupposition.[11] As Augustine maintains, once truth is grasped, its existence is more manifest to the mind than light is to the eye.[12] 'It is clear', Thomas concludes, 'that truth, and consequently knowledge, exists, and this is what I intended to show'.[13]

But what is the source of this truth? This further question, renewed by the meeting of the aristotelian and

augustinian theories of knowledge, must now be considered. Are things in reality the cause of truth in our minds, as Aristotle maintains, or is this truth received from God simultaneously with the creation of the human soul, as Augustine holds?[14] In reply, Thomas draws a parallel between the origin of forms or truths in our intellect and the origin of forms in the physical world. Just as there are three possible positions concerning the origin of forms in nature, so too there are three possible positions with regard to the origin of forms in the intellect.[15] In nature, we saw how, according to the doctrine of the latitatio formarum, forms were wholly actual in matter from the beginning, but hidden as by a veil. On the other hand, according to the doctrine of the dator formarum, these forms were absent from matter in the beginning, but were later introduced by a 'giver of forms'. Thomas, we recall, rejects both positions in favour of the doctrine of 'active natural potencies', which he considers to be midway between these two extremes. Active natural potencies exist in matter neither as wholly actual nor as wholly potential, but virtually, after the manner of seminal principles.[16]

Similarly, on the one hand, according to the doctrine of 'innate species', which Augustine seems to maintain in some places, forms or truths are wholly actual in our intellects from the beginning.[17] On the other, according to the aristotelian doctrine of 'abstraction', these forms are entirely absent from our intellects in the beginning, but are later received through the medium of sense from things outside. Neither position is acceptable to Thomas. Augustine is describing the state of the soul prior to original sin, - a state about which Aristotle was ignorant. Christian wisdom, which declares that the intellect, and indeed the world, underwent a change of state through sin, has to maintain a middle position between the doctrines of 'innate species' and 'abstraction'.[18]

According to this middle position, the intelligible species are not wholly actual in the intellect, nor are they derived entirely from things outside. It is true that the intelligible species in the intellect did exist as wholly actual when man was first created. But after original sin, these same species lost their actuality, and remained only as potential, habitual, or virtual. Consequently, in man's present state, the intellect requires the stimulation provided by the expressed species

in the imagination, before it can actually know the intelligible species contained within it.[19]

In other words, Thomas maintains that the object outside is not the true cause of the species in the intellect, but merely the occasion for the true cause to realize its effect. The object, he says, is not truly the 'parent' or efficient cause of the species within the mind, and accordingly, neither is the species a true 'offspring' or effect of the object. Things in reality are only the cause of truth in our intellects insofar as they provide, through sensation, the occasion for the intellect's actualization of the potential species contained within it.[20] But an occasional cause is still a cause, and accordingly, things are, to this extent, a cause of human knowledge. In this way, Thomas views his own position as a compromise with that of Aristotle.

Moreover, not only are things a cause of human knowledge, but the human intellect itself is a cause. Just as Thomas tried to preserve the efficacy of secondary causes in nature, so now it would appear that he is trying to uphold the agency of the human intellect. In knowledge, the counterpart of the doctrine of the <u>dator formarum</u> is that of 'abstraction', which, for Thomas in

the present context, amounts to the infusion of forms by things into a completely passive intellect. The counterpart of the doctrine of the latitatio formarum is that of 'innate species', which renders any activity on the part of the intellect superfluous. Thomas rejects both in favour of a third, which corresponds to that of 'active natural potencies'. This is the doctrine of 'potential or habitual species', which attributes to the intellect the role of actualizing the potential species contained within it, or of bringing the incompletely actual species to a state of completion. Accordingly, in the created order, the human intellect as well as things is the cause of our knowledge.

Which of these, however, is the primary cause? Thomas proceeds to show that it is the intellect, since the intellect is prior in perfection to things. Augustine tells us that the human soul holds a middle position in the hierarchy of being. Things exist first of all in the Divine Mind, then in intellectual natures, and finally in matter. The being of things in intellectual natures, that is to say, in angels and human souls, is mid-way between the being of things in the mind of God and their being in matter. Simultaneous with the

introduction of forms into matter, these same forms were created in angels and human souls, in which they possess a priority of nature.[21] In the words of the Liber de Causis, the intelligences are filled with forms,[22] and according to Augustine, the soul brings all these forms, 'arts' or species of things into existence with it.[23] Since all things were first created in the 'uncreated wisdom' of the angels, and then in matter, the forms of things in the angels exercize a priority over the same forms in matter.[24] Moreover, insofar as angels and human souls are equal in nature, it can likewise be said that things were first created in the truth of the human soul. Accordingly, the forms of things exist in the human soul in a manner naturally prior to their existence in matter.[25] In other words, man's knowledge of reality is prior in nature to reality itself. In this respect, things could not possibly be the source of our knowledge; otherwise, the converse would be true, namely, knowledge would be subsequent to reality.

Desiring, however, to integrate the wisdom of Aristotle with that of Augustine, Thomas maintains that there is a sense in which our knowledge is subsequent as well as prior to reality. The species in our knowledge are

'universals',[26] predicable of many things outside the mind, and 'universals' can be considered as prior or as subsequent to singular things. Aristotle views the universal as subsequent, because, from his viewpoint, the universal species in our minds is produced by abstraction from things. The universal is a later product, which follows upon the existence and understanding of things. Plato and Augustine, on the other hand, view the universal as prior, because, from their viewpoint, the universal species pre-exists as a prototype, after the manner of a figure on a seal in relation to its impressions on wax.[27] There is no contradiction between these two positions, since they are the result of two entirely different points of view. According to Aristotle, the universal is formed by reason from things, and consequently, is subsequent to things; according to Augustine and Plato, the universal exists in the mind as a prototype, and consequently, it is prior to things.[28]

At first sight, it would appear that the prior and subsequent universals are distinct from one another. Speaking of the subsequent universal, Averroes says that the intellect produces universality,[29] and Aristotle says that if things were destroyed, it would be impossible for

the universal to remain in existence.[30] On the other hand, it must be admitted that a universal possesses a kind of prior existence in the mind, and that it acts as a prototype with respect to singular things outside. Although Aristotle holds that Plato's 'prior universal' does not exist, his reasons for rejecting it are not cogent. It is obviously necessary to uphold the existence of the prior universal, because if the intellect were in its natural state, the species of things would already be actually present within it. There would be no need for abstraction. As a result, the universal, understood in Aristotle's sense as subsequent to things, would not exist.[31]

But let us consider the soul in its present state. After original sin, the soul can know only by being made proportionate to the material conditions under which species or forms exist in things. Accordingly, it needs the help of the senses and the imagination. The mind does not see the common nature of the species unless that nature is first seen in singular things on the level of the imagination. The common nature of any species exists in singular things, and although this nature is spiritual, it exists in things under material conditions.[32]

According to Aristotle, the agent intellect divests the species of its material conditions, and the resultant immaterial species unites with the possible intellect.[33] Through this union, the possible intellect is actualized, and with this actualization, knowledge occurs. Prior to its actualization, the possible intellect is a tabula nuda; it is devoid of all species. Consequently, the species abstracted from the thing outside must act as a kind of efficient and formal cause of our knowledge. For this reason, Aristotle maintains that the being of the species in the intellect is imperfect and secondary to the being of the species in things.[34]

According to Plato and Augustine, however, the possible intellect, prior to its actualization, is not a tabula nuda. On the contrary, it contains the species of all things in a state of habitual or incompletely actual being.[35] For these philosophers, therefore, the new species impressed on the mind are not entirely new. They already exist potentially or habitually, and are actualized by the light of the agent intellect on the occasion of a sense stimulus.[36]

Comparing the two positions, we see how Aristotle, Augustine and Plato agree that the species, which exist

potentially in our knowledge, become actual. They disagree, insofar as Aristotle maintains that the species come entirely from outside the mind, while Augustine and Plato hold that the mind is indebted to things merely for the complete actualization of the species already contained within it. Accordingly, Aristotle's 'subsequent universal' is not distinct from Plato's and Augustine's 'prior universal', although they exist in two different ways. The universal, potentially existing in our minds before its complete actualization, is prior to the things outside, whereas the universal, actually existing in our minds after its actualization, is subsequent to the things outside. We can say, therefore, that the universal, considered as actual, is the same for Augustine, Plato and Aristotle, namely, subsequent to things. But considered as potential, it is not the same. For Augustine and Plato, the potential universal possesses a kind of being in the mind prior to the being of things outside, while for Aristotle, it does not.[37]

Under the influence of aristotelianism, Thomas of York is maintaining that man's actual knowledge is subsequent to things, insofar as things are the cause of this knowledge. Under the same influence, he likewise

attributes a causal role to the agent intellect. For Thomas, however, neither things nor the human intellect are called upon to exercise the causal efficacy required of them in the aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. Prior to actual knowledge, the species of things already possess a potential or incompletely actual being in the soul. Through sensation, things outside the mind merely stimulate the agent intellect to actualize these species. This actualization consists in nothing more than bringing an incompletely actual knowledge to completion. In fact, Thomas maintains that the act of knowing consists essentially in a discovery of species hidden in the memory, where they exist in an habitual or virtual manner.[38]

Ultimately, therefore, Thomas views human knowledge as prior to reality. Since forms, he says, are received by the human soul prior to their reception in matter, the forms in the mind are truly true in contrast to the forms in things, which are true merely by imitation.[39] Consequently, when a species is considered as a universal, it is called a 'prototype', because it exists in things as an <u>exemplar in exemplatis</u>.[40] For this reason, it can similarly be called an 'art', as the efficient cause of our knowledge, in the same way that the prototype or

formal cause in the mind of the artist is the cause of the art-product.[41] It can also be regarded as a final cause, insofar as things tend to it as to their counterpart, in which their perfection is more completely realized.[42] In the created order, therefore, the human intellect, rather than reality, is the primary cause of our knowledge.

But what is the original cause of knowledge in the intellect? It cannot be things, since human knowledge is prior to things. It can only be God, since God alone is prior to the human soul.[43] With this conclusion, the difficulty of upholding the natural character of human knowledge comes to the fore. If, in keeping with the aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, sensible things were the source of truth in our knowledge, the difficulty would not arise. Like sensible things, themselves, the truth in our minds would be many and created; it would not transcend man's natural powers of knowing.[44] But if God is the source of the truth by which we know, this truth would appear to be one and divine, and accordingly, to transcend man's natural powers of knowing.[45] Man, therefore, would be incapable of natural knowledge. Under the influence of aristotelianism, it is true that

Thomas tries to assign a causal role to sensible things and to the agent intellect as well. Their efficacy, however, is secondary and accidental in contrast to the primary and essential efficacy of God. Consequently, the difficulty must be fundamentally resolved on the basis of the divine origin of our knowledge.

But before coping with the problem directly, we must first inquire how God makes His truth present to us, and then see the relationship of this truth to the human soul. With respect to the manner in which God makes His truth present to us, Thomas maintains that the forms, species, or prototypes in our knowledge are made present to us by a special kind of divine illumination shared by no creature other than man. The Eternal Light, in which all the natures and causes or species of things exist, shines on every creature, but it shines on rational creatures in a unique manner. It shines on them alone as a light.[46]

What is the nature of this light? It is simply the knowledge or truth in the human intellect existing from the very moment the soul comes into being. Rational creatures are made in the image of the Eternal Light, and this image is found in man's knowledge.[47] The Uncreated Light, which is synonymous with Uncreated Truth,

shines on every rational soul, thereby giving birth to a light in that soul. After the Uncreated Light Itself, this newborn light is the first to merit the name 'truth'. In it, we find the first conformity, assimilation, or adequation to the Uncreated Light.[48] Since the Divine Light contains all the species and exemplars of things, and since the light in the human soul is an image or imitation of that same Divine Light, the human soul receives from the moment of its creation all the species of things receivable through imitation. Furthermore, it receives them in a manner causally or naturally prior to matter itself.[49] Otherwise, Thomas adds, how could Aristotle say that the soul is in a way all things?[50] Therefore, although the Divine Light floods the whole of creation, the light in the human soul is distinctive, because in it alone among creatures is found the truth of all things. In other words, the form of the human soul, unlike the form of any other creature, receives through a special divine illumination the forms of all created things.

The question now arises as to the relationship between these forms in the soul and the soul itself. In what manner is the light, which contains the species

of all things, present in the soul? Is it in the soul as the substance of the soul, or as an accident? Or does it belong to the soul in some other way?

First of all, the species contained in the light of the soul cannot be identified with the soul's substance, taken either as a whole or as a part. They cannot be identified with it as a whole, because species are many, while substance is one; the species in the soul comprise a multiplicity, but the substance of the soul, taken as a whole, constitutes a unity. They cannot be identified with a part of it, since the whole soul knows and loves its whole self, and this would be impossible if the species whereby it knows were only a part of the soul. Secondly, the species cannot be accidents inhering in the soul as their subject, because they transcend the soul, while accidents remain on the level of the substance in which they exist.[51]

Despite the fact that they transcend the soul, they are, nevertheless, in the soul as in a subject, but not after the manner of accidents. Nor are they in the soul as their subject in the way that wood, for example, is <u>in</u> this place, or the sun <u>in</u> the east. Wood is still wood when it is in another place, just as the sun is still

the sun when it is in the west. In other words, a thing can be in a subject in such a way that it can be separated from the subject and still remain essentially the same. But this cannot be the manner in which the species of things are said to be in the soul as their subject, because the light containing the species of all things is inseparable from the soul. According to Augustine, a thing can be in a subject in another way, namely, in a way that it cannot be separated from its subject, as in the case of the nature of wood in wood, the nature of light in the sun, or of heat in fire. It is in this manner that the truths or species of things exist in the soul.[52]

These species or truths may change and pass away in the order of actual existence, and to this extent they are called accidents. Essentially, however, they remain habitually in the soul, - distinct, but inseparable from its substance as the formal essence of that substance.[53] The light impressed on the substance of the soul by the Creator is the light of reason and the formal essence of the soul, by which the soul is made in the image of God.[54] Accordingly, the soul can never be entirely deprived of

this light, not even by original sin, and no matter how wicked and depraved a human soul may happen to be. It is true that because of sin the species in the soul are merely potentially or habitually present, with the result that they require the stimulation of the senses for their actualization.[55] But if the soul were in its natural state, the species would be intelligible without any outside assistance. As Avicenna maintains, all things would be described in the soul itself, and consequently, the senses would be superfluous for an understanding of things.[56] Now since the human soul was not essentially altered by original sin, the light containing the species of all things still remains the formal essence of the soul. This light, therefore, is not something superadded to the nature of the soul; on the contrary, it is that nature.

From this, it is clear that the truth in the human soul, by which the soul knows, is not divine, unless the nature or light of the human soul itself is divine. Thomas, however, maintains that the light in the human soul is not identical with the Divine Light, since the light in the human soul is created, whereas the Divine

Light is uncreated. The light in the human soul is begotten and caused by the Eternal Light, which is unbegotten and uncaused. As Augustine says, there are two kinds of truth: one which is above the minds, and another which is in the mind as a form or habitus. The first is above the second, because it is that whereby the second is judged. The first is the uncreated truth of God; the second is the created truth of our souls, upon which follows the truth of things.[57] On the basis, therefore, of the augustinian doctrine of divine illumination, Thomas concludes that the truth of the human soul is created.

But Thomas does not let the matter rest there. Granted that the truth of the human soul is created, does it follow that this truth is as multiple as human souls themselves? It would appear that it does, insofar as this truth constitutes the formal essence of each soul, and there are many souls. On the other hand, since the truth of our souls exists only through divine illumination or participation in the One Uncreated Truth, it would seem that the truth of our souls is one, rather than many.[58]

In actual fact, both answers are correct; the truth of human souls is one and many at the same time. In explanation, Thomas draws upon two analogies used by

Augustine, - one belonging to the sensible order, and the other to the theological order. In the sensible order, we see many objects illumined by the one light of the sun; in the theological order, many souls are made blessed by virtue of one 'blessedness'. Similarly, the truths of many minds are true by virtue of the One Divine Truth. Although truth is one as the light of the sun is one and common to that which it illumines, yet truth is also many insofar as different minds are illumined by Divine Truth, just as many distinct things are seen in the light of the sun.[59] Likewise, although truth is one, as beatitude is one and common to all who are blessed, nevertheless, truth is also many. It is many, insofar as one man does not possess wisdom or truth by the wisdom or truth of another, just as one man is not blessed by the blessedness of another.[60] In other words, when, in the light of the fact that there are many souls, we consider whether the created truth of the soul is one or many, we must conclude that this truth is one by virtue of the Divine Truth received, but many by virtue of the many souls receiving it. Although the truth of the human soul is created and as many as human souls themselves, it is still one by virtue of the One Divine Truth.[61]

The question, however, as to whether the truth of the human soul is one or many must be viewed not only in the light of the fact that there are many truths corresponding to many souls, but also in the light of the fact that there are many truths within each soul. Since there are many truths within each soul, it would appear that, in this respect, created truth is many.[62] In response to this, Thomas shows, first of all, how these many truths are one in the same manner as the truths corresponding to many souls are one. The truths in each soul are one by virtue of the One Divine Light. One Uncreated Truth is received through participation by the diverse truths within the human mind. From the viewpoint of the truths as receivers, truth is many; from the viewpoint of the truth received, truth is one.[63] The truth of our knowledge is not its own cause. Without the light of the First Uncreated Truth, the truth in our minds cannot be seen, because the First Truth is a light through which every truth is seen.[64] For truth to exist in any mind, the mind must be enlightened by God, in which the highest truth immutably exists. In this sense, Augustine says that God alone is the truth and light of the rational

soul.[65] Up to this point, Thomas' answer does not vary from the one that he has previously given with respect to the many truths corresponding to many souls. Although the truths within each soul are many and created, they are still one by virtue of Divine Truth.

But the many truths within each soul are true in another way. They are true by virtue of another truth, which is second to Uncreated Truth, but first in the created order. This is the truth that constitutes the very essence of the human soul. Although this truth or light is essentially one, it is virtually many; and by reason of this virtual multitude, the one light of the soul is the source of many sciences. Not only is it a material principle, insofar as its basic truth receives the secondary truths of the sciences, but a formal principle, in the way that a habitus is a principle of operation. All the species in our knowledge are present in this light as operations are present in the habitus of a power, or as a plant is present in its roots. We might even say that they are present in the light of the soul as an effect is in its efficient cause, as colours are in physical light, or as the species and forms of things on earth are in the sun. The forms of things on earth are not in the sun as diverse substances or accidents,

but in an exemplary and virtual manner as the one substance of the sun itself. Similarly, the truths of the sciences do not exist in the soul as many distinct substances or accidents, but in an exemplary and virtual manner as the one essence of the soul.[66] The many created truths of the sciences, then, are one not only by virtue of Uncreated Truth, but also by virtue of the created truth, which is the soul itself.

This unity of truth, which proceeds from the formal essence of the soul, pervades as well the judgments of our intellect and the verbal expressions of these judgments in propositions. With respect to judgments, since the first created truth is the form or habitus of the soul, and the soul is simple, the complex truth of judgments must share in the simplicity and unity of this first created truth. Although the simple truths of concepts precede the complex truths of judgments, they are both true by virtue of the same formal truth of the soul. Simple and complex truths are merely two ways in which one and the same truth exists, with the result that complex truth does not add materially to simple truth; it is just another mode of being for the one truth that constitutes the formal essence of the soul. Viewed from the act

of judgment itself, the act by which the mind forms a judgment is one, although it involves the composition or division of two simple concepts. From the viewpoint of the priority that 'the simple' possesses over 'the complex', simple concepts, which are true by the light of the human soul, are indivisible principles from which the complex truth of our judgments proceeds. Accordingly, complex truths share in the indivisibility of simple truths, which indivisibility arises from the simplicity of the soul, or of its truth. For although the substance of the soul is composed of matter and form, its formal essence is one; and truth belongs to the soul not by virtue of its composition, but by virtue of its form. Accordingly, the truth, by which the soul of a wise man is true, is simple or without parts. There is only one face to this habitual truth of the soul, because, despite the fact that it is divisible into two component kinds of truth, it is in itself one.[67]

Similarly, the truths of propositions are one not only by virtue of Uncreated Truth, but also by virtue of created truth. First, however, they are one by virtue of Uncreated Truth. This is obviously the case with propositions about God, because the truths of these

propositions are God, insofar as they are one with the Divine Being and Truth.[68]

But with propositions about creatures, a distinction must be made between the form and the subject of the proposition. A predicate can be said of a subject because of some form or disposition of that subject, or it can be said of a subject because of the subject or thing itself, which is existing under the disposition or form. Now when something is attributed to a subject by virtue of its form or disposition, this does not permit the same thing to be said of the subject itself apart from the form. For example, let it be asserted that someone praises and has praised Socrates from eternity, and that he will praise Socrates for eternity. I can then say that Socrates was praised from eternity, that he will be praised for eternity, and accordingly, that Socrates praised is eternal, although Socrates himself is not eternal. Both the following propositions, therefore, are true: 'Socrates praised is eternal' and Socrates praised is not eternal'. The first is true because of the form, which is the being of eternal praise; the second is true because of the subject, Socrates, who is not eternal.[69]

In the same vein, let us assume the truth '<u>A</u> was praised from eternity' and the truth '<u>B</u> was praised from eternity'. Since <u>A</u> is other than <u>B</u>, it would seem that there are many truths from eternity. This does not follow, however, because when we attribute 'being from eternity' to both subjects, we are attributing it to them by virtue of the same form, that is, by virtue of the praise, which is eternal. But when we distinguish <u>A</u> from <u>B</u>, the predicate 'praise from eternity' is attributed to the subject by virtue of the corruptible subjects themselves. In this sense, both propositions are false. Although propositions of this kind are distinct from one another on the basis of subject, they are all one through their common form, which exists eternally in the Divine Mind.

In these propositions, which state that certain truths exist from eternity, the common form, by virtue of which 'eternal being' is predicated of them, is explicit.[70] But there are other propositions in which this common form is not so obvious. For example, there does not seem to be any common form existing between 'Two and three are five' and 'The diameter is assymetrical with the sides', since one appears to be entirely distinct

from the other. Similarly, to say that 'the antichrist is future' is not to say that 'Socrates is future'. There is a sense, however, in which the truths of these propositions are also eternal, and to this extent one. Clearly, they cannot be eternal by virtue of the subjects involved, since 'Socrates', for example, or 'a diameter' does not exist from eternity. They must, therefore, be eternal because they, like the preceding kind of propositions, have a common form by virtue of which the predicate 'being from eternity' is said of each subject. But unlike the preceding kind of propositions, this common form is only implicit.[71]

This common form is divine knowledge, since the only reason that these propositions are true from eternity is that they are known from eternity in their 'ideal' cause, which is God. Even a contingent proposition, such as 'The world is not' - speaking of the world before it was created - is eternally true in the same manner.[72] Although 'The world is not' has ceased to be true according to subject or according to the actually existing world, it is still true according to form in the Divine Mind.[73] Therefore, although the truths of propositions are many according to subject, as seen from the fact that 'The

antichrist will be' is not the same as 'Peter will be', they are one eternally in the knowledge of God.[74]

A person might object that there are many ideas in the Divine Mind corresponding to the many created truths, and consequently, that there is no common form by which propositions are eternally true. Truth would then remain many instead of one. This is not correct, however, because the Divine Ideas would still constitute one knowledge or one truth. In God, there are not many truths any more than there are many essences. To say, therefore, that there are many ideas in the Divine Mind is not to say that there are many truths or many 'knowledges', but one truth and one knowledge.[75]

At first, it would seem that the truths of propositions are one solely in this way, namely, by virtue of Uncreated Truth, to the exclusion of created truth. In support of this position, let us assume that truth perishes in the human soul. It is true, accordingly, that 'truth has perished', and if it is true, it must be true by virtue of truth. This truth, by hypothesis, cannot exist in the soul, with the result that it must exist only in the Divine Mind.[76]

On the other hand, Augustine proves the immortality of the soul through the immortality of truth,[77] and this would be impossible unless the truth, which is proved immortal, were in souls themselves. For how could we prove the soul to be immortal through the immortality of truth in God? Accordingly, the truth by which it is asserted that 'truth has perished' is in the human soul itself.[78]

In keeping with the latter position, we must recognize that not only Uncreated Truth, but created truth as well, is indestructible and incorruptible. The fact that there remains a truth by which it is true that 'truth has perished' does not imply that this truth is divine. Instead, it implies that the original assumption, 'truth has perished', is impossible to maintain. This does not mean that the truth of a particular contingent proposition cannot cease to exist; but if it does cease to exist, it is true that it does, and the truth by which it is true is in our souls. Given that A actually existed, it is true that 'A was'; given that A actually exists, it is true that 'A is'; and given that A will actually exist, it is true that 'A will be'. All these propositions are true by virtue of the same truth

in our knowledge. Accordingly, the proposition '_A_ was' is true, even though _A_ has ceased to exist. The truth by virtue of which it is true cannot be in the thing _A_, since _A_ no longer exists. The truth, therefore, by virtue of which it is true, must exist in our knowledge.[79]

To maintain that the truth, by which it is true that 'truth was', is not created truth, but Uncreated Truth, is manifestly false. If _A_ passes out of existence, the truth of this passing, by which we know that '_A_ was', is in our knowledge. We ourselves know that '_A_ was', and accordingly, the truth by which we know it to be true is the created truth of our souls.[80] In fact, this truth of truth is, properly speaking, the human soul itself. In it lives such incorruptible truths as 'Every whole is greater than its part', 'Two and three are five', 'What is received is received after the manner of the receiver'. These fundamental truths of the various sciences live in the soul as colours exist in light.[81] Moreover, from the created truth of the soul, stems the immutability of our universal knowledge, since even if 'man', for instance, did not exist, it would still be true by virtue of truth in our mind that 'Man is man'.[82] Because

of the created truth of the soul, there is no possibility of denying truth, since if it is said that 'truth is not', It is still true by virtue of truth in our mind that 'truth is truth', and true for the same reason that 'truth is not'.[83] Finally, through the presence of created truth in the soul, falsity cannot exist except in conjunction with truth, for if a proposition is false, its contradictory must be true.[84]

In brief, just as the truths of propositions are one by virtue of eternal truth in the Divine Mind, so too they are one by virtue of incorruptible truth, which exists not only in God, but in the human soul as well. It cannot be said that they are one by virtue of eternal truth in the human soul, because eternal truth can only exist in an eternal being, and the human soul, like all creatures, has a beginning.[85] But it is said that they are one by virtue of the incorruptible or immortal truth of the human soul, since the human soul is incorruptible and immortal. Moreover, the eternity of truth that belongs to propositions does not arise from the subject apart from the form of the proposition, but from the form in the Divine Mind. Similarly, the incorruptibility of truth that belongs to propositions does not arise from the

subject apart from the form, but from the form in the human mind. The truths of propositions, therefore, are one by virtue of the eternity of truth in the eternity of God; and they are one also by virtue of the immortality of truth in the immortality of the human soul.

Throughout his consideration of the question as to whether truth is one or many, Thomas has tended to attribute as much perfection to created truth as possible without detracting from the ultimate source of this truth in the Divine Mind. Granted that the many created truths corresponding to the many created souls are one solely by virtue of Uncreated Truth. Yet the many created truths within each soul are one not only by virtue of Uncreated Truth, but by virtue of the created truth of the soul itself, which is the first truth in the created order. Similarly, this applies to the truth of our judgments and to the truth of the verbal expression of these judgments in propositions. The complex truth of judgments and the simple truth of concepts are merely two kinds of one and the same basic truth of the soul. Whether the eternal being of truth is implicitly or explicitly expressed in a proposition, the truth of propositions is one by virtue of the Eternal Truth in the Divine Mind.

But they are likewise one by virtue of the incorruptible and immortal truth of the human soul. Accordingly, Thomas has endeavoured to see created truth possessing a stature of its own within the context of divine illumination.

This theme concerning the perfection and place of created truth remains dominant throughout his treatment of truth in Book VI down to the end. He concludes by extolling the attributes of truth,[86] and among these, he devotes special attention to its 'desirability', or to the fact that truth is naturally desired by all men. As Cicero says, 'an eagerness for seeing the true belongs by nature to our minds'.[87] Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the statement 'All men by nature desire to know',[88] and Averroes comments that 'the desire to know the truth was placed in all men by nature'.[89] Finally, according to Augustine, 'the end of man is to seek the truth'.[90]

But what is the nature of this truth that all men desire? Is it one or many, created or uncreated? On the one hand, since it is by virtue of one common nature that all men desire truth, the truth they desire must similarly be one and common. This truth cannot be

created, because the nature itself by which all men desire truth is created, and it is absurd to suggest that the same thing could desire itself.[91] On the other hand, different people desire different truths and different kinds of knowledge, and accordingly, it would seem that the truth all men desire is many and created.[92] By this, Thomas does not imply that created truths are absolutely many and in no way one. We can assume that the many truths men desire are one on the level of the creature by virtue of the one created truth of the soul. But although they are one in this sense, they are also many insofar as one desired truth is not another. Accordingly, he is now asking whether the truth all men desire is the One Uncreated Truth, or the many created truths of the sciences, apart from the fact that these truths are, in a sense, one even on the created level.

In reply, Thomas immediately affirms that the truth all men desire by nature to know is the First Uncreated Truth, which is the source of all truth as light is the source of all colour. On the basis of man's rational nature, which is made in the image and likeness of God, man is capable of knowing this Truth. When Aristotle says that 'all men <u>by nature</u> desire knowledge', he implies that any lack of this desire would arise from an

unnatural disposition of the soul. Likewise, when he says 'all', using the collective plural, the truth in question would have to be one, because it must correspond to the unity of man's common desire. Accordingly, a desire for many truths would arise from an unnatural disposition of the soul.[93]

Why, then, do different people desire different truths or different kinds of knowledge? It might be, as we have suggested, because of an unnatural disposition in man. If it is not, it might be simply because the different truths or kinds of knowledge desired are ways to the One First Truth. Or it might be, as Augustine maintains,[94] because our weak intellects cannot behold Uncreated Truth, any more than our eyes can gaze at the sun. The object, therefore, of man's desire for truth becomes the many truths that are true by the light of divine illumination, just as the things seen by man's eyes are things that are illumined by the sun. Divine Truth, nevertheless, remains the cause of this desire, since the many truths desired are true by the light of Divine Truth, just as the things seen by our eyes are seen by the light of the sun. Since, as St. Paul says, the First Truth <u>lives in an inaccessible light</u>,[95] the

human intellect here below desires the many created truths, which are caused by the light of Divine Truth.[96]

Does this mean that man's desire for truth falls short of the First Truth? By no means. Insofar as Uncreated Truth is the cause of the many truths desired, the truth that is desired in the many truths is the One Uncreated Truth. Through the many we arrive at the one, just as in all colours we desire light, because, insofar as light is the cause of the colours desired, it is likewise the cause of the desire for colours. In man's present state, the pursuit of the many truths of the sciences is man's way of knowing the One Uncreated Truth.[97] As Augustine says, truth is a way to God.[98] Similarly, Avicenna maintains that truth and knowledge are useful for the acquisition of that perfection which the soul needs in preparation for future happiness.[99] In other words, the created truths of the sciences are not to be ignored. Instead, they should be pursued, because through them we can in this life come to know God, in preparation for our vision of Him in the next.[100]

In our first chapter on the primacy of created unity, we saw that Thomas maintains the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, according to which forms proceed from a

First Cause through a kind of illumination that becomes progressively weaker as it approaches corporeal matter. In the resultant hierarchy, the lower corporeal forms of physical things are virtually contained in the higher spiritual forms of the Intelligences and human souls.[101] In keeping with this cosmogony, Thomas logically prefers the augustinian doctrine of divine illumination for a theory of knowledge to the aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, which maintains that the forms or species in our intellect are received from things. Thomas' adoption of divine illumination, according to which God is the source of the truth in our minds, does not entail denying the human intellect and created things a role in cognition. On the contrary, divine illumination, in the context of man's present state, requires the aid of both. The agent intellect is needed to actualize or bring to completion the intelligible species rendered potential or incompletely actual by original sin. Things, which are perceived through the senses, are needed to stimulate the agent intellect to act. Despite divine illumination, therefore, human knowledge would be impossible without things and an agent intellect.

Moreover, although the truth whereby we know is ultimately Divine, we, as creatures, are still capable of knowing on the natural level. This is true because the truth by which we know is not only the First Uncreated Truth, but also the first created truth, which constitutes the formal essence of the soul. The existence of truth and certitude in our knowledge is assured not only on the basis of a divine guarantee, but on the basis of a natural guarantee contained in the first created truth of our souls. Granted that the many created truths, which correspond to the many created souls, are one only by virtue of the One Divine Truth. Nevertheless, the many truths within each soul are one not only by virtue of their eternity in the One Uncreated Truth of the Divine Mind, but also by virtue of their incorruptibility in the one created truth of the human soul itself. Accordingly, insofar as man's natural powers are capable of containing the created truth by which he knows, man can possess natural knowledge. This knowledge, which is composed of the many truths of the sciences, is to be desired, because it is a way of knowing God while still in this life, and a preparation for our vision of Him in the next. Although Divine Truth is inaccessible directly to man's natural powers, nevertheless through

the pursuit of created truth, which is the only truth that man's natural powers can grasp, he can approach an understanding of God, as the source of all truth.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Having viewed Thomas of York's metaphysics of created being through the avenues of unity, nature, truth and knowledge, we see that he divides this being into two basic kinds, namely the being of reality and the being of truth. Likewise, however, we see that he does not consider reality and truth to be radically diverse, but essentially the same. The truth of a thing is nothing more than the determination by which a thing is what it is. Although it is conceptually distinct from the thing itself, it remains the 'essentiality', 'beingness' or 'substantiality' of the thing.

Moreover, they are both defined in terms of unity. A thing comes into being through the union of form with matter, and the cause of this union is unity. Since a thing exists insofar as it is one, reality is said to be essentially constituted of unity. Similarly, truth is a unity, since truth exists in a thing insofar as a thing is undivided in itself. Truth in the intellect is a unity, insofar as the incomplex truth of definition and the complex truth of propositions are both reducible to unity. Incomplex truth expresses the essence of a thing, and the essence of a thing consists in the unity of form

and matter. Complex truth consists in the indivision of the predicate from the subject, and the predicate can be regarded as a kind of form, and the subject, a kind of matter. Since, therefore, both reality and truth are essentially unity, they are essentially the same.

This sameness of being is mirrored in the principles from which their being arises. Ultimately, of course, the sameness of being is grounded in God as the source of all perfection. He is the Uncreated Unity by which all things are what they are; He is the Divine Truth by which all truths are true. But among the many unities and the many truths that proceed from God, there is one first unity and one first truth. This first unity is the unity of universal spiritual form, or the unity of form that belongs to angels and human souls. The unity of spiritual form is first, insofar as universal corporeal form and the individual forms of material composites are virtually contained in it, and flow from it. The first truth is the truth that belongs to the form of the human soul, which is on a par with the spiritual form of the angels. In other words, it is the same form as that which constitutes the first unity. The truth of the soul, as a spiritual form, is first, insofar as all the truths of knowledge and reality are virtually contained

in it, and flow from it. Similarly, once we recognize that the form of the human soul is the same spiritual form that constitutes the first unity, we can say that the form of the human soul is also the first unity, from which proceed the unity, being and perfection of all things.

The spiritual form of the soul is not only the source of the unity of being and the unity of truth, but the source of multiplicity in both orders as well. It is true that without matter as a principle of individuation, there would be no multiplicity. But although matter is a principle of individuation, it is a passive principle, receiving in a potentially multiple manner the universal corporeal form that emanates from spiritual form. Actual multiplicity can only arise through the co-operation of form. Form is the active principle of individuation. It actively individuates matter; as a unity numbering matter, it gives rise to number or multiplicity. Ultimately, therefore, the spiritual form of the soul is not only the source of the unity of individual form, but by the same token, it is the source of multiplicity in composites. Along with this multiplicity in the order of being, there arises a concomitant

multiplicity in the order of truth. Accordingly, the spiritual form of the soul, as the first truth, and not only the first unity, is the source of the many truths subsequent to it. Whether these truths are the truths of things in themselves or the truths in our knowledge, they are all true by virtue of the truth of the human soul as a spiritual form.

Is reality, therefore, one or many? Is truth one or many? First of all, the many things and truths in the created order are formally one in the ultimate unity and truth of God. Materially, however, there are many unities and many truths; the subjects of unity and truth are multiple. Nevertheless, the perfection received by the many, whether 'the many' be many things or many truths, is the one perfection of God. It is the receivers of this perfection that are many, and these receivers constitute the many unities and truths of creatures. But even among these many unities and many truths, there is a first unity and a first truth, namely the unity and truth of the human soul as a spiritual form, which is the created source of all subsequent unities and truths. Accordingly, all things and all truths are formally one not only by virtue of Divine Unity and Truth, but by virtue of a created unity and truth as well.

The forms received by corporeal matter are not wholly actual from the beginning; if they were, there would be no need for change or efficient causality. On the other hand, they are not purely potential, in the sense that matter merely has the passive capacity to receive them; if they were, the forms would be received entirely from without, and as a result, the aristotelian notion of nature as an intrinsic principle of change would be destroyed. Moreover, there would be no multiplicity in things. For if there were no multiplicity of powers or principles of operation in creatures, there would be no essences, to which powers belong. All things would be an absolute unity, which is absurd. Forms, therefore, cannot be present in matter either as wholly actual or as wholly potential. Instead, they are present in a manner midway between these extremes as active natural potencies or seminal principles, whose incomplete being can be brought to completion through the agency of created causes.

Similarly, if forms were present as wholly actual innate species in the intellect from the beginning, any activity on the part of things or man's intellect would be superfluous. Man would have no need to acquire

knowledge; he would already possess it. In other words, he would be in his natural state prior to original sin, when no labour was needed for the acquisition of truth. On the other hand, the forms or species in the intellect are not acquired through abstraction, since this would entail the infusion of forms from things into a completely passive intellect. But even prior to actual knowledge, the intellect is not a tabula nuda, devoid of all species, as Aristotle maintained. On the contrary, in keeping with the hierarchical order of creation, and according to divine illumination, it already possesses them in some way. It possesses them neither as wholly actual nor as wholly potential, but in a manner mid-way between these extremes, namely as incompletely actual, as virtual or habitual. To achieve completely actual knowledge, the intellect, upon the stimulation of sensible things, must bring to completion the habitual species contained within it. In this way, both the created intellect of man and created things actively participate in human knowledge.

The active natural potencies of matter as well as the habitual species of the human intellect, although materially many, formally constitute a unity. The

active natural potencies of matter, taken collectively, constitute Nature, which is derived from the unity of universal corporeal form. In turn, this unity is received from the first unity in the created order, the unity of universal spiritual form, which is exemplified by the human soul. In the created order, therefore, the forms of active natural potencies are ultimately one by virtue of the unity of the human soul, as a spiritual form. The forms received by matter as active natural potencies are, according to nature, first present in the human intellect as incompletely actual or habitual species. The forms that exist as active natural potencies in matter exist in the soul as the habitual species of the intellect, and these are immediately one by the unity of the soul's spiritual form. Accordingly, just as we saw that wholly constituted things and completely actual truths are formally one by the unity of the soul's spiritual form, so too we now see that this is likewise true of incompletely actual forms and truths. The human soul, therefore, is the first source in the created order of unity, truth, nature and knowledge.

We have maintained that Thomas of York's emphasis on the perfection of creatures can be attributed to the

influence of Aristotle, who rejected Plato's contention that the separate world of Ideas or Forms contains the sole cause of perfection in things. In a similar vein, Thomas of York rejects William of Auvergne's position that Divine Unity is the only cause of reality. Instead, he seeks to establish the existence of a unity second to the Divine, but first in the created order, that constitutes the source of all subsequent perfection in creatures. Instead of attributing the cause of physical change entirely to God, the Uncreated Cause, he endeavours to attribute some measure of perfection to secondary causes. Instead of viewing the First Divine Truth as the exclusive source of truths in things, he maintains that there is another truth, second to the Divine, but first in the created order, that is likewise the source of truth in things. Similarly, instead of considering God to be the sole cause of the truth in our knowledge, he maintains that the same first truth that constitutes the source of truth in things is also the source of truth in our knowledge. This first truth is the natural guarantee of the truth and certitude that our minds possess.

But although this emphasis on the perfection of creatures can be ascribed to the influence of Aristotle,

it is evident that Thomas' metaphysics remains essentially platonic and neoplatonic. As we have seen, the causal primacy of unity comes to the fore in Plato, and assumes special prominence in Plotinus. The conception of truth as an identity, indivision, or unity is found in the Enneads of Plotinus, in the early Christian neoplatonism of Augustine,[1] and in the later Arabian neoplatonism of Avicenna. The doctrine of universal hylomorphism is common to the neoplatonism of Augustine[2] and Gabirol. The identification of unity with form, as well as the identification of the first created unity with universal spiritual form, constitutes an integral part of the neoplatonism that characterized the Fons Vitae of Gabirol, as assimilated in the De Unitate of Gundissalinus. The role attributed to secondary causes in nature is a role commensurate with the perfection needed to bring the augustinian rationes seminales to completion. The roles attributed to the human intellect and things are roles envisaged within the context of augustinian divine illumination, - a theory of knowledge proportionate to the hierarchical order of creation in Gabirol's doctrine of universal hylomorphism. Sensible things are merely the occasional cause of man's intellectual knowledge, and

the human intellect does nothing more than bring to completion the incipiently actual forms of the habitual species already contained within it. Finally, the priority given to truth in our knowledge over the forms in reality is in line with the tradition of Plato, Plotinus and Augustine. In short, Thomas' attempt to uphold the perfection of creatures is conducted within the framework of the platonic and neoplatonic doctrines of unity, truth, universal hylomorphism, and divine illumination.

We have observed that this fundamental platonism and neoplatonism allies the thought of Thomas of York with Clarenbaldus of Arras and Alan of Lille in the twelfth century, and with the members of the augustinian school in the thirteenth. Drawing upon Boethius and Augustine, Clarenbaldus of Arras taught that just as numerical unity is the first principle of number, so too ontological unity is the primary cause of being.[3] He also taught that matter has a being between nothingness and substance, that seminal causes, which reproduce their own likeness in the normal course of nature, were implanted in matter by God, and that there are causes other than these outside the normal course of nature which are the

source of miracles.[4] Alan of Lille, who wrote his Maxims of Theology sufficiently late in the century to use the De Unitate of Gundissalinus, likewise maintained that unity is the primary cause of being.[5] In addition, he upheld the existence of a hierarchy in reality based upon the degrees of unity possessed by three orders of being: the 'supercelestial' unity of God, the 'celestial' unity of the angels, and the 'subcelestial' unity of the corporeal world.[6]

In the thirteenth century, Bonaventure held doctrines similar to those of Thomas of York on potency, seminal principles and efficient causality.[7] Like Thomas, the early English Dominican, Richard Fishacre, claimed the support of Aristotle for the doctrine of rationes seminales.[8] The later secular master at the University of Paris, Henry of Ghent, describes complex and incomplex truth in a manner resembling Thomas.[9] The Pseudo-Grosseteste, in his Summa Philosophiae, written sometime between 1260 and 1270, describes divisions of truth comparable to those described by Thomas.[10] Moreover, in common with Thomas, he defines truth in terms of indivision,[11] as does Bonaventure,[12] who found the definition in Augustine.[13] Robert Grosseteste's treatment of the problem as to

whether truth is one or many, created or uncreated, bears a marked resemblance to the consideration that Thomas gives it.[14] Like Thomas, William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon, in contrast with Bonaventure, maintain that divine illumination provides man not only with the light by which he forms true judgments, but with the conceptual content of his knowledge as well.[15] Finally, in devoting a full chapter towards the beginning of his treatment of truth to the question whether man has true knowledge, Thomas anticipates Henry of Ghent, who was the first to open a Summa with the question 'Does man know something?'.[16]

Apart from any doctrinal affiliation, Richard of Middleton resembles Thomas of York in his style of writing, manner of presentation and sources of inspiration. Speaking of Richard, Sharp says: "... his acquaintance with the writings of Thomas of York is suggested by his special fondness for Avicenna, by his frequent employment of Averroes, Algazel, and the author of the Six Principles (Trismegistus), by his method of citing two or more opinions concerning a problem and then leaving the reader to choose for himself, by his strong personal tone, and above all, by the many similarities of phrases and examples found in their discussions of the same problem".[17]

Of all these thirteenth century augustinians, Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon display the greatest kinship in doctrine with Thomas of York. In Grosseteste, the arguments quoted in support of truth as one and in support of truth as many, the nature of truth as expressed in terms of Anselmian 'rightness', the analogy of the vase of water used to explain the relationship between Divine and created truth, the distinction between the formal nature of truth considered in itself and truth as found in the things of which it is predicated, the propositions used to show that truth is many according to subject, but one eternally in the knowledge of God, all bear a striking resemblance to Thomas of York.[18] This is likewise true of Bacon, but to a lesser degree, in his doctrine of form as the cause of being, operation and knowledge,[19] in his doctrine of active potencies and their completion by an outside agent,[20] and in the extreme brand of augustinianism that sees divine illumination as the source of our conceptual knowledge.[21]

The historical importance of Thomas of York is evident from the fact that he, along with Grosseteste and Bacon, can be numbered among those in the early Oxford school who helped prepare the way for Duns Scotus. This

is especially true of Thomas of York, since his interests, in contrast with those of Grosseteste and Bacon, remained more exclusively on the level of speculative thought than on the level of natural science. His uninhibited pursuit of philosophical learning in Aristotle and the Arabs undoubtedly helped to promote a spirit of free inquiry among his Franciscan successors. His constant effort to enlist the support of Aristotle can be viewed as paving the way for Scotus' defence of Augustine's doctrines with the apologetic force he found in the aristotelian system.

In particular, Thomas' position that form is an active principle of individuation resembles Scotus,[22] and foreshadows the priority that Scotus will give to individual perfection.[23] Moreover, Thomas' account of Aristotle's refutation of the sceptics prefigures the justification of sense and intellectual knowledge provided by Scotus. Likewise, his attempt to establish a ground of certitude and truth in the created order is motivated by the same aristotelianism that inspired Scotus to uphold the natural character of human knowledge.[24]

In pursuit of this aim, however, Thomas does not reject divine illumination in any way, as Scotus does, in favour of aristotelian abstraction.[25] On the contrary,

he seeks to demonstrate the created nature of human knowledge entirely within the context of divine illumination. Accordingly, it might be said that he anticipates the criticism of Scotus, who asserts that divine illumination would reduce the natural autonomy of the intellect, and that a vision of the prototypes in that illumination would entail a supernatural knowledge of the Divine essence.[26] He does this simply by insisting that the light man receives in divine illumination is a created light; it is the formal essence of the human soul, which belongs to the created order.

Despite this difference, the augustinianism that Scotus shared in common with Thomas of York prompted him to maintain that the infallible truth contained in the principles of human knowledge does not depend on the data of sense, but only on the understanding and its analysis of terms; the senses do not cause our knowledge of first principles, but merely occasion it.[27] In summary, we find in Thomas of York the beginnings of a reconciliation between augustinianism and aristotelianism that was later to fructify into the famous synthesis of Duns Scotus.

Notes

Introduction

1. This information on the life and works of Thomas of York is taken from E. Longpre, 'Fr. Thomas D'York, O.F.M., La Première Somme Métaphysique du XIIIe Siècle', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, XIX (1926), pp. 876-881; D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century, (Oxford, 1930), pp. 49-53. Of the works of Thomas of York, only his Manus Quae Contra Omnipotentem and his two Letters have been published; the former was edited by M. Bierbaum, 'Bettelorden und Weltgeistlichkeit an der Universität Paris', Franzisk. Studien, Beiheft 2 (Münster, 1920), pp. 37-168; the latter are found in the correspondence of Adam Marsh, edited by J.S. Brewer in the Monumenta Franciscana (London, 1858), Epist. 26, pp. 113-115, Epist. 227, pp. 394-396. For a survey of the material in the Comparatio Sensibilium, see Longpré's table of contents (art. cit., pp. 929-930), based on manuscript F, which incorrectly labels the work as Book VIII of the Sapientiale (folio 230v).

2. My edition of the Sapientiale, Book VI, is the last in a series of editions of the seven books of the Sapientiale, which have been presented as doctoral dissertations at the University of Toronto (God, His Nature and His Existence according to the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Text and Study, M. Manley, 1951. The Divisions of Being in Thomas of York: Study and Text, J.P. Reilly, 1951. The Doctrine of Creation in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text, C. Grassi, 1952. Substance and Being in Books Four and Five of the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text, C.M. Garvey, 1952. The Doctrine of the Soul in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York: Study and Text, P.M. Byrne, 1955). These editions are based upon the three extant manuscripts: Ms.F - Florence, Biblioteca Nationale, Conv. Sopp. A.6 437; Ms V - Vatican, Latin 4301; Ms R - Vatican, Latin 6711. Brief quotations from the manuscripts are included in the following studies: M. Grabmann, 'Die Metaphysik des Thomas von York', Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Supplementband I (Münster, 1913),

2. (cont'd.)
pp. 181-193; E. Longpré, art. cit., pp. 875-930; E. Longpré, 'Thomas d'York et Matthieu d'Aquasparta. Textes inédits sur le problème de la création', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, I (1926-1927), pp. 269-293; F. Treserra, 'Entorn del Sapientiale de Thomas de York', Criterion, 5 (1929), pp. 5-45, 158-180; F. Treserra, 'De doctrinis metaphysicis Fratris Thomae de Eboraco, O.P.M., (Oxoniae magistri an. 1253)', Analecta sacra Terraconensia, 5 (1929), pp. 33-102; D.E. Sharp, op. cit., pp. 49-112. Further texts from the manuscripts are found in brief studies by two of those engaged in the work of editing the Sapientiale: James P. Reilly, Jr., 'Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes', Mediaeval Studies, vol. XV (1953), pp. 225-233; myself, 'Thomas of York and His Use of Aristotle: An Early Moment in the History of British Philosophy', Culture (1959) XX, pp. 420-436. Helpful background material is provided by: A.G. Little, 'The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, XIX (1926), pp. 803-874; D.A. Callus, Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford, Proceedings of the British Academy, 29 (London, 1943); E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House (New York, 1955), pp. 260-274, 294-312, 353-361.

3. Philebus, 15.

4. Cf. Pragmatism: A New Name For Some Old Ways of Thinking, William James (New York, 1914) Lecture I, p. 12; Lecture IV, pp. 127-162.

5. A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Part I), Sect. 150, "The Works of George Berkeley", ed. A.C. Fraser (Oxford, 1901), vol. I, pp. 342-343.

6. Enneads V, 3, 5.

7. "No doubt there have been intellectual nihilists of this kind before, but at the present day the theory of relativity of modern physics seems to have gone to their heads. It is true that they start out from

7. (cont'd.)
science, but they succeed in forcing it to cut the ground from under its own feet, to commit suicide, as it were; they make it dispose of itself by getting it to refute its own premises." Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, transl. W.J.H. Sprott (New York, Carlton House, n.d.), ch. 7, lecture 35, p. 240.

8. On the circling movement which was to bring back Aristotle to Western Europe via Syria, Persia, Egypt, Morocco and Spain, see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 181.

9. The writings of Pseudo-Dionysius were translated by Scotus Erigena (ca. 810-ca. 877) into Latin. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 609a.

10. Concerning the date of writing, cf. Longpré, art. cit., p. 884; Sharp, op. cit., p. 53.

11. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 649b.

12. Cf. Sharp, op. cit., pp. 3-5; Gilson, op. cit., pp. 235-236.

13. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 235, 260; D.A. Callus, op. cit., pp. 8-12.

14. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 237-238.

15. We shall see this indebtedness manifested, for example, in Thomas' doctrine of unity (cf. infra, ch. 1, p. 4).

16. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 250-258.

17. Cf. D.E. Sharp, op. cit., pp. 1, 9-12.

18. Cf. Sharp, op. cit., p. 5.

19. Cf. Sharp, op. cit., p. 11; Gilson, op. cit., pp. 262, 663b.

20. On the sources of Arabian and Jewish neoplatonism, cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

21. The Liber de Causis was translated by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century and by Roger Bacon in the thirteenth (cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 235-237, 652b.

22. Cf. Sharp, op. cit., p. 55. Thomas of York cites anonymously, and without any elaboration, the Liber de Causis in Book VI (e.g., ch. 15, p. 205; ch. 28, p. 424).

23. To further appreciate this fact, cf. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age, 4 (1930), pp. 142-149.

24. Cf. Longpré, art. cit., p. 894. Longpré contrasts the Sapientiale with the Summa Theologica attributed to Alexander of Hales (ca. 1186-1245), and observes that together they provided for the Franciscans of the thirteenth century a philosophical summa on the one hand, and a theological summa on the other (cf. Longpré, art. cit., pp. 875-876).

25. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 260.

26. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 262. Sharp (op. cit., p. 11) says: "To the Arabian commentators on Aristotle, Grosseteste does not seem particularly indebted, for his interests tended more to Arabic science. He utilizes the Almagest of Ptolemy, the De Motu Accessionis et Recessionis of Ibn Thabit, and the Theorica Planetarum of Alpetragius; ..."

27. Cf. Longpré, art. cit., p. 877.

28. The following survey of the Sapientiale can be readily verified from Longpré's table of contents, which is based on the chapter headings in F manuscript (cf. Longpré, art. cit., pp. 906-929).

29. Book III appears as Book V in F manuscript, and accordingly in Longpré, art. cit., p. 47. But in the text itself (F, folio 142rA) we read: "De quibus aliquid superius secundo libro dictum est ut dicetur infra

29. (cont'd.)
in quarto libro." This would seem to indicate that what is labelled Book V by the copyists of both F and R manuscripts is, in reality, Book III. Manuscript V carries what is evidently the correct division. Cf. James P. Reilly, Jr., The Divisions of Being in Thomas of York: Study and Text, Part I, ch. I, p. ii.

30. Cf. infra, Book VI, ch. 1, p. 1 (the opening paragraph of Book VI).

31. The following survey of Book VI is based on the text of my edition.

32. This method is particularly exemplified for us in the Sophist and the Statesman.

33. This chapter does not appear in F manuscript, and accordingly, is not found in Longpré's table of contents. As a result, my enumeration of subsequent chapters in Book VI will run one number ahead of Longpré's. Cf. Sapientiale VI, 17, p. 229a, and note 1, p. 126a.

34. Sapientiale VI, ch. 18, p. 230. (Subsequent references to Book VI of the Sapientiale will state only chapter and page.) Cf. Algazel, Meta. pars Ia, I, 6, Algazel's Metaphysics, a Mediaeval Translation, ed. J.T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 40.

35. Ch. 18, pp. 242-244. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. III, 6; 206a16-206b19.

36. Ch. 18, pp. 244-245. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. III, 6; 206b33-207a21.

37. Ch. 19, p. 248.

38. Ibid., p. 250. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. III, 7; 207b35-208a1; 207a32-207b1.

39. Ch. 19, pp. 253-254, 256. Cf. Algazel, Meta. pars Ia, 1, 6, p. 40.

40. Ch. 19, pp. 255-258.

41. Ibid., pp. 261-264.

42. Cf. infra, ch. 1, pp. 14-17, 23-25.

43. In Book III, Thomas gives an incomplete presentation of his doctrine of causality and of his theory of knowledge. On the basis of this material, Dr. James Reilly allies the thought of Thomas of York with that of Aquinas. Cf. James P. Reilly, Jr., 'Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes', Mediaeval Studies, XV (1953), pp. 225-233.

44. Cf. infra, ch. 1, p. 17.

45. In this regard, Thomas declares his intention from the beginning of Book VI (ch. 1, p. 1): "Pertractatis divisionibus entis ... isto collocavi libro."

46. The De Sex Principiis, which is not to be confused with the work bearing the same title attributed to Gilbert de la Porrée (cf. Sharp, op. cit., p. 53, ftnote 3), is quoted in ch. 13, p. 182, and the Ad Asclepium is quoted in ch. 13, p. 184.

47. The work is quoted in ch. 14, p. 195.

48. Cicero's De Natura Deorum is quoted frequently, e.g. ch. 15, pp. 202, 204; also his Tusculanarum Disputationum, in chs. 13 and 14, pp. 176 and 200, respectively.

49. Seneca is quoted less frequently than Cicero, but he is quoted, e.g. in ch. 15, p. 204.

50. See, for example, Thomas' use of Aristotle with respect to the arguments of the sceptics, as described below (ch. 4, pp. 105-107). See also his use of Aristotle's notion of nature, as described below (ch. 2, pp. 56-58).

51. These four modes of opposition are: contradictory, contrary, relative and privative. Cf. supra, xiii-xiv.

52. Cf. supra, p. xiv.

53. This is the order prescribed by Aristotle in Book IV of his Metaphysics.

54. This view is at variance with the opinion of Sharp, who is inclined to regard the Franciscans of this period in England as aristotelians. Speaking of the old Franciscan school, to which Thomas of York belongs, Sharp writes (op. cit., p. 51): "The writings of that School are still too little known to justify any closed conceptions of its activities such as are fostered by the vicious obsession of modern writers to label the Oxford Franciscans as disciples of Augustine and of Bonaventure or as precursors of Scotus."

Notes

Chapter 1

1. On the doctrine of unity in Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras, cf. N. Haring, 'The Creation and Creator of the World According to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, XXII (1955), pp. 162-169, esp. pp. 166-167; cf. also E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Random House (New York, 1955), pp. 147-149. On the doctrine of unity in Alan of Lille, cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 173-175.

2. Thomas' doctrine of unity occurs, for the most part, in the first five chapters of Book VI, pp. 1-84.

3. Ch. 2, p. 40.

4. Bk. I, chs. 10-13.

5. From the very outset of Bk. VI, Thomas declares his intention to treat primarily of the perfections of being as found in creatures, and the first perfection he considers is that of unity. Cf. ch. I, p. 1.

6. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. IX, 4, Avicennae peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta, 2 vols. (Venice, 1508), vol. II, fol. 185vA. Cf. also Algazel, Algazel's Metaphysics, a Mediaeval Translation, ed. J.T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 117.

7. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. IX, 4, fol. 105rA. Cf. also Algazel, Meta., p. 119.

8. William of Auvergne voices his opposition to Avicenna's doctrine at great length in the De Universo Ia Iae, chs. 24-30, Opera Omnia, 2 vols. (Aureliae, 1674), vol. I, pp. 617b-625b.

9. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 4, vol. II, p. 5a; 7, vol. II, supplement p. 8b.

10. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, 11, vol. II, supplement p. 16b. Cf. also A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo D'Auvergne A San Tomas II (Milan, 1934) p. 183ff.

11. The only work, however, of William of Auvergne's that Thomas quotes in Book VI, and then merely on one occasion, is the De Fide et Lege, which he quotes anonymously (ch. 32, p. 497). In Bk. VII (chs. 18, 19, fols. 222, 229), Thomas shows a direct acquaintance with William of Auvergne's De Universo, although he merely designates the author as "unus de sapientibus". Cf. E. Longpré, 'Thomas d'York, O.F.M., la première somme métaphysique du XIIIe siècle', Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, 19 (1926), p. 899.

12. The doctrine of potency and causality that Thomas opposes is held by William of Auvergne (cf. below, ch. 2, pp. 48-51). Dr. James Reilly maintains that, with respect to the doctrine of causality in Bk. III(V) of the Sapientiale, "it is certain that William of Auvergne is Thomas of York's opponent." Cf. James P. Reilly, Jr., 'Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes', Mediaeval Studies, XV (1935), pp. 225-233, esp. p. 227.

13. Grosseteste, in his opuscules and commentaries, sought to make use of the latest scientific information obtained from the recently acquired translations of Aristotle and the Arabs to support a fundamentally augustinian position and to explain in a rational manner the truths of Revelation. For example, cf. his treatise De Artibus Liberalibus, ed. L. Baur, 'Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln', Beiträge (Münster, 1912), IX, pp. 1-10; his treatise De Luce, ed. L. Baur, pp. 51-52; and his commentary In Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, Bk. I, ch. 14 (Venice, 1537), fol. 17vA, and loc. cit., ch. 17, fols. 21rA and 23rB-23vA.

14. Ch. 1, pp. 2-3. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. III, 4; 1001b 7-19.

15. This is a general statement of Thomas' position, which he develops throughout chs. 1-5, pp. 1-84; esp. ch. 2, pp. 21-40.

16. Thomas quotes the work anonymously as follows: "auctor tractatus, qui intitulatur De Unitate et Uno" (ch. 1, p. 20); "auctor tractatus, De Unitate et Uno" (ch. 2, p. 34); and "... sic definitur a Boethio ..., prout exponitur in tractatu, De Unitate et Uno." (ch. 2, p. 33), thereby recognizing the presence of Boethius in the work, without naming him as the author. For an account of the authorship of the De Unitate, and on its being authentic Gundissalinus, see P. Correns, 'Die dem Boethius fälschlich zugeschriebene Abhandlung des Dominicus Gundissalinus De Unitate', Beiträge I, 1 (Münster, 1891), pp. 12-38. Here also Correns presents a critical edition of the De Unitate (pp. 3-11), and a commentary on the place of the De Unitate in the history of philosophy (pp. 39-49). In the latter (p. 48), he points out that little is known about the immediate effect of the work on the development of philosophy apart from an occasional quotation in Alan of Lille.

17. The text of the Fons Vitae, in its mediaeval Latin translation, has been published by Clemens Baeumker, 'Avencebrolis Fons Vitae ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et Dominico Gundissalino', Beiträge I, 2-4, Münster, 1882-1895. On the neoplatonic character of the work, with its commingling of Jewish and Arabian thought, see S. Munk, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe (Paris, 1859), pp. 5-306.

18. On the eclectic composition of the De Unitate, see P. Correns, op. cit., pp. 15-28.

19. On the neoplatonic background of the treatise, see P. Correns, op. cit., pp. 40-48.

20. Ch. 2, p. 33. Cf. Gundissalinus, op. cit., p. 3. Cf. also Boethius, De Trinitate III, "Theological Tractates, text and English translation", H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand, Loeb Classical Library (London-New York, 1918), p. 12, line 15: "Etenim unum res est; unitas, quo unum dicimus."

21. Ch. 2. p. 34. Cf. Gundissalinus, op. cit., p. 11.

22. Ch. 2, p. 34. Cf. Dr. Carlo Grassi, The Doctrine of Creation in the 'Sapientiale' of Thomas of York: Study and Text, vol. I, pp. 106-111. Dr. Grassi notes that according to Thomas of York (Sapientiale II, 31, passim), neither matter of itself nor form of itself has unity, since it is the union of the two which constitutes real or actual esse and unity.

23. Ch. 2, p. 28. Cf. Augustine, De Vera Religione I, 29, 55; PL 34, 146.

24. Thomas states that the only difference between the terms 'unity' and 'the one' is that 'unity' is abstract and 'the one' is concrete (ch. 2, p. 33).

25. Ch. 2, p. 29. Cf. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae III, prosa 11, ed. A. Fortescue (London, 1925), pp. 91-92.

26. Ch. 2, p. 31. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae IV, 11, p. 235.

27. Ch. 2, p. 31.

28. Ibid. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 1B, fol. 78rA.

29. Ch. 2, p. 32. Cf. Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus XIII, Dionysiaca, 2 vols., ed. Philippe Chevalier (Paris, 1937), I, pp. 541-542.

30. Ch. 2, p. 40.

31. Ch. 2, p. 35. Cf. Gundissalinus, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

32. Ch. 2, p. 35.

33. Ch. 2, p. 34. Cf. Gundissalinus, op. cit., p. 5; Gabirol, Fons Vitae IV, 11, p. 236.

34. Bk. II, chs. 15-32. Cf. F. Treserra, 'De doctrinis metaphysicis Fratris Thomae de Eboraco, O.F.M. (Oxoniae magistri an. 1253)', Analecta sacra Terraconensia, (5, 1929, pp. 33-102), pp. 51-59.

35. Cf. Treserra, art. cit., pp. 54-56.

36. Ch. 2, pp. 35-36. Cf. De Unitate, pp. 7-9.

37. Ch. 2, pp. 35-36. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae II, 21, p. 62.

38. Ch. 6, pp. 94-98. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo et Mundo IV, 3; 310a20-30; 310a35-310b11: Averroes, In VII Meta., t.c. 4, "Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri Omnes ... cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem Commentariis," 11 vols. (Venetiis apud Juntas, 1574), vol. VIII, fol. 211rC; In X Meta., t.c. 13, VIII, fol. 261vG-H; In IV De Caelo, t.c. 38, V, fol. 263vL: Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis II, PL 64, 212A-B.

39. Ch. 6, pp. 94-95.

40. Ch. 6, p. 95.

41. Ch. 6, pp. 95-96.

42. Cf. supra, pp. 5-6.

43. Ibid.

44. Cf. supra, pp. 8-9.

45. Ibid.

46. Like Grosseteste before him, Thomas visualizes the procession of creatures from God after the manner of the procession of number from unity. Grosseteste, however, envisages three natures at work in the created order, namely the unity of form, the duality of matter and the tertiary nature of composites. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, 'De luce seu de inchoatione formarum', ed. L. Baur, p. 58. Cf. also Treserra, art. cit., p. 71.

47. Bk. II, fol. 78rA: "Cum omne quod exit in esse exit aut per generationem, aut compositionem aut creationem, tunc necesse est quod principia exeant in esse per creationem sicut habetur a Gundissalino De Creatione, c. 4, unde cum creator sit unitas, primus exitus principiorum ab eo erit in dualitate. Duo igitur erunt principia prima. Dualitas enim est prima species numerorum, secundum quod dicit Aristoteles et Averroes, III Meta. c. 11, et ideo ipsa immediate sequuntur unitatem: conveniens igitur est creatio primorum

47. (cont'd.)
principiorum in dualitate." Loc. cit., fol. 78rA-B: "Praeterea hoc ipsum aliter, ex diversitate creati ac creatore, secundum quod eleganter prosequitur Gundissalinus in libro scilicet de creatione: creator, inquit, aliquod principium creavit; creatum omne a creante est diversum, cum igitur creator sit vere unus, profecto creatum non debuit esse unum. Sed sicut inter creatorem et ipsam creaturam nullum fuit medium, sic inter unum et duo nullum est medium; principium enim quod est diversum ab uno est duo, cum igitur creator sit vere unus, creatura quae primo ipsum sequitur debuit esse duo. In unitate enim non est diversitas sed in alteritate; primum autem principium alteritatis est binarius, qui primus ab unitate recedit. Unde si primum creatum unum esset, tunc nulla esset diversitas, si vero nulla esset diversitas, nulla esset quae futura esset rerum universitas: quapropter, sicut infert, duo simplicia ab uno simplici primum creari debuerunt, ex quo omnia constituenda erant, constitutio autem non potuit fieri nisi ex diversis, quare diversa esse debuerunt. Hanc rationem ponit Avencebron, l. 4 De Fonte Vitae, c. 6, quare, inquit, creator omnium dicitur esse unus tantum, et creatum debet esse diversum ab eo ..."
Loc. cit., fol. 78rB: "reductio autem multorum ad primum est sicut reductio numerorum ad unum, et causa est secundum Algazelem II Meta., c. 12, quia quidquid provenit a primo, provenit secundum ordinem, hinc ponebant, sapientes, numeros principia rerum"
Ibid.: "his igitur intendenti patere poterit quod tantum duo sunt principia prima, principia, dico, quae sunt per se principia ad quae et in quae reducuntur et resolvuntur omnia, nam omnia resolvuntur in ea ex quibus componuntur, sicut dicit Avencebron, l. 2, c. 16"
Loc. cit., fol. 89rA: "Ex his igitur et consimilibus sermonibus sanctorum et theologorum apparet quod nulla creatura simplex sed composita, et per hoc materiam et formam habet: et hoc est quod intenditur"
Loc. cit., fol. 98vA-B: "Est igitur voluntas prima uniens et componens materiam primam et formam primam; propter hoc dicit Avencebron, l. 5, c. 31 quod voluntas prima causa est superior illis et ligans et eas uniens et retinens earum unitionem, quia unitio earum non est nisi ex impressione unitatis in illis, inter quam et

47. (cont'd.)
ipsas non est medium; et signum huius est perpetuitas earum et stabilitas in unitione quae est propter propinquitatem earum ad originem unitatis, et hoc est quod dicit idem in eodem, c. 26 quod verbum postquam creavit materiam et formam ligavit se cum illis, sicut est ligamentum animae cum corpore, et effudit se in illis, et non discessit ab eis, et penetravit a summo usque ad infimum"
Cf. Treserra, art. cit., pp. 38-39, 56, 71.

48. Bk. II, fol. 99rA: "materia est proxima unitati primae, et unitas fluit in ea, et ideo movetur ad eam, et cum non possit moveri ad unitatem primam, immediate, movetur ad splendorem ejus, id est ad formam"
Ibid: "Causa autem propria ex parte formae quia unitur materiae, est largitas quam recipit a creatore, ex qua habet in natura sua esse alteri dare et communicare, et per consequens se unire, sicut dicit idem (Avencebron), l. 3, c. 14"
Ibid: "Maxima denique causa est obedientia qua obediunt voluntati primae, fluxu violentiae et necessitatis, quia sunt inter se diversae, et simile simili unitur"
Ibid: "Hae sunt causae unitionis materiae et formae propter quas unum fit ex eisdem sine medio"
Cf. Treserra, art. cit., pp. 71-72.
Bk. II, fol. 80vA: "Amplius secundum quod dicit Avencebron, l. 5, c. 32, omnia appetunt unitatem et propter hoc dicit in eodem, c. 35, quod haec est radix communis, quod unitas vincit omnia et est diffusa in omnibus et est retentrix omnium; et propterea omnia quae sunt, quaecumque sint diversa, appetunt unionem et convenientiam, sicut ipse dicit in eodem; est igitur unio et convenientia in naturali desiderio materiae et constat quod nonnisi respectu formae, quare naturaliter materia appetit formam."
Ibid: "Praeterea perfectio divina est hujuscemodi cui omnia entia appetunt assimilari et ex qua appetunt acquirere secundum quod natura eorum potest recipere, sicut dicit Averroes super I Phys., c. 14b, et propter hoc etiam materia appetit assimilari principio primo, sicut dicit in eodem. Et ideo dicit Avencebron, l. 5, c. 14, quod inquisitio et motus diffusus est in

48. (cont'd.)
omnibus, videlicet ad factorem primum ad illum, enim, moveri, et ipsum inquirere, omnibus inditum est, licet differenter secundum diversitatem propinquitatis et elongationis. Unde, qui non possit sine medio adquirere eam, debet eam acquirere per medium ad quod naturaliter movetur propter extremum; et propter hoc, sicut ipse dicit c. 32, cum inter materiam et esse primum non sit similitudo propinqua, necesse est ut moveatur ad inquirendum lumen et splendorem ejus hoc est formam quae creatur - forma dicitur lumen ab Avencebron - ex eo, ex quo patet sicut ipse dicit in eodem quod omnino motus materiae ad formam non est nisi propter diesiderium primi esse. Et causa est quam dicit Avicenna IX Meta., c. 2 quod omne factum adquirit perfectionem a quo factum est; cum igitur sic sit eodem motu et appetitu quo movetur materia, assimilari pro sui possibilitate unitati primae increatae, movebitursecundum creatam, hoc est formam, Est igitur ille appetitus formae in materia naturaliter, sicut dixit Aristoteles."
Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 42.

49. Bk. II, 86vA: "nam sicut non habet esse nisi per formam ita nec unitatem". Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 51.

50. Treserra, art. cit., p. 70: "Formae conveniunt in nomine et definitione, sunt ergo una in specie, multa in individuis sicut materiae. Est una forma universalis sub qua sunt multae particulares, idem dicitur de materia. Ordo formarum est sicut respondentium materiarum." Cf. Sapientiale II, fol. 98rA.

51. Treserra, art. cit., p. 61: "Existentia formae universalis probatur cum eodem ex existentia materiae universalis cui correspondet. De ipsa dicitur quod essentia formarum quae sunt in forma universali sunt ipsa essentia formae universalis, nam est forma quae sustinet formam omnis formae cum qua unitur forma omnis rei. Formae ergo conveniunt in forma necdiversificantur nisi secundum materias." Cf. Sapientiale II, fol. 93rA-B.

52. Treserra, art. cit., p. 70: "Forma est unitas colligens, materia est dividens ac multiplicans. Omnis unitas est a forma." Cf. Sapientiale II, fol. 96vB.

53. Bk. II, fol. 92rA: "Forma universalis est unitas impressa ab uno vero altissimo, infusa in materia tota et continens illam, initium existens unorum numeratorum". Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 60.
Bk. II, fol. 99rA: "unitas vincit omnia et est diffusa in omnibus et est retentrix omnium". Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 71.
Bk. II, fol. 80vA: "Amplius secundum quod dicit Avencebron, l. 5, c. 32, omnia appetunt unitatem et propter hoc dicit in eodem, c. 35, quod haec est radix communis, quod unitas vincit omnia et est diffusa in omnibus et est retentrix omnium; ...". Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 42.

54. Treserra, art. cit., p. 60: "Dicitur lumen quia comparatur lumini secundum Avencebrol (l. 5, c. 30). Forma enim diffunditur in materia sicut lumen in aere, et sic diversitas formarum accipitur secundum materiam tollentem de subtilitate et luminositate, et secundum earum elongationem a Deo, et ita fiunt debiliores sicut debilitatur lux secundum spissitatem aeris et elongationem a fonte." Cf. Sapientiale II, fols. 92-93.

55. Bk. II, fol. 93rB: "Forma inferior est defluxa a superiori et ideo est in illa, ut particularis naturalis in forma universali naturali, et forma universalis naturalis in forma universali corporali, et forma universalis corporalis in forma universali spirituali, sicut dicit idem (Avencebrol) l. 2, c. 2, et ita est forma in forma quousque perveniatur ad formam in qua est collectio omnium formarum, sicut ibidem dicit l. 3, c. 23 et 24". Cf. Treserra, art. cit. p. 61.
Bk. II, fol. 88vA: "Similiter patet quinaria divisio materiae secundum Avencebron, l. 2, c. 2 ubi dividit materiam in materiam particularem naturalem et materiam universalem naturalem et materiam universalem caelestem et materiam universalem corporalem et materiam universalem spiritualem. Unde secundum eundem ibidem, materia particularis naturalis subsistit in materia universali naturali, et haec in materia universali

55. (cont'd.)
caelesti, et haec in materia universali corporali, et haec in materia universali spirituali; materia quae superior sustinet inferiorem, ut spiritualis corporalem, et corporalis caelestem, et caelestis naturalem universalem, et naturalis universalis naturalem particularem, materia enim universalis est quae continet particulares. Et harum materiarum semper inferior est extremum superioris et ideo per cognitionem inferioris pervenitur ad cognitionem superioris ..." Cf. Treserra, art. cit., pp. 51-52.

56. Cf. supra, p. 8.

57. Bk. VII, chs. 8-9.

58. Cf. supra, pp. 5-6.

59. Ch. 2, pp. 37-38; ch. 1, pp. 8-9, 17-18. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 2C, fol. 78vA. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. V, 6; 1016b1-3.

60. Ch. 1, pp. 8-10. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. V, 6; 1016a33-1016b31.

61. Ch. 2, p. 23. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 2C-D, fol. 78vA.

62. Ch. 2, p. 23.

63. Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. V, 6; 1016b18-21.

64. Ch. 2, p. 23. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. X, 1; 1052b15-26. Cf. also Thomas of York, Sapientiale III, 22, 27. Concerning Aristotle's identification of the measure in every category with the most simple indivisible nature, or basic genus, in that category, see Aristotle, Meta. III, 3; 998b3-10: Meta. V, 6; 1016a24-28: Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale VI, 2, p. 26.

65. Ch. 2, pp. 23-24.

66. Loc. cit., p. 24.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. XIII, 2; 1077a20-23: Averroes, In XIII Meta. III, 2, VIII, fols. 344vM-345rA.

69. Cf. Infra, pp. 23-25.

70. Ch. 2, pp. 24-25.

71. Loc. cit., pp. 25-26. Aristotle, Meta. V, 6; 1016b18-21: "The essence of what is one is to be some kind of beginning of number; for the first measure is the beginning, since that by which we first know each class is the first measure of the class; the one, then, is the beginning of the knowable regarding each class." Aristotle, Meta. X, 1; 1052b15-26: "... 'to be one' means 'to be indivisible', being essentially a "this" and capable of being isolated either in place, or in form or thought'; or perhaps 'to be whole and indivisible'; but it means especially 'to be the first measure of a kind', and most strictly of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other categories. For measure is that by which quantity is known; and quantity qua quantity is known either by a 'one' or by number, and all number is known by a 'one'. Therefore all quantity qua quantity is known by the one, and that by which quantities are primarily known is the one itself; and so the one is the starting-point of number qua number. And hence in the other classes too 'measure' means that by which each is first known, and the measure of each is a unit- ..." Aristotle, loc. cit., 1052b32-1053a2: "In all these, then, the measure and starting-point is something one and indivisible, since even in lines we treat as indivisible the line a foot long. For everywhere we seek as the measure something one and indivisible; and this is that which is simple either in quality or in quantity. Now where it is thought impossible to take away or to add, there the measure is exact (hence that of number is most exact; for we posit the unit as indivisible in every respect; but in all other cases we imitate this sort of measure." Aristotle, loc. cit., 1053a18-21: "Thus, then, the one is the measure of

71. (cont'd.)
all things, because we come to know the elements in the substance by dividing the things either in respect of quantity or in respect of kind. And the one is indivisible just because the first of each class of things is indivisible." Aristotle, loc. cit., 1053a32-33: "Knowledge, also, and perception, we call the measure of things for the same reason, because we come to know something by them- ..." Aristotle, loc. cit., 1053b4-8: "Evidently, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we define it according to the meaning of the word, is a measure, and most properly of quantity, and secondly of quality. And some things will be one if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if they are indivisible in quality; and so that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or qua one."

72. Ch. 2, p. 25.

73. Loc. cit., p. 26. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. V, 6; 1016a24-1016b17, esp. 1016b6-17. Cf. also Thomas of York, Sapientiale III, chs. 15-16.

74. Bk. III (IV, 5), fol. 107vB: "Igitur praeter formam speciei, oportet, ut videtur, quod aut sit forma aliqua propria de se particularis quae contrahat materiam communem ad singularitatem, aut materia aliqua signata quae contrahat formam communem ad singularitatem. Quis igitur modorum istorum est? Videtur quod primo, et non secundo. Primo quod materia non est signata nisi per formam, igitur non est causa signationis formae. Secundo, quod materia est in ratione recipientis et ens in potentia, et forma in ratione largitatis, et est ens in actu: quare illa signabilitas erit ex forma". Cf. Tresserra, art. cit., p. 74. Bk. III (IV, 21), fol. 122rA-B: "Manifestum est quod est duplex numeratio: activa et passiva, formalis et materialis; ad numerationem activam et formalem sequitur productio formarum substantialium, ad numerationem passivam et materialem productio formarum accidentalium. Amplius materia, cum sit numerabilis, hoc est in potentia ut numeretur etiam secundum seipsam ante compositionem ejus cum forma quia haec potentia quae numerabilis est concreta est eidem; tamen in propinquiori dispositione

74. (cont'd.)
vel potentia est ut numeretur cum est in actu sub forma. Et propter hoc forte dicit Aristoteles quod esse praeter formam propriam quae passiva est, est in materia, ipsa forma actu omnes numerans unitate quae est principium numeri substantiarum, ad quem numerum sequitur numerus accidentium."
Ibid: "Et ex his videre poteris differentiam quomodo differenter materia est subjectum formae et subjectum accidentis; quia non est subjectum accidentis nisi cum est actu sub aliqua forma numeratarum a forma prima; subjectum autem formae primae est secundum simplicem ejus potentiam quae est adhuc in potentia ad unam formarum supradictarum. Propter hoc audis ab Aristotele in pluribus locis, sicut superius dixi tibi, quod congregatum ex subjecto et accidente est congregatum ex aliquo in actu et forma; et congregatum vel compositum ex materia et forma vel genere et differentia est compositum ex aliquo quod est in potentia et ex aliquo quod est in actu."
Ibid: "Ex his etiam scire poteris quomodo et materia et forma sint principia accidentium, et quomodo accidens causatur a forma substantiali, et tamen omne accidens est in substantia per naturam materiae. Quia nisi actu numeret forma, non est materia actu numerata. Et nisi materia fuerit actu numerata non est numeratum accidens ipsa. Quia tamen prima radix numerationis est in materia (per) specialissimas rationes quas dixi tibi, ideo accidentia attribuuntur naturae materiae."
Cf. Tresserra, art. cit., p. 75.

75. Ch. 1, p. 9; ch. 23, p. 324; Bk. III, fol. 96vB (Tresserra, art, cit., p. 70). Cf. Aristotle, Meta. III, 3; 998b4-10: Analytica Posteriora I, 2; 71b9-11.

76. Cf. supra, p. 6.

77. Ch. 2, p. 30. Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 11, 31; PL 32, 1258: Epistula 3, 2; C.S.E.L. XXXIV, 1, p. 7. Cf. Ecclesiastes vii, 29.

78. Cf. Timaeus, 34, 54-58: Parmenides, 144.

79. Enneads V, 5, 5.

80. Cf. *supra*, p. 14.

81. Cf. *supra*, pp. 5-6.

82. Cf. *supra*, pp. 23-25. This in no way contradicts the position that matter is the principle of multiplicity, which we treated earlier (cf. *supra*, pp. 7-8). There would be no number or multiplicity, unless there were a matter to be numbered. But although the presence of matter in creatures is the source of their multiplicity, nevertheless, actual beings, and accordingly actual multiplicity, only arises upon the actualization of matter by form. In other words, matter is the passive cause of multiplicity, and must be present wherever multiplicity is found. But form is the active cause, without which there would be no actual being, and consequently no actual multiplicity.

83. *Enneads* V, 2, 1: "It is because nothing in it is, that everything comes from it; so much so that, in order that being be, the One itself is bound not to be being, but the father of being and being is its first born child."
Loc. cit: "It is manifest that the maker of both reality and substance is itself no reality, but is beyond both reality and substance."

84. This identification runs throughout the whole of the *Sapientiale*, but assumes particular prominence when Thomas distinguishes between the being of the Creator and the being of the creature as between that which is one and that which is dual (Cf. Bk. II, fol. 78rA-B. Cf. also Treserra, *art. cit.*, pp. 38-39).

85. *Enneads* V, 7, 1.

86. For texts that stress the freedom of the Divine creative act, see Bk. II, ch. 1.

87. Cf. *supra*, p. 14.

88. Cf. *supra*, pp. 6-7.

89. Ch. 2, pp. 37-38. Cf. Avicenna, *Metap.* III, 2B, fol. 78rB.

90. Ch. 2, pp. 39-40. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 3A-B, fol. 78vB-79vA.

91. Ch. 3, p. 42. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 6A-E, fol. 80vB-81rA.

92. Ch. 3, p. 41. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. X, 3; 1054a20-29.

93. Ch. 3, pp. 42-43.

94. Loc. cit., pp. 43-44. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 6E, fol. 81rB.

95. Ch. 3, p. 44. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. X, 3; 1054a20-29.

96. Ch. 3, pp. 44-45. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae IV, 11, p. 235.

97. Ch. 3, p. 46. Cf. supra, pp. 30-31.

98. Ch. 3, p. 46. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. III, 3A. fol. 79rA.

99. Ch. 3, p. 46.

100. Loc. cit., p. 50.

101. Loc. cit., p. 51. Cf. Averroes, In IV Meta., t.c. 3, VIII, fol. 67rE. Cf. also Avicenna, Meta. III, 3, 79rB.

102. Ch. 3, pp. 51-52. Cf. Averroes, In IV Meta., t.c. 3, VIII, fol. 67rD: In I Meta., t.c. 6, VIII, fol. 255vL: loc. cit., t.c. 8, VIII, fol. 257rD.

103. Ch. 3, p. 52. Cf. Averroes, In IV Meta., t.c. 3, VIII, fol. 67rE.

104. Ch. 3, pp. 52-54.

105. Loc. cit., p. 53. Cf. Averroes, In I Meta., t.c. 8, VIII, fol. 257vK: loc. cit., t.c. 5, VIII, fol. 255rA: In IV Meta., t.c. 3, VIII, fol. 67rC-D.

106. Ch. 3, pp. 54-55.

107. Cf. supra, p. 22.

108. Ch. 3, p. 55.

109. *Ibid.*

110. Ch. 1, pp. 1-2. These are the positions of Parmenides and Zeno respectively, which Thomas, using Aristotle as his source, reports and rejects in summary fashion. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 2; 185a20-23: *loc. cit.*, 187a10: *Meta.* III, 4; 1001b7-17.

111. As was seen earlier (cf. *supra*, pp. 36-37), Thomas tries to avoid Avicenna's error of wholly identifying numerical and ontological unity. This does not prevent him, however, from considering numerical unity as the primary instance of unity to which all others, including ontological unity, are reducible (cf. *supra*, pp. 37-38).

Notes

Chapter 2

1. Cf. Avicenna, Metp. IX, 3-5. Cf. also Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 214-215; Being and Some Philosophers, p. 54

2. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Universo I, I, chs. 24-30, vol. I, pp. 617b-625b; De Trinitate 11, vol. II, supplement, pp. 16a-17a. Cf. also A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a san Tomaso d'Aquino, 2 vols., Milan, 1930, 1934; James P. Reilly, Jr., 'Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes', Mediaeval Studies, vol. XV (1953), pp. 225-233; Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 255-256.

3. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Universo I, I, 30, vol. I, p. 625b.

4. Cf. William of Auvergne, op. cit., 26, vol. I, p. 622a; De Trinitate 7, vol. II, supplement, p. 8b.

5. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 11, vol. II, supplement, p. 16a-b. Cf. also A. Masnovo, op. cit., I, pp. 190, 241-242.

6. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 7, vol. II, supplement, p. 7b. Cf. also A. Masnovo, op. cit., I, pp. 262-263.

7. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 11, vol. II, supplement, p. 16b. Cf. also A. Masnovo, op. cit., I, p. 246.

8. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Trinitate 7, vol. II, supplement, pp. 6a-7a. Cf. A. Masnovo, op. cit., I, p. 260.

9. William of Auvergne does not deny that potency precedes act, but, on the contrary, explicitly affirms it. He does, however, deny potency any kind of existence of its own prior to its actualization. De Trinitate 7, vol. II, supplement, p. 7a: "Potentiale per hoc quod est potentiale non potens est ut

9. (cont'd.)
ipsum habeat esse vel ut veniat in esse. Potentiale enim de essentia et intentione sua non habet in effectum eo quod possibilitas sola per se non sufficit ad effectum: quia si hoc esset, non contingeret quod possibilitas praecederet effectum." In other words, for William of Auvergne, the very fact that potency does not have a being of its own or that potency, of its own accord, cannot acquire actual being makes it possible for potency to precede act. For Thomas of York, however, as we shall see in what immediately follows, to say that potency does not have a being of its own necessitates saying that potency does not precede act. The reason is that, for Thomas, unless potency has some kind of being of its own, it would constitute a 'nothing', and to say that a 'nothing' precedes act is the same as saying that potency does not precede act. Put in another way, if a man wishes to maintain that potency precedes act, he can only do so if he accepts the position that potency has a being of its own. If he does not accept it, he cannot. Insofar as William of Auvergne denies any existence to potency in itself, he would, therefore, in Thomas' eyes, be committed to the position that potency does not precede act. In fact, according to Thomas, as we shall see shortly, such a person is committed to the denial of potency altogether.

10. Ch. 12, p. 170.

11. Ibid., pp. 170-172. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. IX, 3; 1046b28-1047b1.

12. Ch. 12, pp. 172-173.

13. Ibid., p. 173.

14. Loc. cit.

15. Loc. cit. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. IX, 6; 1048a31-1048b5.

16. Ch. 12, p. 173. Cf. Averroes, In IV Phys., t.c. 8, IV, fol. 213rE; In XII Meta., t.c. 11, VIII, fol. 297rE. In an earlier book of the Sapientiale, Thomas speaks

16. (cont'd.)
of the potency of matter as having a being of its own. "Matter in its definition, or according to reason has an *esse* of its own, but it is an *esse* in potency (II, 19, Grassi ed., p. 259). That is, it has an *esse* not *in actu* as though it were a *hoc aliquid*, but an *esse* which is between actual *esse* and *non esse*" (II, 16, p. 211). (Grassi, *op. cit.*, vol. III (Study), p. 66). In that same book, Thomas says that "it is better to speak of the being of potency in a wider extension than *esse*, for *ens* is divided into being in potency and being in act (*in effectu*), whereas *esse* is properly restricted to the second only, namely, being in act. *Ens* can be said of matter of itself and of form of itself, while *esse* is defined by Gundissalinus and Gabirol as 'the existence of form in matter'; and further *esse* is a property of form which it (the form) gives to matter" (II, 33, pp. 474-475). (Grassi, *op. cit.*, vol. III (Study), pp. 116-117).

17. Ch. 12, pp. 173-174. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* IX, 6; 1048b5-34.

18. Ch. 12, p. 174. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* IX, 4; 1047b4-5: Averroes, *In IX Meta.*, t.c. 8, VIII, fol. 232vG.

19. Ch. 12, p. 175. Cf. Gabirol, *Fons Vitae* I, 3, p. 5.

20. Ch. 12, p. 175. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* IX, 4; 1047b4-30: Averroes, *In IX Meta.*, t.c. 9, VIII, fol. 233rC-233vM.

21. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, 7, 2, 2, 1, Concl., *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi, 1882-1902), t. II, p. 198: "Differunt enim actus et potentia, non quia dicant diversas quidditates, sed dispositiones diversas ejusdem; non tamen sunt dispositiones accidentales, sed substantiales. Et hoc non est magnum si est in potentia agentis creati, ut quod est uno modo faciat esse alio modo." Cf. Gilson, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure*, 3rd. ed., J. Vrin (Paris, 1953), pp. 242-243.

22. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., 18, 1, 3, Concl., t. II, p. 440: "Cum satis constet rationem seminalem esse potentiam activam inditam materiae, et illam potentiam activam constet esse essentiam formae, cum ex ea fiat forma mediante operatione naturae, quae non producit aliquid ex nihilo; satis rationabiliter ponitur quod ratio seminalis est essentia formae producendae, differens ab illa secundum esse completum et incompletum sive secundum esse in potentia et in actu." Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 241.

23. Ch. 11, pp. 160-161.

24. Ibid., pp. 160-162.

25. Ch. 13, p. 179. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II, 1; 192b21-23. Besides Aristotle's definition, to which he gives special prominence, Thomas reports the definitions of nature provided by a wide variety of authors, including Seneca, Isaac Israeli, Averroes, John Damascene, Boethius, Trismegistus, Gabirol and Augustine (Ch. 13, pp. 176-186).

26. Ch. 13, p. 179. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II, 1; 192b23-26.

27. Ch. 13, p. 179. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. IX, 8; 1049b9-11: Averroes, In IX Meta., t.c. 13, VIII, fol. 240rA.

28. Ch. 13, p. 180. Cf. John Damascene, Dialectica, 29, 1, Version of Robert Grosseteste, ed. Owen A. Cooligan (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953), p. 26.

29. Ch. 13, p. 180. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. V, 6; 231a5-10.

30. Ch. 14, pp. 192-193. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. V, 4; 1015a13-19.

31. Ch. 16, p. 221; ch. 14, p. 193. Cf. Averroes, In IX Meta., t.c. 2, VIII, fol. 227rA.

32. Ch. 16, pp. 220-221; ch. 14, p. 193.

33. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II, 1; 192b21-33.

34. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. I, 7-9; 189b30-192b5.

35. Ch. 16, pp. 218-220. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram V, 4, p. 144; VI, 10, p. 183; VI, 16, pp. 190-191; IX, 17, p. 281; De Vera Religione I, 42, 79, PL 34, 158.

36. Ch. 16, p. 220. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram VI, 10, p. 182. On the doctrine of rationes seminales in Augustine, see M.J. McKeough, The Meaning of the rationes seminales in St. Augustine, Washington, 1926; Gilson, Introduction a l'étude de saint Augustin, 3rd. ed., J. Vrin (Paris, 1949), pp. 269-272.

37. Ch. 16, p. 222. Cf. Augustine, De Vera Religione I, 42, 79, PL 34, 158.

38. Ch. 16, pp. 222-223. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram VI, 16, 27, PL 34, 350.

39. Ch. 16, p. 223. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram IV, 33, 52, PL 34, 318.

40. Ch. 16, p. 223. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate III, 8, 13, PL 42, 876.

41. Ch. 16, p. 223. Cf. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XXII, 14, Dombart and Kalb ed., vol. 2, p. 591.

42. In the actual text, Thomas ascribes the expression 'active, natural potencies' to Aristotle. Ch. 16, p. 220: "Has aestimo Aristotelem vocare potentias activas naturales, secundum quod definit hujusmodi potentiam principium motus et transmutationis in aliud secundum quod aliud, V Metaphysicae, capitulo 5 et IX Metaphysicae, capitulo 2;" Later (p. 221), however, he correctly attributes the expression to Averroes (cf. supra, p. 58).

43. Ch. 16, p. 221.

44. Loc. cit. I have translated "principio transmutante" by "efficient cause". Although Thomas does not use the actual expression "causa efficiens" at this point, he does use it later in his treatment of truth in the human intellect (ch. 29, pp. 442-443).

45. Ch. 16, pp. 221-222.

46. Ibid., p. 222: 'Haec est igitur veritas et ratio nominationum diversarum in his legibus seu naturae viribus, secundum quod jam declaratum est.'

47. Ch. 16, pp. 223-225. The classification of the three positions is based on Averroes, In XII Meta., t.c. 18, VIII, fol. 303Kf. Thomas does not attribute the doctrine of a latitatio formarum to any author here, but in an earlier book of the Sapientiale (II, 26, Grassi ed., pp. 356-357), he attributes it to Empedocles, following the lead of Averroes, and not, as was the custom, to Anaxagoras (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta., lect. viii, n. 1430 (Marietti, 1950), p. 350: St. Bonaventure, II Sent. 7, 2, 2, 1, Concl., t. II, p. 197). For another treatment of this same classification, as found previously in Bk. II of the Sapientiale, cf. Grassi, op. cit., vol. III (Study), pp. 93, 97, 104.

48. Ch. 16, pp. 224-225. Cf. Averroes, In VII Meta., t.c. 31, VIII, fol. 181rD.

49. Ch. 16, p. 225. Again, I have translated "principio transmutante" as "efficient cause". Cf. supra, p. 62 and note 44.

50. Ch. 16, p. 225.

51. Cf. supra, pp. 58-60, 65.

52. Cf. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., 7, 2, 2, 1, Concl., t. II, pp. 197-199.

53. Cf. St. Bonaventure, II Sent., 7, 2, 2, 2, Concl., t. II, pp. 198, 202. As in Thomas' doctrine of unity, a comparison may also be made here between Clarenbaldus of Arras and Thomas. Clarenbaldus taught that matter has a being between nothingness and substance, that seminal causes, which reproduce their own likeness in the normal course of nature, were implanted in matter by God, and that there are causes other than these outside the normal course of nature which are the source of miracles (Cf. N. Haring, art. cit., pp. 170-173, 180).

54. Ch. 16, pp. 225-226.

55. Ibid., pp. 226-227. The miracles to which Thomas refers are recounted in the Old Testament: Num. xvii, 8; Dan. xviii, 11; Gen. xxi, 2.

56. Ibid., p. 227.

57. St. Bonaventure, I Sent., 42, 1, 3, ad 1; 42, 1, 4, Resp. Cf. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Scribner's (New York, 1949), p. 378.

Notes

Chapter 3

1. Cf. ch. 25, pp. 361-370.

2. Cf. *infra*, p. 89.

3. Cf. *infra*, pp. 81-82.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

5. Ch. 25, pp. 372-373.

6. *Loc. cit.*, p. 373; ch. 26, pp. 387-390.

7. Ch. 26, pp. 384-390, esp. pp. 387-390. Cf. Anselm, *De Veritate* II-VII, *Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia*, critical ed., F. S. Schmitt, vol. I, pp. 177-186.

8. Ch. 26, pp. 390-391. Cf. Anselm, *De Veritate* VII, vol. I, pp. 185-186.

9. Chs. 26-27, pp. 380-405, esp. pp. 400-405.

10. Thomas speaks of the truth of things in general as "veritas generaliter" and the truth as found in the human intellect as "veritas specialiter" (ch. 27, pp. 399-400).

11. *Ibid*. Cf. Anselm, *De Veritate* VII, vol. I, p. 185.

12. Ch. 27, p. 400. Cf. Avicenna, *Meta*. VIII, 6, fol. 100rA.

13. Ch. 27, p. 400. Cf. Isaac Israeli, *Liber de Definitionibus*, ed. J.T. Muckle, *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, 11 (1937-1938), pp. 307, 322-323. As with 'unity' and 'the one' (ch. 2, p. 33), Thomas distinguishes between 'truth' and 'the true' in terms of the abstract as opposed to the concrete. Ch. 27, p. 400: "Sed hoc quod dicitur 'id quod est' magis describit verum quam veritatem, nisi per pronomen concretum intelligamus abstractum, quia veritas non est id quod est proprie, sed entitas ejus quod est, ..."

14. Ch. 27, p. 400. Cf. Augustine, Liber Soliloquiorum II, 15, 29, PL 32, 898.

15. Ch. 27, p. 404. Cf. J.T. Muckle, 'Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge, 8 (1933), pp. 5-8.

16. Ch. 26, p. 382. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. IX, 10: 1051b2-23.

17. Ch. 26, pp. 382-383. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. IX, 10; 1051b24-25: Averroes, In IX Meta., t.c. 22, VIII, fol. 248vG. The doctrine of complex and incomplex truth in Thomas of York resembles that of Henry of Ghent. Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique, J. Vrin (Paris, 1938), pp. 39-40.

18. Ch. 27, p. 405. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. I, 6C, fol. 72vA; II, 2, fol. 76rA; III, 5, fol. 80rB. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae V, 7, p. 268; V, 18-19, p. 292.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. In the Pseudo-Grosseteste, the divisions of truth resemble those of Thomas of York, and the definition of incomplex truth is similarly expressed in terms of indivision ("the indivision of the thing that is and its being"). Cf. Summa Philosophiae Roberto Grosseteste ascripta, Treatise II, ed. L. Baur, 'Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln', Beiträge (Münster, 1912), IX, pp. 290-302, esp. p. 292.

21. Ch. 27, p. 405; ch. 26, pp. 382-383.

22. Cf. supra, pp. 77-78.

23. The concept of truth expressed in terms of unity can be found in Augustine, De Vera Religione XXXVI, 66, PL 34, 151-152. Cf. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, pp. 280-281. Similarly, the notion of truth as indivision is in St. Bonaventure, I Sent., Dist. VIII, Part I, art. 1, question 1.

24. Cf. *supra*, p. 77.

25. Thomas poses a number of arguments drawn from Augustine, Boethius and Anselm in favour of the position that there is only one truth, namely the Divine (ch. 25, pp. 361-365).

26. Ch. 25, p. 364. Cf. Anselm, *De Veritate* XIII, vol. I, p. 199.

27. Ch. 25, p. 365. Cf. Augustine, *De Vera Religione* I, 39, 72, PL 34, 154.

28. Ch. 25, pp. 365-367.

29. *Loc. cit.*, pp. 365-366. Cf. Augustine, *De Mendacio* I, 19-20, 40-41, C.S.E.L. 41, pp. 461-462.

30. Cf. *supra*, pp. 75-76.

31. Ch. 25, p. 366. Cf. St. Ambrose, *Comment. in Epist. ad Rom.* (Spurious) I, 25, PL 17, 62.

32. Ch. 25, pp. 367-370.

33. *Loc. cit.*, p. 367.

34. Ch. 25, p. 369.

35. *Ibid.* Cf. Augustine, *Liber Retractionum* I, 4, 2, C.S.E.L. 36, pp. 22-23.

36. Ch. 25, p. 367.

37. *Loc. cit.*, p. 368.

38. Cf. *supra*, ch. 2, p. 52; also, ch. 1, pp. 38-41.

39. Ch. 25, p. 368.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Ch. 26, pp. 396-398; ch. 25, pp. 369-370. Cf. Augustine, *Liber Soliloquiorum* II, 15, 29-30, 35, PL 32, 898-903.

42. Ch. 26, p. 397.

43. Ch. 26, pp. 397-398, 396; ch. 31, p. 483.

44. Ch. 26, p. 398; ch. 25, pp. 369-370.

45. Ch. 26, p. 396.

46. Ibid. Also, ch. 25, pp. 369-370.

47. Cf. supra, pp. 81-82.

48. Ch. 25, pp. 370-371. Cf. Augustine, De Vera Religione I, 18, 35, PL 34, 137; I, 12, 24, PL 34, 132; De Libero Arbitrio II, 17, 45-46, PL 32, 1265.

49. Ch. 25, p. 371. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae II, 20, p. 60. This is one of the major points that we considered in Thomas' doctrine of unity (cf. supra, ch. 1, p. 17).

50. Ch. 25, pp. 371-372.

51. Loc. cit., p. 372. Cf. Augustine, Liber Soliloquiorum II, 4, PL 32, 888.

52. Ch. 25, p. 372.

53. Cf. supra, p. 85.

54. Ch. 25, p. 368: "Et cum dico 'per se', non excludo causam extrinsecam, sed pono intrinsecam."

55. William of Auvergne, De Universo Ia Iae, chs. 35-36, vol. I, 836a-837a.

56. Ch. 25, pp. 373-374.

57. Loc. cit., p. 374. William of Auvergne, in another context, also alludes to the analogy of the vase. Against Avicenna's agent intellect, William argues that it leaves the soul with no more causality than a vase gives to the liquid it contains. Cf. William of Auvergne, De Anima V, pt. 7, vol. II, II, 122b. Grosseteste, however, like Thomas of York, uses the analogy of the vase to aid him in explaining the relationship between Divine and created truth. Cf. Grosseteste, De Veritate, 'Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln', Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters vol. IX (Münster, 1912), p. 141.

58. Ch. 25, p. 374. Cf. Anselm, De Veritate XIII, vol. I, p. 199.

59. Ch. 25, pp. 374-375. Cf. Anselm, De Veritate XIII, vol. I, p. 199.

60. Ch. 25, p. 375.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ch. 27, pp. 407-408.

65. Ch. 25, pp. 376-377.

66. Loc. cit., p. 375.

67. Ch. 27, pp. 408-409. In keeping with the 'universal hylomorphism' of Gabirol, Thomas maintains that matter has an essence of its own apart from form. Cf. Gabirol, Fons Vitae I, 10, pp. 10-11.

68. Ch. 27, p. 409. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. I, 6C, fol. 72vA. I have translated the word 'certitudo' by 'determination'. On this translation, cf. Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., On Being and Essence, by St. Thomas Aquinas, (Toronto, 1949), p. 28, note 8.

69. Ch. 27, p. 410.

70. Loc. cit., pp. 411-412. Thomas also tells us at this point that, like being, truth is predicated analogously of things. Loc. cit., p. 410: "Unde sicut ens ita verum, sicut entitas ita veritas est nomen multipliciter, id est analogice dictum;"

71. Ch. 25, p. 377.

72. Loc. cit., p. 376.

73. Ibid.

74. Loc. cit., p. 377.

75. Loc. cit., p. 378.

76. Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate, ed. cit., p. 139: "Unica est ergo veritas ubique significata et praedicata per hoc nomen veritas, sicut vult Anselmus, scilicet veritas summa. Sed in multis veritatibus rerum dicitur illa una veritas multae veritates."

77. Robert Grosseteste, loc. cit., p. 143: "Quapropter intentio veritatis, sicut intentio entis ambigua est: ex parte aliqua est una in omnibus veris et tamen per appropriationem diversificata in singulis."

78. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, loc. cit., pp. 130-143.

79. Ch. 25, p. 379.

Notes

Chapter 4

1. For information on the exponents of divine illumination in the thirteenth century, see Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 257 (William of Auvergne), pp. 337-338 (Bonaventure), pp. 341 and 690a (Matthew of Aquasparta), pp. 304-305 and 674b-675a (Roger Bacon), pp. 264 and 664b-665a (Grosseteste), p. 273 (Pseudo-Grosseteste).

2. The difficulty of upholding the natural character of human knowledge within the context of divine illumination reaches its apex in an author like John Peter Olivi (1248-1298), of whom Gilson writes: "After restating the problem of divine illumination, and describing the respective positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas, Olivi concludes that, being himself a Franciscan, he feels bound in conscience to stick to the Franciscan position. Yet, he adds, I do not want to do so if that position really entails the destruction of natural knowledge. I hope that such a consequence can be avoided, but as I do not see how, I leave to greater men the task of answering the question." The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 58.

3. Thomas' consideration of the problem runs throughout his treatment of truth (chs. 23-32, pp. 321-506), but is found primarily in the four final chapters of Book VI (chs. 28-32, pp. 415-506).

4. Gilson says that Aristotle led philosophers of the thirteenth century, for example, William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon, to take cognizance of the origin of our conceptual knowledge. Cf. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin, p. 121, ftnote 4.

5. For example, Bonaventure, De Scientia Christi, IV, Concl., t. V, pp. 23-24. Cf. Gilson, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, p. 324.

6. Cf. Augustine, Contra Academicos II, 5, 11ff., PL 32, 924ff. Cited by Bonaventure, De Scientia Christi, IV, Concl., t. V, p. 23. Cf. Gilson, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, p. 315. Similarly, the arguments of the sceptics considered by Matthew of Aquasparta were those of the Contra Academicos (Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de fide et de cognitione, Quaest. I (Quarrachi, 1903), vol. I. Cf. Richard McKeon's introduction to Matthew of Aquasparta, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, vol. II, p. 236.

7. Thomas' recognition of this fact anticipates the justification provided by Duns Scotus (cf. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 447).

8. Ch. 24, pp. 338-360. In devoting a full chapter to the question towards the beginning of his treatment of truth, Thomas can be said to anticipate Henry of Ghent, who was the first to open a Summa with the question 'Does man know something?'. On this point in Henry of Ghent, cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 447-448. 759-760.

9. Ch. 24, pp. 338-346. As indicated in the text, Thomas' account of the arguments and of their refutation is composed from material in Books IV and V of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

10. Ch. 24, pp. 338-346.

11. Ibid., pp. 346-360.

12. Ibid., p. 346; ch. 32, pp. 499-500. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate VIII, 1, 2, PL 42, 947.

13. Ch. 24, p. 360.

14. Ch. 23, pp. 321-324.

15. Ibid., pp. 329-330.

16. Cf. supra, ch. 2, pp. 63-66.

17. Ch. 23, p. 330. Cf. Augustine, De Quantitate Animae I, 20, 34, PL 32, 1055; Retractationes I, 7, 2, C.S.E.L. 36, p. 35; De Immortalitate Animae I, 10, 17, PL 32, 1030. Later, Thomas quotes texts from Augustine in support of the position that the innate species are only habitually, virtually, or potentially present in the soul after original sin (cf. infra, pp. 115-116).

18. Ch. 23, p. 330.

19. Ibid., pp. 330-331.

20. Ibid., pp. 331-332; ch. 28, pp. 430-431; ch. 29, p. 441. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate XI, 5, 9, PL 42, 991. In an earlier book of the Sapientiale (III (V), 24, Reilly ed., p. 299), Thomas similarly affirms that the senses are merely the occasion, and not the true cause of our knowledge.

21. Ch. 28, p. 424. Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio III, 11, 32, PL 32, 1287.

22. Ch. 28, p. 424. Cf. Liber De Causis, 10, ed. Bardenhewer, p. 173.

23. Ch. 28, p. 424. Cf. Augustine, De Quantitate Animae I, 20, 34, PL 32, 1055.

24. Ch. 28, pp. 424-425. Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram II, 8, C.S.E.L. 28, pp. 43-44.

25. Ch. 28, pp. 424-425. In keeping with his acceptance of Gabirol's universal hylomorphism (cf. supra, ch. 1, pp. 16-17), according to which the lower corporeal forms are contained in the higher spiritual forms, i.e. in the intelligences and human souls, Thomas of York maintains that corporeal things are exempla of the exemplary forms in the human soul. Accordingly, the forms in man's intellect are prior to the forms in matter. "Si iterum dicamus cum eodem, l. 4, c. 20 quod forma omnis causati est in sua causa, et forma prima omnium est causa omnium causatorum, sicut superius declaratum est, sequitur ex hoc quod forma prima principium est omnis formae. Hinc manifestum

25. (cont'd.)
est quod forma omnis inferior repraesentat formam primam quoquomodo per imitationem secundum quod dicit Avencebrol l. 2, c. 7 et 8: quod inferius exemplum est altioris, c. 11: quod ex aliis veniunt, exempla sunt eorum a quibus veniunt. Hinc formae infusae corporibus exempla sunt formarum spiritualium, imagines et picturae earum, sicut dicit l. 3, c. 18. Inde est quod forma haec inferior participat aliquo modo nomina formae primae convenientia, ut sunt lumen, unitas etc., ... (fol. 96rB). Cf. Treserra, art. cit., p. 36.

26. 'Universal' is one of the names assigned to the species in our intellects that expresses a relationship to things. There are others, as we shall see, viz., 'exemplar', 'art', 'similitude' or 'counterpart', etc. (cf. ch. 29, pp. 442-449).

27. Ch. 29, pp. 445-446.

28. Ibid., p. 446.

29. Loc. cit. Cf. Averroes, In I De Anima, t.c. 8, VI, part II, fol. 4rC.

30. Ch. 29, p. 446. Cf. Aristotle, Categories I, 5; 2b 5.

31. Ch. 29, p. 447.

32. Loc. cit.

33. Ibid., pp. 447-448.

34. Ch. 28, pp. 428-429; ibid., p. 420. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. VI, 4; 1027b29-33. Thomas uses the expressions ens diminutum and ens perfectum to describe the being of the species in the human intellect and the being of the species in things, respectively. On the origin of the notion of ens diminutum, see Armand Maurer, C.S.B., 'Ens diminutum: a Note on its Origin and Meaning', Mediaeval Studies, 12 (1950), pp. 216-222.

35. Ch. 28, pp. 428-429.

36. Ch. 29, p. 448.

37. Loc. cit.; ch. 23, p. 336.

38. Ch. 29, pp. 428, 438, 439-440. Thomas' position resembles that of Grosseteste's. According to Grosseteste, the soul gradually awakens to the intelligibles within it as a result of the successive stimulations provided by our sensations. Cf. R. Grosseteste, In Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum libros, Venice, 1537, Bk. I, ch. 14. Cf. also Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 264-265.

39. Ch. 23, pp. 332-334; ch. 32, pp. 493-494.

40. Ch. 29, p. 444.

41. Ibid., p. 443.

42. Ibid., p. 444.

43. Ch. 25, pp. 365, 379.

44. The abstracted form does not differ essentially from the form in singular things (ch. 23, p. 335). Accordingly, like things themselves, the species in our intellect would be many and created.

45. Ch. 25, pp. 364-365.

46. Ch. 28, p. 425.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Loc. cit., pp. 426-427. According to Thomas, divine illumination provides man not only with the light whereby he forms true judgments, but with the conceptual content of his knowledge as well. In adopting this extreme brand of Augustinianism, Thomas, along with writers like William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon, parts company with Bonaventure, who, under the influence of Aristotle, held that the species of things in our intellects were acquired through sensation and the

49. (cont'd.)
action of the agent intellect. At the same time, in keeping with Augustine, Bonaventure held that the truth of these species was seen only in the light belonging to the soul, and made present through divine illumination (Bonaventure, II Sent., 39, 1, 2, Concl., t. II, p. 903). On Bonaventure's synthesis of Aristotelian empiricism and Augustinian divine illumination, see Gilson, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure, pp. 299-300. On the prevalence in the thirteenth century of the interpretation of Augustine given by William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon, see Gilson, Introduction a l'étude de saint Augustin, p. 121; 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin', Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge, I (1926), p. 68.

50. Ch. 28, p. 427. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, 8; 431b20-23. By this, Aristotle means that the soul is potentially all things. Thomas knows full well that, for Aristotle, the species potentially in the intellect do not possess any being prior to their actualization. Accordingly, there is only a verbal similarity between the statement in Aristotle and the statement as used by Thomas to support his own position.

51. Ch. 29, pp. 433, 437-438.

52. Loc. cit., pp. 438-440. Cf. Augustine, Soliloquiorum II, 12, 22, PL 32, 895.

53. Ch. 29, pp. 438-440, 435, 449.

54. Loc. cit., p. 435.

55. Ch. 28, p. 426.

56. Loc. cit., p. 427. Cf. Avicenna, De Anima I, 1; V, 2; V, 6. Similarly, Henry of Ghent will maintain that without original sin, divine illumination would have always been present to man as it was in the beginning (Henry of Ghent, Summa Theologiae I, 2, fol. 82M). Cf. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 760b. Likewise, William of

56. (cont'd.)
Auvergne held that because of original sin, we cannot rise with ease to know sublime truths, and consequently that we cannot know sensible things as sensible and particular (cf. William of Auvergne, De Universo IIIa IIae, ch. 19, I, 1057a). The use of the theological doctrine of original sin in philosophy by these authors is an instance of the 'theologism' that permeated augustinian thought in the thirteenth century. According to this 'theologism', philosophical principles were deemed inadequate to resolve philosophical problems without recourse to theology. Cf. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, pp. 54-58.

57. Ch. 28, pp. 425-426; ch. 25, p. 366; ch. 32, pp. 486-487. Cf. Augustine, Contra Faustum XX, 7, C.S.E.L. 25, p. 541; De Immortalitate Animae I, 5, 7-8, PL 32, 1025.

58. Ch. 25, pp. 364-365, 369-370; ch. 32, pp. 487-492.

59. Ch. 32, pp. 487-488. Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 12, 33, PL 32, 1259; Epistulae 118, 4, 25, C.S.E.L. 34 (Sec. II, pars II), p. 689.

60. Ch. 32, p. 489. Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 9, 27, PL 32, 1255.

61 Ch. 32, pp. 491, 495.

62. Ch. 32, pp. 489-492.

63. Loc. cit., pp. 491,494-495.

64. Loc. cit., p. 495.

65. Ibid. Cf. Augustine, Epistulae 137, 17, C.S.E.L. 44 (Sec. II, Pars III), p. 112.

66. Ch. 29, pp. 435-437.

67. Ch. 30, pp. 454-458.

68. Loc. cit., pp. 466-467.

69. Loc. cit., p. 463.

70. Loc. cit., pp. 463-464.

71. Loc. cit., pp. 464-467.

72. Loc. cit., p. 467.

73. Loc. cit., pp. 468-469.

74. Loc. cit., pp. 466-467. Using some of the same propositions for examples, Grosseteste arrives at the same conclusion. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate ed. cit., pp. 139-141.

75. Ch. 30, pp. 467-468.

76. Ch. 31, pp. 478-479.

77. Ibid., p. 479. Cf. Augustine, Liber Soliloquiorum II, 19, 33, PL 32, 901-902; De Immortalitate Animae I, 1, 1, PL 32, 1021.

78. Ch. 31, p. 479.

79. Loc. cit., pp. 479-482.

80. Loc. cit., pp. 480-481.

81. Ch. 32, p. 494; ch. 31, p. 483. Earlier (ch. 27, p. 407), Thomas maintains that the (first) created truth is the intellect itself.

82. Ch. 31, pp. 483-484.

83. Loc. cit., p. 484.

84. Loc. cit., pp. 484-485.

85. Ch. 30, pp. 458-459.

86. Ch. 32, pp. 496-506.

87. Loc. cit., p. 503. Cf. Cicero, Tusculanarum Disputationum I, 19, 44.

88. Ch. 32, p. 503. Cf. Aristotle, Meta. I, 1; 980a21.

89. Ch. 32, p. 503.

90. Ibid. Cf. Augustine, Contra Academicos I, 3, 9, Pl 32, 911.

91. Ch. 32, p. 504.

92. Ibid.

93. Loc. cit., pp. 504-505.

94. Loc. cit., p. 505. Cf. Augustine, Contra Mendacium XX, 40, C.S.E.L. 41, p. 525.

95. Ch. 32, p. 505. Cf. St. Paul, I Timothy, vi, 16.

96. Ch. 32, pp. 505-506. Thomas of York does not give a definite reason as to why different people desire different truths in the created order, but instead, suggests the various possible reasons mentioned above. His point is that, regardless of the reason, men do in fact in their present state desire different created truths. Similarly, Duns Scotus does not give a definite reason for man's present state, in which the object of the intellect is material being, but suggests various possibilities. He maintains that, whatever the reason may be, the object of the intellect in man's present state is in fact material being. Cf. Duns Scotus, Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, n. 24; ed. M.F. Garcia, O.F.M. (Quaracchi, 1912 and 1914, 2 vols.), vol. I, pp. 351-352. Cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, J. Vrin (Paris, 1952), pp. 56-65, esp. pp. 62-63.

97. Ch. 32, pp. 505-506, 495-496.

98. Loc. cit., p. 496. Cf. Augustine, Liber Soliloquiorum I, 15, 27, PL 32, 883.

99. Ch. 32, p. 502. Cf. Avicenna, Meta. I, 3A, vol. II, fol. 71rB.

100. On the one hand, Thomas of York's position might be interpreted as similar to that of St. Bonaventure's

100. (cont'd.)
in his Itinerary of the Mind to God and his Reduction of the Arts to Theology. Accordingly, by knowledge and by things man is led back to God whom things and ideas express; but to remain in the contemplation of creatures is to be condemned to error. (With respect to St. Bonaventure, cf. Richard McKeon's introduction to St. Bonaventure, op. cit., vol. II, p. 116). On the other hand, Thomas' position might be compared to Grosseteste's. Grosseteste's search for God in things led to the elucidation of things and inspired the first systematic experimental investigation of things. (With respect to Grosseteste, cf. Richard McKeon's introduction to Robert Grosseteste, op. cit., vol. I, p. 262). Of the two comparisons, the latter would seem to be more accurate. Thomas of York's concentration on the perfections of created being and truth is an indication of a concern more in line with the interests of Grosseteste than with those of Bonaventure.

101. Cf. supra, ch. 1, pp. 16-17.

Notes

Chapter 5

1. De Vera Religione XXXVI, 66, PL 34, 151-152. Cf. Gilson, Introduction a l'etude de saint Augustin, pp. 280-281.

2. De Civitate Dei XII, 15, PL 41, 363-365; De Genesi ad Litteram I, 15, 29, PL 34, 257. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 257-258.

3. Cf. N. Haring, art. cit., pp. 166, 195-196.

4. Cf. N. Haring, art. cit., pp. 170-173, 180.

5. Alan of Lille attributes his quotations from the De Unitate to Boethius. Cf. P. Correns, art. cit., pp. 17, 29, 48.

6. Cf. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 173-174.

7. Cf. supra, ch. 2, pp. 55, 66, 69-70.

8. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 354.

9. Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique, J. Vrin (Paris, 1938), pp. 39-40.

10. Summa philosophiae Roberto Grosseteste ascripta, Tractatus II, 'Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste', pp. 290-296.

11. Loc. cit., p. 294.

12. I Sent., Dist. VIII, Part I, art. 1, quest. 1.

13. De Vera Religione XXXVI, 66, PL 34, 151-152.

14. Cf. supra, ch. 3, pp. 102-103.

15. Cf. supra, ch. 4, notes, no. 49.

16. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 447-448, 759-760.

17. Sharp, op. cit., p. 213 (The brackets in the quotation are mine).

18. Cf. supra, ch. 3, pp. 102-103. Cf. Robert Grosseteste, De Veritate, ed. cit., pp. 139-143.

19. Sharp, op. cit., p. 143.

20. Cf. Sharp, ibid.

21. Cf. supra, ch. 4, notes, no. 49.

22. Cf. Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense l. II, d. 3, q. 4, n. 10-11; Opera Omnia, Garcia ed., t. II, pp. 247-248. Cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p. 459.

23. Cf. Opus Oxoniense l. II, d. 3, q. 7, n. 3; t. II, p. 279. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 398, 460-466.

24. Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, Dist. 3, Pars I, Q. 4, Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, ed. P. Carolo Balic (Vatican City, 1954), vol. III, pp. 133-156.

25. Cf. Duns Scotus, loc. cit., p. 168. Scotus does not, by any means reject divine illumination entirely, as we can see from the following statements: "... igitur dico quod propter verba Augustini oportet concedere quod veritates infallibiles videntur in regulis aeternis; ..." (loc. cit., p. 160); "... potest concedi quod cognoscuntur veritates sincerae in luce aeterna sicut in obiecto remoto cognito, quia lux increata est primum principium entium speculabilium et ultimus finis rerum practicarum: et ideo ab ipso sumuntur principia prima, tam speculabilia quam practica, - et ideo cognitio omnium, tam specualabilium quam practicabilium, per principia sumpta a luce aeterna ut cognita, est perfectior et purior cognitione sumpta per principia in genere proprio." (loc. cit., p. 169).

26. Cf. Duns Scotus, loc. cit., pp. 156-159.

27. Cf. Duns Scotus, loc. cit., pp. 167-168.

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